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The idea that analysis of organisms can proceed by distinguishing organisms from machines
is common to many areas of philosophy. This thesis argues that our search for a philosophy
of organisms should not proceed by defining or relying on a Machine–Organism Distinction
(MOD). We are often able to take biological theories that are thought to characterize organ-
isms, such as theories of organismal autonomy and stability, and apply them to machines. I
argue that we should not provide an analysis of organisms according to an MOD because
there is no distinction available that holds up to scrutiny and evidence. There have been
several major attempts to provide an MOD. I divide these in consecutive chapters according
to the property of organisms offered as an MOD: teleology (Nicholson 2013), autonomy
(Mossio and Moreno 2015), stochasticity (Skillings 2015; Godfrey-Smith 2016) and pro-
cessual stability (Dupré and Nicholson 2018). I address these major attempts to provide
an MOD by showing how each fails to provide an analysis of organisms that distinguishes
them from machines. To do this, I examine a diversity of machines and organisms that serve
as naturalistic counterexamples. Discoveries in molecular biology and ecology, as well as
developments in robotics and biotechnology, show the failure of MODs in contemporary phi-
losophy and biology. Moreover, not only does the MOD consistently fail, but philosophical
arguments that rely upon MODs consistently misrepresent organisms themselves. I conclude
with the idea that we should consider machines not as external to, or distinguished from,
organisms, but as proper objects of biological science.
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Nature and Art, they go their separate ways,
It seems; yet all at once they find each other.
Even I no longer am a foe to either;
Both equally attract me nowadays.
*
Some honest toil’s required; then, phase by phase,
When dilligence and wit have worked together
To tie us fast to Art with their good tether,
Nature again may set our hearts ablaze...




1.1 The Machine–Organism Distinction (MOD)
In this thesis I examine ways that machines have been distinguished from organisms, or, at-
tempts to provide a Machine–Organism Distinction (MOD). Despite the apparent desirability
of an MOD, there is no such distinction that holds up to scrutiny. There are always borderline
cases and blatant violations; for any MOD, none cuts Nature at its joint with Art. I show
repeatedly, across topics in philosophy, that providing an MOD is a common logical device
and rhetorical move. The following two argument structures are common: Because there is
some MOD, some claim or theory T is true; or, Because T is true, there is some MOD. But
there is no empirically adequate MOD; at least, none sufficiently strong to support arguments
of that sort. I argue against each MOD currently on offer, showing how it does not survive
analysis or live up to examples from contemporary biology and engineering.
This thesis is about rejecting distinctions between machines and organisms. To do that, I
raise many examples of similarities between machines and organisms, but it is not merely a
defence of the idea that machines are similar to organisms. Machines are similar to organisms
in some ways, different in others, most of which are obvious enough not to deserve defence.
No known organism is composed entirely of iron, no known machine collects blue buttons to
adorn its nesting site. But these aren’t interesting distinctions because nobody thinks that
being entirely composed or iron of collecting blue buttons are fundamental to our concepts
of machines or organisms. This thesis addresses differences that are thought, often for very
good reasons, to define or characterize organisms and machines. As such, it is a defence of
the idea that machines are similar to organisms in ways thought characteristic of organisms,
or vice versa as the case may be. To argue for this, I supply naturalistic counterexamples,
of type I and II, for each MOD discussed: examining only extant and known cases, for
each MOD, I show (type I) that there is a machine that possesses a property thought to
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characterize organisms, and I show (type II) that there is an organism lacking a property
thought characteristic of organisms.
MODs often arise from earnest attempts to pick out some fundamental and important
feature of organisms by contrast with machines. This is prima facie a good strategy, and a
large part of the work of introducing MODs throughout this thesis is done to show just how
often this happens in the philosophy of science. Consider one example, a detailed examination
of which will appear later (Ch.3). Organisms seem to be peculiarly autonomous things: they
can move on their own, seek out food and shelter and evade capture, they can reproduce their
own kind, etc. So it seems that autonomy must somehow figure as a fundamental, special
or important feature in our analysis of organisms. One prima facie good way to justify that
some property is fundamental or important for a class is to construct a contrast class. So
it seems that justifying the special place of autonomy in our analysis of organisms should
show how it contrasts with the non-autonomy of non-organisms. Here is the point where the
MOD, unhelpfully and wrongly I argue, comes to serve a logical role in debates about our
analysis of organisms. Since machines are non-organisms, presumed members of the contrast
class, they must be non-autonomous. On the basis of a good-faith attempt to understand
organisms, this provides an MOD: organisms are autonomous and this distinguishes them
from machines, which are non-autonomous. However (as I will argue in detail in Ch.3),
machines are not all non-autonomous, nor are organisms all autonomous. Confronted by
cases (type I) of autonomous machines from computer engineering and robotics, and (type
II) of non-autonomous organisms drawn from microbiology and biochemistry, the MOD
based on autonomy fails as a justification for an analysis of organisms that defines them as
fundamentally, specially autonomous.
The MODs addressed in this thesis are drawn from contemporary debates within the
philosophy of science, of biology in particular. They are divided here by topic into MODs
based, respectively, on biological teleology (Ch.2), autonomy (Ch.3), ontology (Ch.4-5) and
evolutionary theory (Ch.6). However, each has historical and conceptual roots deeper within
general philosophy. Sometimes, the authors of MOD themselves trace the antecedents of their
views back to keystone philosophical ideas. For example, the MODs appearing in conceptions
of organizational teleology (Nicholson 2013) and biological autonomy (Moreno and Mossio
2015; Maturana and Varela 1972) trace back to Kant’s ideas about the internal grounding of
purposiveness in his Third Critique. Likewise, contemporary debate surrounding the correct
metaphysics of organisms can be divided into two camps. One, dealing with a cluster of
views termed New-Mechanist philosophy of science (Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel 2011;
Skillings 2015; Godfrey-Smith 2016), traces back to Descartes’ ideas about the dispositions
of animal bodies in his Treaties on Man. Another, alternative, metaphysics of science termed
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Process Ontology (Dupré 2018; 2013; Seibt 2018; Rescher 1996; Dupré and Nicholson 2018)
traces itself much farther back, to the metaphysics of change derived from the fragments of
Heraclitus. I will note these connections to general philosophy as they arise throughout this
thesis. Resolving these background issues on which the MOD currently takes centre-stage is
not what this thesis is about. That said, I hope to convince the sceptical reader that the MOD
is not an isolated issue, not peculiar to contemporary philosophy of biology, but a pernicious
conceptual distinction arising in many different philosophical quarters.
At the end of this thesis, after the work of rooting out MODs is finished, I speculate on
the biological relationship between us and our machines. I argue that it is precisely analogous
to the relationship between non-human animals and their animal-artefacts, and to the relation-
ship between social organisms and their worker castes. I argue that the proper relationship
between machines and organisms is captured by part-whole relationships. Our machines
are, for now at least, parts of us in the same way that spider-webs are parts of spiders, and
worker bees are parts of their queen or their hive. If machines are to be “distinguished”
from organisms at all, it is as parts are distinguished from their wholes. However, even this
part-whole relationship can change, I argue, and is not sufficient to support MODs of the sort
that have been offered previously in the philosophy of biology.
The MOD is an old issue. However, the following section (§ 1.2) argues that it is worth
reconsidering now, given developments in both biology and engineering science. We have
discovered a greater diversity of organisms and their ways of life than were known to early
modern philosophers, and have developed a greater diversity of machines—so much so that
the gaps there once were between them are closing fast. Moreover, I argue that neglect of
the diversity in contemporary machines in particular leads to a philosophical methodology
that is detrimental to our understanding of organisms. In the best case, our philosophy of
the natural world would be supported by a thoroughgoing naturalism that accounted for the
rich diversity of both biological and technological things—and in so doing we would see that
provision of MODs is a misguided way of analysing organisms.
1.2 Contemporary Diversity In Machines and Organisms
Clocks are untimely. They were very sophisticated machines in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Now, by comparison, they are not particularly special. Clocks are not even the most common
machines; cars would be better, or light-bulbs, computers, or microprocessors, if we wanted
an example of a common, familiar machine. Most people today use a microprocessor to
tell the time, not a mechanical clock. So it is remarkable that clocks still appear to be the
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exemplar case of a machine in philosophical discussion of organisms. The reason for this
is surely more genealogical than analogical; clocks are our intellectual inheritance, and not
now particularly apt sources of (dis)analogies with organisms. Throughout this thesis we
will see the claim that organisms should not be understood as machines justified by their
difference with clocks.1 I agree that organisms are not much like clocks, but deny that this
fact has any particularly interesting implications about organisms and machines generally
speaking. To properly understand the MOD today I will need to discuss the relationship
between organisms and clocks, but to appropriately resolve the issue we will need to move
past clockwork. The sorts of machines previously available for comparison to organisms, and
on the basis of which historically significant MODs were justified, are now largely outmoded.
On the one hand, present technologies are far more diverse and sophisticated than the
clockworks imagined by Descartes, Kant and Leibniz. Recently, Riskin’s (2016) Restless
Clock argued that we misunderstand Descartes because we fail to appreciate how much his
(and his contemporaries’) view of machines was “active” and “agential”. However life-like
the marionettes may have been to Descartes, our robotics are more so. Granted, what we find
in biology we often do not find in technology, or find only in simplified imitation. Animals
could fly and flash, count and calculate, balance and burrow, long before we could produce
technologies that approximated these. But that is changing. Machines exist today that can
fly, flash, count, calculate, balance and burrow. Indeed, some machines can speak, care
for the elderly, derive theorems and self-replicate, more or less.2 These new machines will
form one side of the naturalistic examples used to counter MODs throughout the thesis.
Given this Holocene explosion of technologies, it is increasingly dubious what philosophical
work can be done by noting a difference between present machines and organisms.3 An
optimistic induction—which may nonetheless be apocalyptic—is that present differences
between machines and organisms are also likely to be overturned, and so too would any
philosophy founded on these.
On the other hand, discoveries within molecular biology and microbiology have shed
greater light on just how diverse organisms themselves are. Biology is a science that collects
counterexamples. The ancient divisions of macroscopic organisms into two kingdoms were
just as soon amended to three (with the discovery of microbes), as they were expanded to
four (with the distinction between prokaryotes and eukaryotes), then five (adding fungi).
Now molecular phylogenetics has revealed hitherto unknown and still largely unexplored and
unculturable diversity across a massively complex network of life. Some organisms appear
1For example, see Ch.5 Sec.1.
2See Ch.3 Sec.4.2.
3For example, Ch.5 argues that such differences do not speak conclusively in favour of, or against, the new
mechanical philosophy.
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to live autonomously, feeding at the bottom of food chains on raw materials, while others
depend integrally on complex communities and cannot live alone. Some organisms require,
or can accept, high temperatures, fast reactions and chaotic chemical processes, while others
made do with simplified life-cycles, dividing slowly in glacial ice.4 Some organisms seem
to be able to replace any of their parts and live indefinitely provided the resources to do so,
while others heal no wounds, live ephemerally or commit cell-suicide at the earliest signs
of trouble.5 Some survive by tooth and claw, others build elaborate structures and take up
weaving.6
Most organisms are very different from us, most are unlike animals generally. O’Malley
(2014) has pointed out that attempting to understand evolution writ large by (narrowly)
focusing on our favourite macroscopic examples of life – ourselves, rabbits, butterflies etc. –
neglects both the majority of life and its ancient origins, since both are microbial (O’Malley
and Dupré 2017). Likewise, when attempting to understand the relationship between ma-
chines and organisms broadly speaking, focus on these “charismatic megafauna” neglects the
majority of diversity in the latter. Some of these newly discovered and characterized forms of
life form the other side of the naturalistic examples used as counters to the MOD throughout
the thesis.
For example, autonomy is supposed to provide us with an understanding of organisms
and an MOD (Ch.3). Considering animals, with their largely autonomous behaviours and
comparing these to comparatively less autonomous machines – even to walking and talking
robots – autonomy seems to mark a fundamental difference. But any theory of autonomy
will need to contend with discoveries of diversity in autonomous capacities, organisms that
simply cannot survive alone, perhaps because, like we ourselves, they cannot synthesize all
the molecular components they require for survival. You will become ill and eventually die
without a source of vitamin C; your cat will not, since it can make its own vitamin C on a diet
of meat alone. Once such diversity in organisms is included in the comparison, autonomy
fails as an MOD.
Nonetheless, this is not to say that all machine-talk in biology is appropriate. The rise
of molecular biology and its reliance on machine-metaphors—DNA "coding", molecular
"machines", the "programs" of development and gene regulation, the circadian "clock",
molecular "motors" etc.—has lead to justifiable scepticism that a machine-based view of
organisms is the right one. A torrent of philosophy of science has reacted to what it sees
as an excessive or wrongheaded Cartesianism, which sees organisms as machines, and has
4Ch.4-5, see Mariscal, C., & Brunet, T. D. P. (2020). What Are Extremophiles?. Social and Conceptual




marshalled current biology against this equivocation.7 Within the philosophy of biology at
least, this current has been largely unopposed8 and roundly supported by scientists themselves
(Moore 2012, Woese 2004).
My aim in this dissertation is to provide a countercurrent, not as a defender of Descartes
or machine-talk in contemporary molecular biology – which do not need defending anyway
– but as a critic of the critics. To say that molecules or organisms should not be described
as machines is one thing, but to say that this normative claim is justified on the basis of a
fundamental MOD is another. This thesis collects together countless cases where an initially
sensible claim – sometimes even a trivial one – that fits well with contemporary biology and
engineering science, has been aggrandised into an MOD that does not. In these moments it
may be little more than custodial work on the factory and laboratory floor, but it is necessary
work if we are to avoid the philosophical pitfalls of neglecting contemporary diversity.
This dissertation is also a plea for naturalism about machines to go hand-in-hand with
naturalism about organisms. Unfortunately, this is not always so, and to the detriment of
our analysis of organisms. We are often good, at least well-intentioned naturalists about
organisms, but fail to appreciate “late twentieth century machines” (Haraway’s (1991)
phrase) as newly discovered natural phenomena. My hope in noting this early on is that
recognizing this can balance out whatever part of the arguments for and against MODs that
seem to depend on issues of the appropriate philosophical methodology. Not all parties
are innocent of errors; the primary error encountered and criticized in this dissertation is
methodological. In attempting (with rigour, clear intellectual conscience and good-will) to
provide a naturalistically grounded understanding of organisms, philosophers often rely on
a concept of machines that is derived, not from naturalistic investigation into machines as
phenomena, as parts of nature, but from pre-theoretic and pre-19th century intuitions about
machines. Though in different terms and in the philosophy of technology proper, Frederick
Rapp makes this point of caution well.
The first characteristic of technology is that it is always a factually given phe-
nomenon. Its actual features cannot be deductively derived from a contemplation
of its logical, timeless essence while disregarding concrete empirical evidence.
To avoid arbitrary and nonconvincing speculations, philosophical analysis and
reflection must be given based on contingent facts.
—Friederich Rapp (1981)
7As we will see, the view that organisms are literally machines is neither particularly Cartesian (see Riskin
2016), nor sufficiently prominent to be pernicious within the science of biology. It is, however, a common
feature of Western unscientific folk biology.
8cf. the conciliatory views of, e.g., Lewens (2013) or Hacking (1998)
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Neither Rapp nor I note this for its profundity. I note it because contemplation of logical,
timeless essence while disregarding concrete empirical evidence about machines leads to
mistakes about organisms. Worse, the concept of machine that is supposed to help us under-
stand organisms through critical argument is usually a very simple one. The bare-bones of
Newtonian intuitions about how, e.g., a clock must work is a recurring theme in disanalogies
with the physiology of multicellular organisms. One factually given phenomenon (organ-
isms) are being understood by distinction with an intuitive conception (of machines). Indeed,
sometimes arguments turn out not to hold up even to empiricism about clocks,9 since their
assumptions about how clocks must work do not match how clocks happen to work. If you
want to argue naturalistically about how organisms should be understood (in some way or
other) because they are different (in some way or other) from machines, then some prior
understanding of those machines is necessary; advocates of an MOD also need to go out and
observe machines. This is perhaps the more ironic point: it is because philosophers providing
or relying on an MOD have aimed at a naturalistic analysis of organisms without having
a naturalistic analysis of machines that they fail, overall, to have a naturalistic analysis of
organisms. Rapp’s caution has not been heeded.
The MOD encourages thoroughgoing naturalistic philosophers to temporarily neglect
the staples of their philosophical methodology. Throughout this thesis I encounter cases
where some traditional philosophical topic10 rests on an MOD established on the basis of
intuitions about a small sample of machines. In part, this is surely due to the seemingly
excusable fact that this thesis addresses philosophies of biology, which are not in general
also intended as philosophies of technology. If the consequences of the MOD were only a
little unfairness or parochialism towards machines, this might be excusable. But this thesis
shows that it is not so: the failure to treat machines naturalistically does continual disservice
to our understanding of organisms.
1.3 Machines in the Philosophy of Organisms
I have explained what an MOD is, where they come from, and why we should care about them
strictly for their role in our analysis of organisms. There are, nonetheless, independent reasons
to be concerned with the MOD. There are two elephants in the room: (1) the emergence of
9See Ch.5, Fig.5.3.
10For example, the neo-Kantianism of Nicholson (2013) in Ch.2, and that of Maturana and Varela (1980)
and Moreno and Mossio (2015) in Ch.3, the naturalistic metaphysics of Dupre and collaborators (Dupre and
Nicholson 2018) in Ch.4 and the philosophy of mind of Godfrey-Smith (2016) in Ch.5. All are thoroughgoing
naturalistic philosophers, yet all rely in part on characterizations of machines that are at best intuitive.
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automata, organism-like, human-like, machines, and (2) the emergence of organism-machine
hybrids, prostheses or cyborgs in the extreme.11 These cases have fascinated the public
and philosophers for centuries, and seem to present independent grounds for rejecting the
MOD if only they exist. Reasoning about these cases is simple, powerful and has been
influential: there are intermediate cases, such as organism-machines, machine-organisms,
mechanical-persons, or organisms on the outside with machines on the inside, therefore there
is no sharp difference between machines and organisms—organisms are not special, not
fundamentally different from machines. Haraway perhaps put it best,
Late twentieth century machines have made thoroughly ambiguous the differ-
ence between natural and artificial... and many other distinctions that apply to
organisms and machines.
—Haraway (1991) p.120
I agree with the conclusion and take the premises to be true, but see the reasoning as invalid.
It is invalid because the MOD is prior to our analysis of these elephants in the room, a
fortiori, since having some MOD in hand is required before we can make sense of claims
about machine-organism intermediates.
Before embarking on a critique of a variety of different MODs (Ch.2-7), I want to discuss
these points and bring them out into the open, showing how the MOD affects them rather
than assuming it is the other way around. I also want to discuss them as issues arising firstly
within our philosophy of organisms—for all their other charms, scientific plausibility and
postmodern metaphorical uses—automata and cyborgs are a way of challenging our concep-
tion of organisms, ourselves in particular. The following sections discuss the connection of
automata and cyborgs with the MOD (§ 1.3.1-2). Though these examples are more uncertain
and hypothetical at present, they are continually connected with the MOD and will merit
occasional discussion throughout the thesis. The final section of this introduction (§ 1.4) will
cover in outline the content of each forthcoming chapter, what MODs appear therein, and
which authors’ views are addressed.
11There are more elephants, cases where the MOD is directly relevant, which I do not extensively discuss.
For example, there is the issue of the ethics of treatment of machines, e.g. their capacity for organism-like
mental states and thus merit for moral consideration; and there are the ethical and ontological issues associated
with artificial personhood generally, perhaps most contentiously in the case of artificial sex-workers. Other
interesting topics needed to be avoided. I set aside ethical issues, and issues of the definition of “life” generally
speaking. I also set aside MODs that pertain specifically to the relationship between AI and brains. I find this
focus on a single organ to the exclusion of the rest unhelpful to the broader aim of this thesis, however, my
work on this topic has been published elsewhere (Brunet and Halina 2020).
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1.3.1 1633, Automata and All That
It is not difficult to weave machines into a history of ideas, connecting the origins of modern
philosophy, evolutionary biology, and contemporary catastrophic predictions about the human
species—they all engaged with automata in some way. Quoting selectively, one can make
Descartes, Darwin and Samuel Butler sound like the same person at different times. This
section begins with these three threads of inquiry into automata, then shows how our grasp
of them depends on MODs.
Descartes is a good place to mark an origin of early modern European philosophy.
Descartes’ philosophy deployed supportive analogies between organisms and machines. His
mind-body dualism, and therefore his distinction between humans and other animals, rested
on a conception of the body by analogy with machines like pulleys and waterworks, machines
of his day, and on the assumption that God could construct machines with infinitely more
sophistication than those available to him.
We see clocks, artificial fountains, mills, and other similar machines which, even
though they are only made by men, have the power to move of their own accord
in various ways. And, as I am supposing that this machine [which imitates the
movements of humans] is made by God, I think you will agree that it is capable
of a greater variety of movements than I could possibly imagine in it, and that
it exhibits a greater ingenuity than I could possibly ascribe to it.—Descartes
(1633)
Switching from artificial beings to natural ones, Darwin employs remarkably similar rea-
soning to Descartes, however, Darwin’s God was Nature. Darwin’s evolution by natural
selection rested on a conception of artificial selection of organisms like pigeons and orchids,
topics current in his day, and on the idea that Nature, being far more powerful and of longer
standing than man, was capable of much more sophisticated selection than those available to
him.
Slow though the process of selection may be, if feeble man can do much by
his powers of artificial selection, I can see no limit to the amount of change,
to the beauty and infinite complexity of the coadaptations between all organic
beings...which may be effected in the long course of time by nature’s power of
selection.—Darwin (1859)
Both Darwin and Descartes make their case by extrapolating from familiar cases known to
affect or change some complex entity (organisms or machines), by referring to a higher power
or process that ought to be capable of much more than present in the familiar cases. Both
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of these lines of reasoning are brought together, in unholy matrimony, in later predictions
about the catastrophic effects of machines, for instance, in Samuel Butler’s Darwin Among
the Machines.
Butler evidently understood Descartes and Darwin both. For Butler, “subservience to the
use of man has played that part among machines which natural selection has performed in
the animal and vegetable kingdoms” [ibid]. Butler worries about the future of the human
species, and applies a power similar to that of Darwin’s Nature, not God, to the construction
of sophisticated machines (Ch.6), to the “development of mechanical life,” and ultimately to
its dominance over us.
Day by day, however, the machines are gaining ground upon us; day by day we
are becoming more subservient to them; more men are daily bound down as
slaves to tend them, more men are daily devoting the energies of their whole
lives to the development of mechanical life. The upshot is simply a question of
time, but that the time will come when the machines will hold the real supremacy
over the world and its inhabitants is what no person of a truly philosophic mind
can for a moment question.—Butler (1863)
On this last point, plenty a “truly philosophic mind” has questioned the idea that machines
will develop so significantly, and these minds remain split as to whether it is a serious
existential risk or an idle fantasy. Either way, we can see that the very same sorts of
hypotheses, about the capacities of autonomous machines, appear in philosophy as early as
Descartes and, as much as with Butler in 1863 as today. Moreover, automata are a topic of
philosophy even when the apocalyptic ludditism is left out. Even if machines never overcome
humanity or start a war, they are challenges to our conception of ourselves and have been
since Descartes. Even if we are not worried for our lives, we remain concerned with our
identities. Descartes’ spiritual answer—that humans are different for their possession of
souls—is no longer satisfying to a secular audience. Autonomous mechanical bodies are now
possible, and they are possible on grounds more secure than the omnipotence of God or the
near omnipotence of Nature. They are possible because they are more or less actual. Butler
would be horrified.
Whatever way we lean on the possibility of fully-fledge machine automata, our analysis
of them as a special sort of entity requires we make some distinctions between machines
and organisms. It presumes some MOD. Surely, when Butler claims that “mechanical life”
or “machines” will hold supremacy over the world, he does not intend a conception of
machines that includes animal life. On this trivialization of Descartes, machines already
hold supremacy over the world, so it is not a “question of time” before this happens. To
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make sense of the claim as intended, we have to provide an MOD.12 In Ch.5 I address
Descartes’ mechanical philosophy and subsequently developed, new-mechanistic, accounts
of organisms, to show they likewise fail to provide an account of machines or an MOD.
To see how different MODs affect our analysis differently, we can consider another
philosopher at the origin of the European tradition. Kant provided an MOD (Ch.2-3) that
has received continued attention, accords well with common sense, and is prototypical of
MODs generally. For Kant, machines are defined by the purposes they serve for organisms,
while organisms have purposes, ends, only for themselves. At first this distinction seems
to work very well. Hammers drive nails, clocks tell time, but organisms do what they do
only to survive and reproduce their type. Birds are not for the songs we value from them,
nor are beavers for making hats—they are for themselves, if anything. Moreover, this sort
of distinction makes posing the kinds of questions we have about machines and organisms
possible. “Can machines hold supremacy over the world?” becomes, on a Kantian reading:
“Can the things that are useful for us come to hold supremacy over the world?” To which we
might respond, in a wide reading of ‘can’, that it is conceptually possible for things that are
useful for us now to later be in control of us.
Forget whether Kant is right and consider the role that the conception of machines in an
MOD plays in interpreting Butler’s philosophical question. If Kant’s MOD is right, then
Butler’s idea seems to require that machines can become organisms provided they come to
have ends in themselves. Or, at least, Kant’s MOD entails that we can become the “machines
of machines”, provided we are reduced to our usefulness for them. Turning the idea that
humans are “ends in themselves” on its head in this way also occurred to Nietzsche, shortly
after Butler.
It is with men as with charcoal-kilns in the forest... Mankind mercilessly employs
every individual as material for heating its great machines: but what then is the
purpose of the machines, if all individuals (that is to say mankind) are of no other
use than as material for maintaining them? Machines that are ends in themselves
– is that the umana commedia [human comedy]? —Nietzsche (1987) 585
Moreover, Butler’s explanation of how this comes about by “subservience to the use of man”
suggests that it is the very thing that makes machines what they are, “usefullness” on Kant’s
account, that puts them in the position to become organisms. Our concern about the potential
existence of automata of the sort imagined by Butler must be founded on some MOD, and
12There are of course ways around having some analytically satisfying MOD and making similar claims.
Someone wishing to advocate for a view like Butler’s, might simply claim, for instance, that “entities made
from gears and wheels will some day hold supremacy over the earth”. However, substituting definitions for lists
of current components is a very limited way of making sense of claims about machines.
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if this MOD is like that provided by Kant, we are left asking whether machines can come
to have certain sorts of purposes. This idea is addressed more fully in Ch.2. For now, note
that a seemingly innocuous MOD, based in Kantian teleology, turns our line of inquiry away
from future contingencies and towards our conception of what machines and organisms are
at present.
1.3.2 1960, Cyborgs and All That
In 1960, Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline wrote Cyborgs and Space, a speculative article for
Astronautics detailing their view of how space-flight could be assisted by bodily modification
of astronauts. Its influence – on science, philosophy and society – can hardly be doubted.13
Many have found some challenge to the status quo in the cyborg concept. Clynes and Kline
themselves evidently saw the possibility of modification of human beings as a vindication of
the cybernetics14 of the day; Donna Haraway’s (1991) Cyborg Manifesto15 used the concept
as a metaphor for the intersectionality and changeability of race and gender identity; Ian
Hacking (1998) saw a way to retroactively justify Canguilhem’s (1947)16 philosophy of
machines and organisms, offered more than a decade earlier than Clynes and Kline (1960);
Steve Mann and Hal Niedzviecki (2001) see the cyborgs of the present as changing human
identity and potential; and Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) see cyborgs as changing,
by extending, our minds—and all these presumably more so in a cyberpunk future. For the
present connection, its importance lies in the fact that it spawned another current within
philosophy that opposes MODs.
Cyborg concepts and actual cybernetic technologies are an inspiration for this thesis and
will reappear occasionally therein. Cybernetics provides an interesting class of counterex-
amples17 to some MODs, but it is not necessary for arguing against MODs. Microbiology
also provides many interesting counterexamples,18 and so does ornithology,19 commu-
nity ecology, robotics and computer science.20 Cybernetic hearts challenge the way we
think of autonomous human development and organs as human parts, but the existence of
chemolithoautotrophic bacteria in specialized organs of deep-sea worms has the same effect,
13See § 6.3
14Surviving today as “systems theory”.
15Which was still being offered for free, tucked inside alternative magazines, in the 1990’s when the author
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when considering (potentially non-human) organisms generally speaking.21 As machine-
organism chimeras, cyborgs are a lovely challenge for any MOD to prove its mettle. However,
the MOD would fail even if we left cyborgs mostly out of the picture, focusing instead on
the status quo of engineering and biology. The MODs under consideration here often fail
simply because they fail to provide an analysis of organisms that holds up to discoveries
within biology.22
Moreover, cyborgs are also not as powerful a counter-example to the MOD as its advocates
sometimes suppose. The standard line that cyborgs threaten the distinction between machines
and organisms can be turned around: if the MOD fails, then the very concept of the cyborg is
threatened. The more difficult it becomes, according to our preferred theories, to establish
an MOD, the more dubious any special category of “cyborg” becomes. Our futurism about
cyborgs could just as well have gone another way, if we begin at the rejection of the MOD.
Instead of the hypothesis that the future will hold more and more cyborgs of increasing
sophistication—further “cybernetic” implants and “mechanical” appendages—we might
imagine that the steady progression of discoveries in biology and engineering will turn the
tables on our imagination. “Cyborgs” will increasingly become difficult to imagine, unclearly
defined entities, somewhere in the middle-ground on a multi-factorial spectrum of diversity.
This is so, I will argue, because organisms and machines are already in that position.23
Nonetheless, something interesting comes from bringing cyborgs in. In the final substan-
tial chapter of this thesis I examine the idea that something common to the cyborg literature
and, oddly, the literature on the evolutionary genetics of animal artefacts, furnishes us with
a plausible relationship between machines and organisms. Both the iconoclastic advocates
of cyborg ideas and the ultra-conservative accounts of organismal phenotypes have come to
share the idea that animal artefacts can be seen as extensions of organisms.24
Altering man’s bodily functions to meet the requirements of extraterrestrial envi-
ronments would be more logical than providing an earthly environment for him
in space... Artifact-organism systems which would extend man’s unconscious,
self-regulatory controls are one possibility...
The Cyborg deliberately incorporates exogenous components extending the
self-regulatory control function of the organism in order to adapt it to new envi-
ronments.
—Clynes and Kline (1960), emphasis added
21§ 3.4.1
22This excludes Ch.4-5, where I argue that both new mechanism and processualism provide an analysis of
both machines and organisms, despite the contrary – MOD based – views of their defenders and critics.
23See the Conclusion, Ch.8.
24Ch.7
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A bird extends its phenotype, its body, by building a nest, in much the same way that an
hypothetical astronaut extends her phenotype, her body, by the building of a ship, or the
implantation of devices for physiological control. Perhaps a robin is a cyborg, if nests are
machines. Regardless, though this does not provide a distinction between machines and
organisms as a whole, I argue (§ Ch.7) that the notion of extension does provide a relationship
between machines and organisms that does not suffer the same pitfalls as the MODs.
1.4 Chapter Overview
We can now look at the content of the MODs later examined. The following list clusters
the ideas addressed in this thesis into six kinds, corresponding to the chapters in which they
appear and restated more simply for the time being, followed by the authors who most clearly
advocate or rely upon them.
1. Teleology: organisms enjoy a particular kind of teleology that machines do not;
organisms have their teleology “intrinsically” while machines have their teleology
“extrinsically”; organisms work or are of use only to themselves, machines work or are
of use only to organisms; in organisms the parts are for one another, in machines the
parts are for some external purpose. This idea appears recently in Nicholson (2013).
This is examined in Ch.2-3.
2. Autonomy: organisms are defined by their autonomous organization; machines are
non-autonomous because their organization differs significantly from that of organ-
isms; moreover, the teleological differences between organisms and machines are a
consequence of their fundamentally different organizations. This idea originates in
Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgement, from which it is adapted in Maturana
and Varela’s (1980) Autopoiesis, and more recently in Mossio and Moreno’s (2015)
Biological Autonomy. This is examined in Ch.3.
3. Processualism: organisms are correctly understood as processes, whereas machines
are best seen as mechanisms; organisms have a number of features as processes
that machines lack, e.g., organisms are unstable but stabilized whereas machines are
intrinsically stable, or organisms are subject to processes of turnover at all hierarchical
levels, while machines are typically static structures. This idea arguably has ancient
origins (in the West) in Heraclitus, but has been defended by a number of authors in
the 20th and 21st century (Rescher 1996; Seibt 1997; 2004; 2009, Dupré 2013; 2018,
Dupré and Nicholson 2018). This is examined in Ch.4.
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4. New Mechanism: The mechanical philosophy incorrectly reduced organisms to ma-
chines or equated organisms with machines; organisms are fundamentally stochastic
while mechanisms are not; organisms cannot properly be understood within the philos-
ophy of mechanism, new or neo-mechanism, or the "mechanical philosophy", while
machines can be understood therein; or, on the other hand, only new mechanism can
correctly account for the multiple realizability of organisms, while a machine-based
ontology cannot. Mechanism arguably begins with the mechanical philosophy of
Descartes, although receives particular attention as source or target of MODs at the
rise and contention surrounding organicism and neo-mechanism (Needham 1928) and
new-mechanism (Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamson 2005; Dupré 2013;
Skillings 2015; Godfrey-Smith 2016). This is examined in Ch.5.
5. Evolution: Organisms evolve and machines do not; or, organisms evolve in some
specific and rich sense while machines evolve only in a general and abstract (uninfor-
mative) sense. The applicability of natural selection to change in technologies begins
in Butler (1863), and the evolution of (human and non-human) artefacts generally has
been contested in cultural evolution and its philosophy. I largely deal with the views of
Lewontin (1970), Sterelny et al. (1996) and Lewens (2015). A different conception
of evolution appears in Woese and Fox (1977) and Woese (1998), which I argue is
applicable to technological evolution. This is examined in Ch.6.
6. Extension: Machines as human animal-artefacts differ from non-human animal-
artefacts in some fundamental way; machines are not extended phenotypes while
non-human animal artefacts are. This idea arguably begins as an MOD in Dawkins’
(1982) Extended Phenotype, where he argues that some human artefacts, e.g. buildings,
are not extended phenotypes of humans. On the other hand, before Dawkins, Camguil-
hem’s (1952) notion of extended organs and Clynes and Kline’s (1960) notion of the
cyborg as exogenously extended provide earlier examples where extension was treated
not as an MOD but as a relationship between machines and organisms. The idea has
been taken up more recently by Haraway (1991), Hacking (1998), Clark and Chalmers
(1998) and R. Kline (2009). I argue that, in our classification of biological things on
the basis of part-whole relationships, we should adopt a broad view of what counts as
an extended part, including both human artefacts, non-human animal artefacts, and
social organisms. This is examined in Ch.7, the final substantial chapter.
Tactics differ between chapters but the aim is much the same in each: to argue against
prominent incarnations of the MOD. The chapters cluster in pairs (2-3, 4-5, 6-7) based
on their philosophical themes. In the first two substantial chapters (2-3), autonomy and
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teleology have been offered explicitly as MODs, so my tactic is analytic refutation by way of
naturalistic counter-examples. The teleological properties raised in Ch.2 are thought to be
founded in an important way on deeper issues about the internal make-up of living things,
specifically, their autonomous organization. So Ch.2 leads to the neo-Kantian accounts of
organisms discussed in Ch.3.
In the next two, (Ch.4-5) process and mechanism-based ontologies have been offered
as metaphysical theories, bearing directly on biology and entailing or deploying MODs
as justification for their view of organisms. There my tactic is synthetic and conciliatory,
showing that the use of MODs in both process ontology and neo-mechanism is misplaced.
Neither requires nor benefits from the attempt to distinguish organisms from machines, and
both are better off leaving the MOD out of their view. Since mechanism and processual-
ism are currently seen as competing metaphysical accounts of biology, they are discussed
sequentially.
In the final two chapters (Ch.6-7) I offer parallel positive theses about the inclusion of
machines into biological theory; arguing that theories which include machines as objects
of evolutionary and physiological study have not gone far enough to that end. Ch.6 argues
that changes in machines can be genuinely evolutionary, according to three respectable
accounts of evolutionary change. Moreover, that since a portion of the changes in machines
are genuinely evolutionary, a complete understanding of machines requires an evolutionary
understanding of them. Finally, and perhaps most speculatively, Ch.7 argues that machines
can be included into biology as extended parts of organisms, generalizing the Dawkinsian
theory of the extended phenotype to provide a foundation for claims that machines are
extended parts of us.
Many have recently argued that we should not understand organisms by their relationship
(or similarity) to machines (e.g. Nicholson 2013; Skillings 2015; Godfrey-Smith 2016).
In arguing against these MODs, I agree with this position in broad strokes: we should not
understand organisms by their relationship of difference to machines, since our best accounts
of these differences turn out to fail and thus furnish little understanding. Given machines and
organisms are plainly similar in a number of respect and different in others. What I argue
is not that organisms are machines, or that old machine-based analogies about organisms
provide special understanding of them, but that none of the proffered differences amounts to
a fundamental distinction. This is reviewed in the concluding Ch.8.
In this introduction I hope to have enticed the reader in two ways: the MOD is pervasive
and, whether we are interested more in providing an account of organisms or more in
speculative futurism, the MOD has serious consequences. The next chapter begins a two-
chapter treatment of MODs based on an organizational account of teleology.
Chapter 2
Teleology and The Machine Organism
Distinction
Abstract: In this chapter I argue against the view offered by Nicholson (2013) that the
difference between intrinsic and extrinsic forms of teleology is the MOD. According to
Nicholson, organisms are characterized by having intrinsic teleology—their ends, telos, or
purposes are directed towards themselves—while machines are only extrinsically teleological.
This is an overly idealized picture of the MOD. There are machines that operate towards
ends or purposes that benefit nothing but that machine and there are organisms that (through
external control or symbiotic evolution) have come to have purposes directed towards others.
2.1 Introduction
Many hold the view that machines are defined by their relations to external, human intentions,
while organisms have purposes or teleological properties in some rich internal sense. On this
view machines only have a teleology by proxy, through their relationships to us. Nicholson
(2013) offers the best representation of this view, arguing that it is the difference between the
‘intrinsic teleology’ of organisms and the ‘extrinsic teleology’ of machines that fundamentally
distinguishes them. I here argue that this binary division of machines and organisms into
intrinsically and extrinsically teleological is incorrect. The teleological profile of entities
should instead be seen as a spectrum (Fig.2.1).
In section 2 I reiterate Lewens’s (2013) argument that on an etiological account of
what it takes to be an artifact or organism there are many examples of entities that are
both—ourselves included. In section 3 I offer an exposition of the alternative view, presented
by Nicholson (2013), that it is not etiological, but teleological differences that distinguish
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machines and organisms. Sections 4-5 argue against this view: first through examples of
extrinsically teleological organisms and second through intrinsically teleological machines.
In the last section (6) I present a view of both biological and technological things where
entities can have a mixture of both intrinsic and extrinsic purposes.
2.2 Etiology
The best account of teleology is etiology. This is a contentious claim; one with a history
too long to address here.1 Philosophers of biology predominantly accept that theological
explanations of teleology are wrong and that the correct account of biological teleology
must somehow involve reference to evolutionary history, but disagree on precisely how
(Godfrey-Smith 1993). For my purposes, De Sousa’s (2017) characterization of the status
quo will suffice,
[T]he concept of objective teleology—independent of human interests and pur-
poses—does not require intelligent design after all. Natural functions can be
identified with those effects of an organ’s activity that resulted in its being se-
lected for, and hence explain its present existence. . . the aetiological explication
of natural function marks one of the few genuine advances in philosophy in the
past hundred years. —De Sousa (2017) p.147
This etiological or Selected Effect (SE) account of function and teleology has not gone
without its critics and is not without counter-examples of non-selected yet intuitively func-
tional things. Nonetheless, to my mind it is our best account of biological teleology. I will
here consider an etiological account of teleology in machines and organisms first, before
arguing against an alternative to it, offered by Nicholson (2013) and founded in part on the
organization account of functions (see Moreno and Mossio 2015; Ch.3).
An etiological account can also be given for the functions, teleology, of machines or
artifacts—even when human interests and purposes are involved (Lewens 2006). We can
always ask, of an artifact or its parts: What past effect of this thing explains its present
existence? When ordinary artifacts are in question, it may not be the same sort of explanation
1However, it is worth noting that the idea that evolutionary etiology implies the absence of purposes in nature
goes back much farther than is typically said in quick summaries of the history. It is often said that the etiological
approach dates back to Wright (1973) or Millikan (1984) but, surprisingly, Nietzsche (1881) in Daybreak
already sees evolutionary explanations as an alternative to natural purposes, “The impartial investigator who
pursues the history of the eye and form it has assumed among the lowest creatures, who demonstrates the whole
step-by-step evolution of the eye, must arrive at the great conclusion that vision was not the intention behind
the creation of the eye. . . and ‘purposes’ fall away like scales from the eyes!” (Book.II.122).
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we obtain from natural selection, but what Wright (1973) calls “consequence-selection”, a
form of conscious choice or deliberation about intended effects. For example, a knife had the
effect of cutting when pressed against certain surfaces, it is the intention of some humans to
select tools that have the effect or consequence of cutting, so the effect of cutting explains
the present existence of some knives. Thus cutting is a function, or the purpose, of some
knives in an etiological sense based on consequence selection.
This does not entail that the intended effect is the same as the actual effect that in fact
explains the present existence of a thing—our intentions can mislead as to why a given
artefact exists. Weapons of self-defence are intended to have the effect of bringing about
physical safety, but often do not have that effect, or have precisely the opposite effect. Here
the actual past effect that explains the present existence of the weapon is perhaps that of
producing the belief that it will bring about physical safety, for example. In section 5 I
will discuss ascribing purposes to unintended effects in machines. For now, note that the
separation of intended and actual effects does not change the overall form of an etiological
explanation deploying consequence-selection. As Wright (1973) notes,
Both natural and conscious functions are functions by virtue of their being the
reason the thing with the function “is there”. . . The differentiating feature is
merely the sort of reason appropriate in either case: specifically, whether a
conscious agent was involved or no. . . it can be looked upon as a matter of mere
etiological detail, nothing in the essential form of the explanation. –[ibid]
It is not the mere availability of an etiological account of teleology that can distinguish
machines and organisms but, if anything, a distinction between sorts of teleological or
etiological accounts. One way of distinguishing between sorts of etiology is by what sort of
process is referred to in the explanation for present existence. Some explanations refer to
processes of natural selection, some to processes of reasoning or intention. Let us call these
natural etiologies and rational etiologies respectively. Rational processes are “natural” in
the sense that everything is, but the distinction is helpful here. Now, we might distinguish
machines from organisms as follows: if an entity is an organism then its functions are
explained by a natural etiology, and otherwise for machines.
This distinction fails for many machines and organisms. It might work well enough to
distinguish medium-size-dry-good machines and organisms, but there are others. There are
machines and organisms for which an historical explanation of the processes resulting in
their current existence do not neatly separate into the natural and rational. We can look to
some of the more current examples from the special sciences of biology and technology.
A genetically modified mouse is an entity that has both a natural etiology (explaining its
evolution qua mouse) and a rational etiology (explaining its transformation qua experimental
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research animal). Likewise, an evolved microchip—the product of an artificial selection of
randomly generated microchips (see Thompson 2002; Lewens 2013)—has both a natural
etiology (explaining its evolution qua chip lineage) and a rational etiology (explaining its
copying and construction qua experimental machine). In such cases one and the same part
may owe its existence to both a history of intention and natural history.
Furthermore, we needn’t rely on 21st century examples. If we see artefacts as the products
of rational etiology, then we already eroded that distinction prior to the industrial revolution.
As Lewens (2013) notes about worries that synthetic biology “threatens to blur the distinction
between organisms and artefacts”,
A dairy cow is an organism if anything is. And yet, dairy cows have clearly been
modified by human breeders with the purpose of increased milk yield in mind.
Dairy cows are organisms that have been purposefully manipulated: they are
organisms and artefacts at the same time. Artificial organisms have been around
for as long as intentional agents have practiced artificial selection.—Lewens
(2013) p.642
Cows had evolved by natural selection without rational intervention for some time before
humans began to breed them. They are organisms. But dairy cows have been artificially
selected, humans have reasoned about which pairs to intentionally breed to achieve, for
instance, maximum milk production or longevity. So they are artifacts. Likewise, we can
look to domesticated plants, artificially selected and engineered to suit our desires, as Pollan
(2001) does with potatoes, marijuana, tulips and apples. All of these organisms are artefacts;
each has a partly rational etiology owing to artificial consequence selection.
We are also partially artificial in this sense. Humans perform a sort of “artificial selection”
on themselves when intention and reasoning about the production of the next generation is
involved. Cases vary from the morally reprehensible to the everyday—genocide, infanticide,
forced sterilization, eugenics, trait-specific mate choices, sexual preferences and any case
where reasoning about the biological characteristics of kin precedes mating. If sexual
selection in humans involves any reasoning or intergenerational intentions whatever, then we
are artefacts insofar as we have sexually selected traits. We are products of our own intentions
and therefore a perpetually constructed causa sui. Although the distinction between natural
and rational etiology is defined in part in terms of human intentions, while sexual selection
is not, in the human case sexual selection implies rational etiology. On the view that the
natural-rational distinction is the organism-artefact distinction, we are artefacts.
If there is a function or purpose based distinction between machines and organisms—
between artifacts and us—it is not captured by the applicability of the distinction between
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rational and natural etiology. But recently there has been a revival of interest into non-
etiological accounts of teleology (see Walsh 2015; reviewed in Dupré 2017; see also Mossio
et al. 2009; Ch.3), with the added hope that the distinction between machines and organisms
can be better cast in another way (Nicholson 2013). The remainder of this chapter describes
and argues against the view, offered in Nicholson (2013), that the MOD can be defined by
intrinsic and extrinsic teleology.
2.3 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Teleology
Instead of rational and natural etiology, Nicholson (2013) offers a view of the distinction
between machines and organisms that depends on the difference between the sorts of teleology
applicable to each. My aim in the remainder of this chapter is to explain the teleological
account and show how it likewise fails as an MOD. Like Lewens (2013), Nicholson (2013)
is also concerned with the implications of synthetic biology for the distinction between
organisms and machines,
. . . If synthetic biologists eventually succeeded in engineering from scratch a
living system—that is, a system that was self-organizing, self-producing (upon
its initial creation), self-maintaining, and self-regenerating—then such a system,
despite its artificial origin, would still have the capacity, by virtue of its internal
organizational dynamics, to act on its own behalf in accordance with its own
norms.—Nicholson (2013) p.674
He takes this as a reductio of the idea that machines are distinguished by an “artificial
origin [etiology]”. If a totally artificially originating synthetic living system were to be
made—as in the above definition—it would be an organism on his account, not a machine.
He instead offers a view based on varieties of teleology, which he believe is “far better suited
than the distinction between natural and artificial origin” ([ibid], p.674). The essence and
perhaps the best representation of this view is as follows.
Organisms are intrinsically purposive, whereas machines are extrinsically purpo-
sive. A machine is extrinsically purposive in the sense that it operates towards an
end that is external to itself. Its telos is imposed from the outside and it is of use
or value to an agent other than itself. A machine does not serve its own interests
but those of its maker or user. On the other hand, an organism is intrinsically
purposive in the sense that it acts on its own behalf, towards its own ends. Its
telos is internal, arising from within, and ultimately serves no purpose other than
maintaining its own organization. –Nicholson (2013) p.671 his emphasis
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This is the representation of Nicholson’s view that I will be addressing. I take it to consist
essentially in the following claims: (1) there is a distinction between sorts of purposes,
intrinsic and extrinsic, (2) extrinsic teleology involves a purpose that is somehow directed
externally, either by “operating towards an end external to itself” or by being “of use or value”
to another agent, (3) intrinsic teleology involves purpose that is somehow directed internally,
either by an agent “acting on its own behalf” or “towards its own ends”, and (4) that the
difference between machines and organisms is that organisms are intrinsically purposive
while machines are extrinsically purposive. Only the last point is relevant to the issue of the
MOD, so I will not dispute (1)-(3) while arguing against (4).
The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology also manifests, according to
Nicholson, in two further interesting respects: through the attribution of functions, and the
possession of certain self-directed capacities (e.g. self-organization, self-formation, self-
production, etc., see Ch.3). These will be addressed first before turning to the more strictly
teleological aspects of the view.
2.3.1 Intrinsic Teleology and Functional Ascription
Mindful of domestication and human “interferences” with other organisms, Nicholson (2013)
notes that the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology also gives rise to a difference
in how organisms and machines are ascribed functions. Organisms, he says, do not have
functions as wholes, while machines do. He explains,
An organism does not have a function because its operation is not good for
anything; it simply acts to ensure its continued existence. [In Footnote] This is
true ceteris paribus. Humans do domesticate animals and cultivate plants, and in
doing so use them for their own ends. Such human ‘interferences’ confer upon
the manipulated organism a level of functionality it would not otherwise have in
nature. –[ibid p.671]
However, what is true ceteris paribus is false simpliciter. The world that this ceteris
paribus condition asks us to imagine is far from our actual world, and was so even before the
evolution of human intention. We are asked to consider functional ascription to organisms
in nature, where ‘interferences’, manipulation, domestication and cultivation are the sorts
of interventions that make the functional profile of an organism unnatural, and these must
be excluded to validate the claim about functional ascription to whole organisms. But if we
are told that “organisms do not have function ceteris paribus” means “organism do not have
functions unless there is something unnatural, rational, about their history”, then—as well
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as conceding to the etiological account—we can only say that some organisms do not have
functions.2 Plenty of others do.
Moreover, it is not only human ‘interferences’ that impart functionality to whole organ-
isms, non-human cases abound where one organism has learned or evolved to confer a level
of functionality on another. Consider Voltaire on “equality”,
What does a dog owe to a dog, and a horse to a horse? Nothing, no animal
depends on his like; but man having received the ray of divinity called reason,
what is the result? Slavery throughout almost the whole world. —Voltaire (1764)
Voltaire was not overstating the consequence of reason. Countless humans have a level
of functionality conferred upon them that they would not otherwise have—they have their
telos imposed upon them. Humans also impose functions on non-human animals. As Milan
Kundera3 put it, “‘Man the cow parasite’ is probably how non-man defines man in his
zoology textbooks”. We have been cultivators and domesticators since prehistory, but we are
not the only animals that cultivate and domesticate. However, Voltaire was understating the
teleological relationships between non-human organisms. Even prior to human history there
were lineages capable of manipulating and intervening on others. A pack of dogs or a herd of
horses must cooperate, they do depend on and make use of one another. Likewise, farming
behaviors such as the ant-aphid or ant-fungus symbiosis result in relations of subservience
between non-human organisms—slavery throughout an even larger proportion of the world.
Organisms have long adapted to make others perform functions for them and this is a sort
of biological relationship we should not neglect or exclude in service of an MOD. The
consequences of this for the teleological view of the MOD will be taken up fully in § 2.4-5
below.
2.3.2 Intrinsic Teleology and Self-Organization
That organisms are intrinsically teleological should be explanans or explanandum for some-
thing that makes them different from machines. For Nicholson (2013), the explanation
of intrinsic teleology in organisms derives from features of their organization. The main
treatment of this topic is provided in the following chapter (Ch.3), though some background
here is helpful for understanding the basis of renewed interest in an “intrinsic” account of
organismal teleology as an MOD.
2These are precisely the same sorts of interventions that would grant something a rational etiology in the
above sense, an etiology that does not support a machine-organism distinction. It is hard to see how Nicholson
would need to make this admission on a strictly organizational account of function (see Ch.3), since it seems to
deploy an etiological account to ascribe functions to organisms that have been intervened upon.
3Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being (Faber and Faber ltd.) p.279
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Organisms, unlike machines, are not only organized but are also self-organizing
and self-regenerating systems. Organisms are intrinsically purposive because
they have an autonomous self: the phenomena of self-formation, self-preservation,
self-reproduction, and self-restitution are all characteristic of the internal organi-
zational dynamics of living systems.—Nicholson (2013) p.671
On this view, a hypothetical synthetic living system is still an organism because its
internal organization explains its capacity to have an intrinsic teleology, despite its artificial
origin or what use is made of it. I think this is the wrong way to establish the explanatory
purchase of the intrinsically teleological account of organisms.
In Nicholson’s distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology above (§ 2.3.0), there
is an implicit distinction between the source and content of teleological properties. The source
of an organism’s telos is internal, it arises from within, whereas the source of a machine’s
telos is external. The content of these ascriptions of purpose, however, relates to how they are
“directed”, on whose “behalf” they operate, and where their “use or value” lies. This presents
a problem, because the source and content of purposes are, presumably, independent in
some cases—something might have an internal source of purpose with external content—yet
Nicholson presents the two together, as if both source and content made the purposes of
organisms intrinsic.
How an organism can have an intrinsic source of teleology, purpose, is supposed to
be related to its autonomous self-organization. This view of the source of teleology has
antecedents in Maturana and Varela (1972) and more recently in Mossio et al. (2009) and
Mossio and Moreno (2010; 2015), but can be dated back to ideas of reciprocal causality in
Kant’s Third Critique.
[P]urposiveness is grounded either on the internal possibility of the object, or
on the relative possibility of its external consequences. In the first case the
teleological judgement considers the perfection of a thing in accordance with
an end that lies in it itself (since the manifold elements in it are related to each
other reciprocally as end and means); in the second the teleological judgement
about a natural object concerns only its usefulness, namely its correspondence
with an end that lies in other things. —Kant (2001, p.49), emphasis in original
In the following chapter (Ch.3) I will argue that autonomous self-organization (or self-
directed capacities4 of organization) does not amount to an MOD. This is in part because
each self-directed capacity comes in degrees, and many are possessed to some degree or
other by machines. Likewise, many organisms lack some self-directed capacities completely.
4E.g. self-organization, self-formation, self-regeneration, self-reproduction, etc.
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Thus, if it is the nature of self-directed capacities such as self-organization that is the
source of the teleological characteristics of entities, then some organisms lack features of
intrinsic teleology and some machines possess them. Kant was unaware of the extent of
interdependence of life, and did not live to see our present state of technological development.
If he did, one would hope we would partially rescind his distinction between internal and
relative purposiveness—organisms are imperfectly organized, and some machines are more
than merely useful.
For Nicholson (2013), these organizational claims are “related in one way or another to
this key distinction [between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology]”, and this is a conclusion I
am happy to affirm. However, if organization is a necessary condition for teleology, then the
intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is not a special MOD, over and above that of self-organization.
If the teleological MOD is to occupy a special place, then it must be related to organization
by some way other than being a necessary condition—otherwise it fails as an MOD if
organization does. This would be a setback, since Nicholson’s view seems to be especially
lodged in teleology. Instead of looking to special sorts of intrinsic organization, I here
consider whether the division of machines and organisms into extrinsically and intrinsically
teleological provides an explanation of the content of purposive claims, their ends, telos,
“direction” or functions.5
Restricting attention on the teleological MOD to what I claimed above is its best repre-
sentation, I will argue that some organisms have functions that are extrinsically teleological
(§ 2.4) and some machines have intrinsically teleological parts (§ 2.5). Beyond the specific
debate about the correct account of the distinction between machines and organisms, this
allows us to address a pair of wider issues: whether or not organic function arises strictly
from the intrinsic nature of organisms; and whether machine functions can be conceived as
the mere product of, or constituted by, human intentions and purposes. I will answer both
cases negatively and conclude with an alternative view.
2.4 Extrinsically Teleological Organisms
The ubiquity of symbiosis and cooperation...affect the way in which researchers
think about biology’s most taken-for-granted entity, the organism. Microbial
5Another confusion here seems to arise from confounding properties that are intrinsic (i.e. non-relational)
with internal (i.e. physically inside). Properties that obtain inside an organism can nonetheless be relational,
extrinsic. Homeostasis, a patently organizational property, often depends on relations to external states of
affairs, such as external physical or chemical variables. Self-directed capacities, being often physically internal
properties, seem like a good candidate to explain the intrinsic properties of an organism, but need not align to
the distinction between teleological properties and relations.
28 Teleology and The Machine Organism Distinction
ecology shows how collaborative interactions at many scales blur the usual
distinctions that are made between so-called individual organisms and the larger
organismal groupings of which they are a part.—O’Malley (2014) p.156
I will argue that some symbiotic relationships involve extrinsic teleology—functions of
organisms for others. While O’Malley’s (2014) aim is to show that a narrow “Dawkinsian"
account of the organism is violated in micro-ecology, mine is to show that symbiotic ecologi-
cal interactions generally speak against an intrinsically teleological account of organismality.
Once we see how organisms live together, we see that they do not always act only on their
own behalf or only towards their own ends. Nicholson (2013) recognizes but dismisses this
fact in a footnote discussing the apparently extrinsic nature of the functions in biofilms and
colonial insects. He writes:
It is interesting to observe that in such cases one always encounters the added
difficulty of deciding whether the systems in question constitute populations or
individuals. Is a biofilm, or an insect colony, a community or a (super)organism?
Regardless of the answer, the fact that the ‘intrinsic vs. extrinsic purposiveness’
distinction is strongly correlated with the ‘individual vs. population’ distinction
provides a compelling reason for adopting intrinsic purposiveness as a means of
individuating organisms. –Nicholson (2013) fn.4
The worry is that, in (some) biofilms and colonial insects, there are many organisms
engaged in symbiotic relationships where some putative functions are for other members,
and this seems to grant extrinsic teleology to some of the organisms living, e.g. in biofilms
and colonies. However, both of these symbiotic systems are contested cases of individuals.
Ereshefsky and Pedroso (2013) argue for the individuality of biofilms, and Wilson (1980)
makes similar claims about colonial insects. Thus, we have some license to treat these larger-
than-single organism systems as individuals, making the extrinsic teleology between colony
members intrinsic to the colony as a whole individual. Given these biological outliers, perhaps
there is no perfect correspondence between organisms and intrinsic teleology, however,
Nicholson claims that there remains a sufficiently high degree of correlation to justify using
intrinsic teleology as a means of individuating organisms.
Nonetheless, there are two problems with this approach to resolving the apparent ex-
trinsically teleological features of symbiosis: (§ 2.4.1) there is a switch from the notion of
organism to biological individual, and (§ 2.4.2) a focus on too narrow a class of symbioses
(on only those that are plausible individuals). The following two sections argue that intrinsic
purposiveness does not strongly correlate with biological individuality, nor does it provide a
means of individuating organisms.
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2.4.1 Intrinsic Teleology and Biological Individuality
Even if intrinsic teleology correlates with biological individuality, this does not imply that
it correlates with organismality. This is because there are a variety of putative biological
individuals at organizational levels above and below that of the organism. Genes, chromo-
somes, colonies, populations, species and clades, have all been argued to enjoy varieties
of “biological individuality” (in a broad sense) and to be bearers of self-serving functions
specific to their level of organization. None of these individuals are organisms.
Dawkins (1976) famously advocated an intrinsically teleological view of genes—selfishness
in one sense—while Doolittle and Sapienza (1980) and Orgel and Crick (1980) were ar-
guing that the evolution of transposable element genes did not require an organism-level
explanation—selfishness in another sense. At some level above organisms, Hull (1986) has
argued that species are best conceived as biological individuals—rather than classes thereof—
and Jablonski (2008) has convincingly shown how selection and functional attribution can
there apply. We need not accept all of these views of individuality or function, but unless
we reject them all we cannot hold to the perfect correlation of organismality, biological
individuality, and intrinsic teleology.
Perhaps we could save something of the intrinsic teleology view by admitting that the
focus on organisms was hasty. Instead, perhaps intrinsic teleology is correlated best with
“biological individuality generally speaking". All that seems to follow from a high degree of
correlation between the ‘intrinsic vs. extrinsic purposiveness’ distinction and the ‘individual
vs population’ distinction is that there is a compelling reason to adopt intrinsic purposiveness
as a means of individuating biological individuals (and a reason that intrinsic purposiveness
should not be adopted as a means of individuating populations of individuals).6 Then,
Nicholson’s (2013) central claim could be modified as a denial that machines are biological
individuals since, supposedly, only the latter are characteristically intrinsically teleological.
However, this is a substantially weaker view than it might seem. For one, it still allows for
machines to be biological. A number of biological things are not (or marginal, questionable)
biological individuals (e.g. ecosystems, organs, and holobionts). On the other hand, as will
be addressed in the following section, if we pick out individuals that are characterized by
intrinsic teleology we find that some of them are not entirely biological.
6In Ch.7 I argue that reciprocal causation should be involved in an account of machines as extended parts of
larger biological wholes. However, this is not an MOD.
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2.4.2 Intrinsic Teleology and Individuation
Could we nonetheless use intrinsic teleology as a means of individuating organisms? Lets
first consider how we might individuate biological parts generally. McShea and Venit (2000)
and Newman (2006) offer a helpful view of the individuation of biological parts. In a large
collection—network, web, graph—of connections between entities, we can pick out parts—
sub-networks, sub-graphs—on the basis of which entities have more internal than external
connections, provided we choose a way to establish connections. The entities that form a
part will mostly be connected to each other, though they may have connections to other
entities or other parts. When the part in question is an organelle we might take connections
to be established by protein-protein interaction networks; when the part is a cell or tissue
we might consider connections in terms of chemical or signal exchanges. In each of these
biological cases, how we individuate on the basis of networks depends on the connectivity
between parts. In the present case, we are concerned with teleological-individuals, so the
relevant form of connection should be established by the relation between an entity and its
ends—where a connection is internal to an entity when its “telos arises from within” and
external when its “telos is imposed upon it”—so that connections match the ascription of
types of teleology. I think we gain some traction here by looking at how teleology might
serve as a means of individuating biological parts, and whether the parts individuated by
intrinsic teleology turn out to be organisms.
Often, if we restrict ourselves to individuals of the organismal and super-organismal level,
we can expect that such individuals have more intrinsic than extrinsic teleology, but this does
not imply that anything with more intrinsic than extrinsic teleology will be an individual
organism, which would be required to use it as a criterion of individuation for organisms.
Nicholson (2013) is right that these teleological connections can carve out individuals, but
wrong that these are organisms. Moreover, some such individuals are not strictly biological.
Sometimes, connected collections of machines and organisms will have an intrinsic teleology.
Consider the view of machines on offer: they have an extrinsic teleology and function
for things (organisms) external to themselves. Now, consider some organism together with
the collection of machines that have functions for and only for that organism—perhaps a
patient on dialysis or yourself and only those machines specifically for your ends.7 Calling
this collection an “individual” requires a somewhat promiscuous individuation, we might
think. No matter, we are not concerned with a broad notion of individuality, but only the
sort of individuality that arises due to a predominance of intrinsic teleology. Importantly for
us, this collection has more intrinsic than extrinsic teleology: perhaps most of your bodily
functions are intrinsic to you and the functions that your machines have for you are intrinsic
7For discussion of machine–organism amalgamations, see Ch.7.
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to the collection containing both you and them. So a cyborg-like collection of an organism
and some machines can sometimes be an intrinsically teleological individual.8
Here, the attempt to individuate on the basis of teleology results in the conclusion that
many of us are a sort of cyborg—with all the attendant post-modern appeal. However, it does
not provide a means of individuating organisms. Many maximally intrinsically teleological
individuals turn out to be non-organisms—indeed, they are not even members of the usual
hierarchy of biological individuals since they include machines as parts (see Ch.7). If we go
looking for individuals that are characterized by intrinsic teleology, we find that many are
not organisms. Next I will show that if we examine some organisms we find that they are not
fully characterized by intrinsic teleology.
2.4.3 What is the function of hairs on pollinators?
Many organisms engage in symbiotic interactions that involve extrinsic teleology—functions
for others. Tightly knit symbiosis can sometimes be good candidates for super-organismal
individuals, but not all symbioses are so well integrated.9 For instance, colonial insects
engage in mutualisms with flowering plants.
Bee pollinated flowers have evolved in such a way that a visiting bee has to
brush against the flower’s anthers bearing pollen... Compared with other insects,
bees are extremely hairy. Each hair has a branched structure that makes it highly
effective at catching pollen. —FAO10
Why are bees so hairy?11 The best explanation of bee hairiness involves a coevolved
symbiosis between bees and flowers where both have functions for which the other is the
beneficiary. Explanations that do not involve this sort of extrinsically teleological relationship
are available, yet they either ignore the reciprocally beneficial nature of the bee-flower
relationship or ignore coevolution.
Here is an explanation that does not require extrinsic teleology in bees: the function of bee
hairiness is to allow them to capture pollen grains from the flowers they pillage, the benefit
8Moreover, these collective cyborgs can demonstrate some of the self-directed capacities thought charac-
teristic of autonomous organisms. There are some machines, such as dialysis machines, without which some
organisms cannot perpetuate or regenerate, so only the collection containing both a patient with kidney failure
and a dialysis machine could be self-perpetuating or self-regenerating. More in Ch.3.
9There are symbioses between hymenoptera and angiosperms that do seem to constitute instances of
evolutionary individuality, such as the fig-wasp symbiosis, yet it should suffice to say that not all pollinator
systems are like this.
10http://www.fao.org/tempref/docrep/fao/012/i0842e/i0842e04.pdf (July 25 2018)
11Perhaps it is better to ask, “Why do hives of bees have so many hairy members?” to account for the fact
that individual bees often have no non-kin-selective reproductive success whatever and are not the beneficiaries
of their own hairiness. This is not being overlooked, but simply ignored for stylistic reasons.
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to bees is that this pollen provides them with food for their hive. The hairiness of bees does
have the effect of carrying pollen from flower to flower, facilitating the sexual reproduction
of angiosperms, but this is not a purpose of bees. This explanation is unattractive, since
it ignores the importance of the reciprocally beneficial relationship that pollination has for
bee colonies. It clearly is beneficial for bees that their primary food-source is better able to
engage in its primary form of reproduction: the following season’s harvest depends on this.
Accounting for the reciprocally beneficial effect of pollination on bees, we can provide
another explanation of bee hairiness: the function of bee hairiness is twofold, (1) it provides
a physiological mechanism of pollen capture, (2) it maintains or improves the health of the
environmental food source. Here the functions of hairiness are still of and for bees. Black-
boxing flowers, we obtain as explanation that locates all functions and the beneficiaries of
hairiness in bees. While the initial explanation was unsatisfactory for ignoring the reciprocally
beneficial effects of pollination, this explanation ignores the fact that flowers are more than
a passive, constructible, environmental resources—it ignores the fact that the bee-flower
symbiosis is coevolved. Indeed, it is highly idealized to treat the population dynamics of
angiosperms as a “complex environmental effect” of the hairs of insects. It is tempting, at
first, to give an organism-centric explanation for the purposes of structures in organisms, but
this story is partial.
Accounting for coevolution of the bee-flower symbiosis puts us in a position to ascribe
teleology to bees in the same way that we might ascribe it to paradigmatic machines. The
function of bee hairiness is still twofold, (1) it provides a mechanism of pollen harvest, and
(2) it also has the function of pollinating flowers. This is an effect that “operates towards
an end that is external to itself”, the telos of which is “imposed from the outside and is of
use or value” to flowers. Flowers, for their part of the coevolutionary bargain, have their
own extrinsically teleological function: providing sufficient pollen and nectar. This situation,
wherein one organism bears a function benefiting another, is maintained by a reciprocal
exchange of purposes. Indeed, it is not entirely a case of self -maintenance, self -production,
or self -reproduction (Ch.3).
The effect of pollinating flowers is of course also valuable to bees, due to the coevolved
mutualism. The Kantian objection here would be that the effects of co-evolved traits ulti-
mately come back around to benefit the organism, so what seems like an extrinsic function
is intrinsic after all—regardless of the fact that this effect propagates by a circuitous route
external to the organism—it is reciprocal causation nonetheless. If we consider the ultimate
effects of bee hairiness, the Kantian would note, we would see that these are ultimately
for bees and not for flowers. This reaffirms the teleological view, with a qualification that
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organisms “ultimately act on their own behalf” and “ultimately towards their own ends”.
However, the Kantian objection is wrong on two fronts: one biological, the other conceptual.
Firstly, there is nothing preventing one partner in a mutualism from withdrawing its
reciprocity and converting a former mutualism into commensalism or parasitism. Then, a
structure from the other partner would still be valuable to the first yet not, for that reason,
ultimately beneficial to itself. A flower, for instance, might begin to produce nectar and
pollen which has no nutritious value to bees yet remain the beneficiary of bee hairiness.12
As research on Hummingbird flowers suggests, when bee hairiness is not doing the trick,
flowers evolve to cut bees out of the former mutualism through “anti-bee” and “pro-bird”
morphological changes (Castellanos et al. 2004). Just as the telos of bee hairiness can be
imposed from the outside, it can be deprived. Such cases show that organisms do not always
ultimately act only on their own behalf, or ultimately towards their own ends.
Secondly, we need not see intrinsic and extrinsic purposes as mutually exclusive. Even
when a trait is ultimately beneficial for the organism bearing it, this need not be overriding of
any intermediate extrinsically beneficial effects. Even when symbiotic interactions ultimately
benefit an organism, it is nonetheless true that intermediate effects are of use or value to
others and that such interactions serve purposes other than maintaining their own organization.
Pollinating flowers is an effect of bee hairs and it is valuable to flowers, all of this withstanding
the cases when pollination is also valuable to bees. A given structure can have a diffuse
spectrum of purposes. I return to this point below, but for now turn to the other case at hand:
purposes in machines.
2.5 Intrinsically Teleological Machines
Above we saw that picking out intrinsically teleological individuals does not necessarily
pick out organisms—sometimes we are left having individuated a cyborg. We also saw the
inverse, that picking out an organism does not necessarily give an intrinsically teleological
individual—symbiotic organisms can have extrinsic purposes. This establishes that intrinsic
teleology and organismality are independent, but not that intrinsic teleology fails as an MOD.
For that, we need intrinsic teleology in machines.
Below I argue that the design, construction and copying of machines creates parts
that are not the product of human intention towards an end, yet which make a significant
contribution to the machine. Granting that there are cases where intention cannot be used as
12For a more timely example, consider that bees do not distinguish between flowers coated in insecticides
and those without. This has apparently resulted in a decline in the population of bees, yet hairiness serves the
same purpose for flowers regardless.
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the explanation of extrinsic teleology, we must look elsewhere for the source of purpose. In
organisms, we can ascribe teleological characteristics on the basis of the relationship between
the provider and recipient of some effect—a purpose is intrinsic when bearer and benefactor
are the same, extrinsic when they are different. With organisms, this benefit is best thought
of in terms of increases in reproductive success or persistence. Likewise, I argue, we can
analyse benefit to machines in terms of increases in production or persistence (Ch.6). Thus
we can establish that some machines have intrinsic teleology by showing that they can be the
beneficiaries of their purposes; that they can have their own ends or, at least, ends separate
from those of our intentions.
2.5.1 What is the function of fortuitous accidents?
Fortuitous accidents in the design of machines can have unintended effects. Consider the
following hypothetical origin story: a designer is creating a machine M for the purpose of
doing X. For instance, a chip for a radio. In the process of designing the chip, the designer
reasons about what the chip must do overall, X, and how specific parts should contribute.
The designer has some understanding of the interaction between parts A-Z, so assembles
them into M according to a design that is intended to bring about X. As it turns out, M does
X, and so the designer rests content and begins mass-manufacturing copies of M.
Nonetheless—despite a designer’s understanding—some machines might include parts
or effects that were not included in the design nor intended to contribute to the operation of
the machine. As Lewens (2013) notes, design methodologies can result in machines that are
not easily comprehended by functional decomposition: “innovators may have unwittingly
failed to reduce [interactions] that, unknown to them, make an important contribution to the
overall operation of the artifact” [ibid]. Unintended effects can make a positive contribution
to the capacity of M to X. Suppose further that within M there are two parts A and B. These
parts were intended to have effects FA and FB that were intended to contribute to the capacity
of M to X13. Now, suppose that the interaction A:B between A and B has some other effect
FA:B that is unknown to the designer. Moreover, equally unknown is that without FA:B M
would not X, i.e. A:B is a cause of M’s capacity to X.
Such cases are not negligible; examples are growing in number and significance. On
the extreme end, we can imagine a serendipitous machine for which the designer knows
nothing about how individual parts contribute to the overall capacity X. Artificial intelligence
13The example is intentionally simple, though I am told by electrical engineers that they believe the case
described is a common one. We might equally supposed that A and B are part-types, instead of part-tokens;
that X is an effect that may obtain to varying degrees; that FA and FB are a collection of related effects, each
contributing partially to X. None of these change the upshot of the example.
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machines now loom large as examples of machines that become more mysterious as they
grow more powerful, as their intelligence grows in proportion to our inability to understand
their finer workings. In an article for the MIT technology review14 entitled “The Dark Secret
at the Heart of AI”, Will Knight points out that many AI are “so complicated that even the
engineers who designed it may struggle to isolate the reason for any single action.” Once
an initially general purpose AI has learned or been trained, the purpose for most internal
effects are not only unknown and unintended, but not understandable. Though it is, for
now, still clear that the AIs as a whole have a teleology that is imposed by the designer—or
trainer—this is not so for the particular effects of their parts.
What should we say about the purpose of parts like A:B? Intuitions about whether
fortuitous accidents have ‘functions’ are split. Wright (1973) argues that they are accidents,
Kitcher (1993) thinks of them as ‘functions’ without intention. I will take no stand on the
correct intuition behind the word, but will show that indeed the etiological and teleological
accounts presented here do apply to such parts.
To begin with, one sort of functional analysis involves merely identifying the effect that
each part has on a containing system and ascribing each a function / purpose if it contributes
causally to the overall effect of a system. These are so called Causal Role (CR) or Cummins
functions (Cummins 1975). Here, we can say that the CR-function of A:B in M is to FA:B in
virtue of the fact that FA:B contributes to the capacity of M to X. Minimally, unintended effects
do have CR-functions, yet these alone will not establish a difference with organisms—both
sorts of entities can be subjected to a CR analysis. Something more is required to establish
whether fortuitous accidents should have purposes in a more richly intrinsically teleological
sense.
Consider the etiological case first. Unintended effects of fortuitous accidents are like
dairy cows: they have both a rational and natural etiology. Though A:B exists in part by
virtue of the rational intervention on nature by the designer, the unintended effect FA:B does
not. FA:B instead owes its existence to the naturally arising effects of the parts A and B.
Though the occurrence of A:B is in part due to the rational and intentional manufacture of
machines M to do X, it is nonetheless also due in part to the natural contribution of FA:B to
X. Here, intended and actual effects come apart. While the rational etiology of M involved
only the intended effects FA and FB, the natural etiology also involves the actual effect FA:B.
In Wright’s (1973) terms, were it not for FA:B, A:B and the containing M would not have
been consciously-selected by the designer, even though it was not a reasoned consequence
of the designer’s intentions. If we ask “Why is A:B in M?” while concentrating only on
intentions and design, the answer will be “A:B is there by accident.” But if we look at all of
14https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-the-heart-of-ai/ (August 3, 2018)
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the causes for A:B’s presence in M, we can answer that “A:B is in M because it does FA:B.”
An etiological analysis of some machines should describe them as both artifact and natural
entity.
To provide a teleological account we require an analysis of the relationship between
purpose and benefit. When we say that the purpose (or function) of X is to F, there is an
implicit third relatum: the beneficiary15. Really, we should say the function of X is to F for
Y. Notice how the identity of beneficiaries determines the variety of teleology. As Nicholson
(2013) says, rightly, whether something’s telos is intrinsic or extrinsic depends on which
‘agent’ it is of use or value to and on whether it ‘acts’ on its own behalf. When all the parts of
some entity Y are functional for Y then Y has a strictly intrinsic teleology. Above I attempted
to show that many organisms contain parts that are functional for an external entity and thus
that organisms are not strictly intrinsically teleological. Likewise when all the parts of an
entity Y are functional for some other entity Z, then Y is strictly extrinsically teleological.
So to argue that some machines contain parts that are functional for those machines further
requires an analysis of what it means for a machine to be a beneficiary of a function of one
of its parts.
One way to define benefits to entities is in terms of fitness, interpreted as (at least, actual
or potential) increases to survival and/or reproduction. Considering fitness as a matter of
survival, we can analyze “The function of P is to F for Y” as “The effect F of P contributes
to the persistence of Y” (Doolittle 2014; Bouchard 2008). Indeed, if P is a part of Y then F
would, in keeping with the organizational account that is supposed to underpin Nicholson’s
(2013) analysis, be a capacity of self-maintenance. On the side of reproduction, we can
analyse “the function of P is to F for Y” as “the effect F of P contributes to an increase in
the number of Y”. How F affects an increase in Y will surely differ with machines, but the
same teleological analysis can be provided. The effect F of P is its purpose, and it is directed
towards Y, it is the telos of Y, provided it affects an increase in persistence or increases in
number of Y. We can consider machines as beneficiaries in both of these senses.16
What it means for a machine M to be the beneficiary of a function F of one of its parts P,
is that the effect F of P in M contributes to an (actual or potential) increase in the number or
15There are many more relata of course. On CR functional analysis we really ought to say something of the
form “The function of X is to Y in Z on analysis A for O at time T”, but these further relativizations can be set
aside here (but see Cummins 1975).
16Recall that at the beginning of this chapter I endorsed the SE account of function—I still do here. This
section is an engagement with the consequences of the organizational or Kantian view of functions, as advocated
by Nicholson (2013), qua MOD, not an endorsement of this approach to teleology in biology.
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persistence of M.17 Beginning with increases in number, since FA:B contributes to the capacity
of M to X, and X is (by hypothesis) part of the reason that M’s are manufactured, M’s benefit
from the effect FA:B of their constituent A:B’s. Thus the copying of machines on the basis
of their overall capacities for us ensures that parts that contribute to their capacities also
have functions for machines—machines benefit from the purposes of their parts. Likewise
for persistence. There are indeed machines that have effects on their own persistence or
durability, so we need only imagine that FA:B contributes to some such effect X—such as
self-cleaning, or self-defragmentation (Ch.3). In that case M would be, in part, the ben-
eficiary of FA:B. This is all that is required to say that M has some part with intrinsic teleology.
What makes cases like the bee-flower symbiosis and unintended machine parts so per-
plexing is the assumption that intrinsic and extrinsic teleology are mutually exclusive. They
are not: one and the same entity can have purpose arising from within and imposed from
the outside. Perhaps ideal organisms would do nothing that they themselves were not the
beneficiaries of, but real organisms are often co-opted by others, enslaved, or cheat in former
mutualisms. Perhaps ideal machines serve no other purpose than what they were intended to
perform for our benefit, but real design processes can create machines with purposes that
are not imposed by designers but arose naturally. Just as with natural and rational etiology,
intrinsic and extrinsic teleology fail as an MOD.
2.6 Conclusion: Spectra of Purposes
Adopting an etiological view of the machine organism distinction does not provide a mutually
exclusive MOD since one and the same entity can possess both a rational and natural etiology.
Coupled with the possibility that synthetic biology might generate intuitively organismal
entities with a totally artificial history, this suggests the plausibility of an alternative, more
Kantian and teleological, view of the MOD. Nonetheless, cases abound where one and the
same entity or part can have both an intrinsic and extrinsic teleology. Symbiotic interactions
between (rather than within) individuals, non-rational or unintentional designs, and the blind
copying of fortuitous machines all speak against the view that organisms operate towards
their own ends and that machines operate towards ours. The distinction between an artificial
and natural history or between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology may sometimes be good
17I am here glossing over a type-token distinction that is surely applicable: the difference between tokens
and types of machine M. So long as some type-token distinction can be made, on the basis of contributions to
copying similar machines, then we can safely exclude this detail from the present argument.
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heuristics for talking separately about organisms and machines as classes, but these are not
their characteristic properties.
This suggests another view of the teleology and etiology of organisms and machines.
Entities sit on a spectrum of purposes; they can be classified according to their coordinates
on a teleological-etiological plane. Familiar organisms and machines might sit at opposing
corners (Fig.2.1, top-right and bottom-left). Although, on either of these scales, other
machines and organisms will sit at positions between the extremes. The following figure
sketches how this might look.
Fig. 2.1 Spectrums of rational-natural etiology opposed to intrinsic-extrinsic teleology.
Positioning of examples within broad categories is illustrative.
Plainly, the historical explanation for the traits of an entity is not restricted to the history
of entities of its type, but may involve reference to the functions or intentions of other
entities. Sometimes the traits of an entity will be explained by the functions of other entities;
sometimes the functions that are for one entity will be of another entity. If we wanted
to provide an historical explanation of the traits of any entity that lives symbiotically, has
been artificially selected, enslaved, bred, cultivated, otherwise functionally-coopted (by
human or non-human entities), genetically, surgically, or technologically modified, then
this explanation will involve a spectrum of purposes. Organisms may have purposes that
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are directed outside and operating—deleteriously or not—towards the ends of what might
otherwise be considered the (technological) environment. In a phrase with post-modern
appeal, for these stranger sorts of living and technological things we need a cyborg teleology
(§ 7.2.2).
Now that we have considered the content of teleological judgements about machines
(their telos or direction), we should consider their source (autonomy or self-organization).
The following chapter addresses views of organization and autonomy of organisms, their
apparent lack in machines, and how these bear on the MOD.

Chapter 3
Autonomy and the Machine Organism
Distinction
Abstract
In this chapter I argue against the views of Maturana and Varela (1980) and Moreno and
Mossio (2015) that autopoiesis or autonomy is the MOD. I argue against this by showing that
both machines and organisms demonstrate forms of marginal or incomplete autonomy. To
show this, I analyse autonomy into a number of interrelated “self-directed capacities” (e.g.,
self-organization, self-synthesis-of-adenine, etc.). There are organisms that are dependent
on others to survive, organisms that lack certain self-directed capacities; there are machines
that are capable of persistence and some reproductive operations without human intervention,
machines that possess certain self-directed capacities. Together this shows that autonomy
is one of the characteristics on which organisms and machines vary, not their characteristic
difference.
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter addressed the teleological content of a Kantian view of organisms, as
defended by Nicholson (2013). I argued that the direction of ends, whether their telos is self-
or other-directed, does not fundamentally distinguish machines from organisms. To do that it
was necessary to background the sources of teleological properties somewhat, in an attempt
to isolate any special role that is played by the content of teleological claims. I argued that if
the source of teleological properties is etiological, a relationship to rational or natural history,
then this will not serve as an MOD. This chapter considers the source and backgrounds the
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content of teleological judgements. Specifically, it addressed the idea, hinted at by Nicholson
(2013), though addressed more directly in Maturana and Varela (1980) and Moreno and
Mossio (2010; 2015), that the source of teleology in organisms is the distinctive form of
Kantian reciprocal causation between their parts.
Maturana and Varela (1980) address this in their theory of autopoiesis; Moreno and
Mossio (2010; 2015) as the theory of biological autonomy, or organization. What these
perspectives share is an emphasis on the autonomy of organisms, their self-organization and
self-maintenance, and the conclusion that machines and organisms can be distinguished on
the basis of these properties. In this chapter I argue that an appreciation of microbiology
and contemporary robotics shows both that autonomy is not the characteristic feature of
organisms and that it does not provide an MOD.
This chapter consists of two main parts: this first (§ 3.2-3) is a conceptual analysis of
biological autonomy, the second (§ 3.4-5) is a naturalistic catalogue or survey of marginal or
borderline autonomous systems. In § 3.2-3 I will explicate the views of autopoiesis offered by
Maturana and Varela (3.2.1) and how these developed into the view of biological autonomy
offered by Mossio and Moreno (§ 3.2.2). Both of these views are often obscured by their
highly abstract and variable terminology, but a plausible reading sees them as offering up an
account of organisms on the basis of some intuitive criteria for autonomy. I then argue that
autonomy can be analyzed further into a large number of self-directed capacities (§ 3.3, e.g.
that self-organization includes self-synthesis-of-required-chemicals).
Once we see autonomy as consisting of a large number of self-directed capacities, it is
clear that many organisms lack forms of autonomy, and many machines possess them (§
3.4). Autonomy obtains in a balance with its antithesis, here called ‘allonomy’. There are
marginal or borderline autonomous systems in both biology (§ 3.4.1) and technology (§
3.4.2). In § 3.4.1 I examine cases where organisms must acquire energy, synthesize their
parts, or reproduce with the aid of others. § 3.4.2 examines cases where robotics have
some self-organizing, self-maintaining and self-reproducing capacities. These cases amass
evidence that autonomy does not establish a fundamental difference between machines and
organisms, but another spectrum along which entities of both types predominantly occupy
intermediate positions (§ 3.5).
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3.2 Autonomy and the Machine–Organism Distinction
3.2.1 Autopoiesis and Allopoiesis: Maturana and Varela
Autonomy appears so obviously an essential feature of living systems that
whenever something is observed that seems to have it, the naïve approach is to
deem it alive. Yet, autonomy...seems so far the most elusive of their properties.
—Maturana and Varela (1972)
In their book Autopoiesis (1972), Maturana and Varela present an account of organisms
based on autonomous organization. We will soon see how this view establishes an MOD.
However, we should first note what they claim is not involved. They distinguish their view
from those involving teleology or purpose (Ch.2), which they claim are “obviously naïve”
([ibid] p.77), and from accounts that stress the importance of a particular composition. Varela
et al. (1974) explicitly state that “reproduction and evolution are not constitutive features of
the living organization and the properties of a unity cannot be accounted for only through
accounting for the properties of its components.”
To understand the MOD provided by autopoiesis, we should begin with the account of
“machines” on offer.
[M]achines are unities...they are made of components that are characterized
by certain properties capable of satisfying certain relations that determine in
the unity the interactions and transformations of these same components... —
Maturana and Varela (1972)
The foregrounding of ‘unity’ is an endorsement of holism. Machines are components that
work together and should be understood together, unlike some other transforming collections,
like junk-piles. This very general account of machines is given in order to make a further
distinction between two types of machine: allopoietic and autopoietic. These are derived
from allos meaning “different” or “other”, auto “self”, and poietic “production”. Autopoietic
machines produce themselves; allopoietic machines produce (and are produced by) something
other. It is through autopoiesis that they provide an account of organisms. According to
Maturana and Varela (1972), ‘autopoiesis’ is “the organization which makes a living system
a whole, autonomous, unity that is alive”.
They do provide a definition of ‘autopoietic machine’ ([ibid] p.79), although their defini-
tion is somewhat obscure1. Much of Autopoiesis can be seen as repeated attempts to give
similar definitions. What is essential in their definitions, and has stood the test of time, are
1One such definition appears in full in the following section, for later comparison.
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the following features. Autopoietic machines are organized such that (a) their components
interact to regenerate the same sorts of components, and (b) they maintain themselves, as a
homeostatic whole, in the face of external perturbations. I will call (a) ‘self-organization’
and (b) ‘self-maintenance’.
The concept of allopoiesis is intended to align with that of more familiar machines. They
provide the following definition for the allopoietic: “machines that have as a product of their
function something different from themselves, as in a car” ([ibid], also see Varela et al. 1974,
p.8). Here it is some functional effect like locomotion, and not fumes, that is the intended
“product”. More clearly, the products of machines on a factory assembly line are typically
not the assemblers themselves. Maturana and Varela (1972) use ‘allopoietic’ as a catch-all:
including most familiar machines and designating anything not-autopoietic—a machine is
allopoietic if it is not self-organizing and not self-maintaining.
Here is the MOD: Organisms are a type of machine, the autopoietic type, whereas familiar
machines are allopoietic. Organisms are autonomously maintaining their organization;
familiar machines are non-autonomously producing something else. Varela et al. (1972) are
direct,
Allopoietic systems are by constitution non-autonomous insofar as their re-
alization and permanence as unities is not related to their operation.—[ibid]
p.8
The view offered by Maturana and Varela is the skeleton of a complete view. They only
claim that unity is somehow maintained and organized, without explaining “unity” or how
it is achieved. Mossio and Moreno (2010), described in the following section, go further
towards filling these lacunae.
3.2.2 Self-Organization: Mossio and Moreno
Mossio and Moreno (2010; 2015) offer an account of biological autonomy that stems from the
work of Maturana and Varela (1972).2 Their view drops the use of ‘autopoiesis’, but retains
emphasis on organization, maintenance, and regeneration. It also adds explicit reference
to additional autonomous capacities and requirements for energy. As well as relationships
of production, this newer organizational account emphasizes thermodynamic relationships.
Beginning with the account of ‘machines’,
2Unfortunately, as Garson (2017) points out about the closely related organizational theory of functions,
“the details and terminology vary somewhat in different publications” (c.f. Mossio et al. 2009; Mossio and
Moreno 2015). I will follow the details and terminology offered in Moreno and Mossio (2010) and Militello
and Moreno (2018).
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[W]e define a machine as a meta-stable structure, which can persist in thermody-
namic equilibrium, consisting of a number of functionally interdependent parts
that constrain an energy flow to do work and perform a systematic function.—
Militello and Moreno (2018) p.35
As with autopoiesis, we can see the account of organisms as carving out a special class
of machines. This time, depending on which work is done and how this affects existing
constraints within the machine. The essential ingredients of the account of organismal
autonomy are tripartite, including (1) self-maintenance, (2) organizational closure, and (3)
reproduction and regulation. These will be described in turn.
(1) Self-Maintenance—To understand what Moreno and Mossio add to Maturana and
Varela, it is now worth considering the latter’s definition of autopoietic machines.
An autopoietic machine is organized (defined as a unity) as a network of pro-
cesses of production (transformation and destruction) of components that pro-
duces the components which: (i) through their interactions and transformations
continuously regenerate and realize the network of processes (relations) that
produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the machine) as a concrete unity in the
space in which they (the components) exist by specifying the topological domain
of its realization as such a network.—Maturana and Varela (1972) p.79
Moreno and Mossio (2010) take (i) in the above definition and replace the emphasis
on components with that of constraints and add explicit mention of the role of energetic
transformations that was absent in Maturana and Varela. Self-maintenance “results from the
action of local constraints”, and a system is self-maintaining when “it is able to use its work
to re-generate at least some of the constraints that make work possible”. Put another way, self-
maintenance consists of a relatively simple feedback loop where work generates a constraint
that positively effects the ability to do precisely that kind of work. Self-maintenance is
essentially maintenance via partially reciprocal causation. The authors acknowledge this
quality in many non-living systems, e.g. candle-flames.
(2) Organizational Closure—The move to organizational closure involves more complex,
holistic forms of self-maintenance. Here is the connection to Kantian teleology. Mossio and
Moreno (2010) trace this idea back to the reciprocal causation advocated in Kant’s Critique
of the Power of Judgement. Each organ is producing and being produced by all others. They
refer to this as an organism’s ability to “self-organize”, where the limit of self-organization is,
at the high end, organizational closure. The term ‘closure’ itself comes from Varela (1974),
but I think it easiest to trace their formulation back to part (ii) of the definition of autopoietic
machines, given above. Mossio and Moreno (2010) write,
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[B]iological systems are able to maintain themselves by constituting a web of
structures exerting mutual constraining actions on their boundary conditions,
such that the whole web is collectively self-maintaining. The mutual dependence
between a set of constraints is what we call an organizational closure. –[ibid]
p.276
Besides the diverging terminology between Maturana and Varela (1972) and Mossio and
Moreno (2011) for apparently similar notions—between ‘web’ and ‘network’, or ‘boundary
conditions’ and ‘topological domain’—we are dealing in approximately the same idea: a
more complete form of biological autonomy requires a collection of interdependent self-
maintaining systems. Both are elaborations on Kant’s view of reciprocal causation. Re-
ciprocal causation may obtain between pairs of parts in achievement of self-maintenance,
but organization closure requires “mutual dependence” [ibid],3 where reciprocal causation
obtains between a “web of elements” [ibid].4 Moreover, this is supposed to be a “fundamental
property” or “essential mark” of the biological [ibid]. While candles may be self-maintaining
in a simple sense, their organization is “open” in that it requires the constant input of wax
that is not affected by any constraint of the candle itself.
(3) Control and Reproductive Mechanisms—Moreno and Mossio (2010) say that (1)
and (2) are necessary but not sufficient for being an organism: “all organisms are organiza-
tionally closed systems, [but] we do not conclude that any organizationally closed system
is a (fully-fledged) organism” [ibid]. Although organizational closure is apparently not a
sufficient condition for being an organism, their association between organizational closure
and organisms is nonetheless quite strong. They say that (1) and (2) “[make] the crucial
transition between the physiochemical and the biological domain”, that they “constitute a
fundamental property of the distinctive causal regime at work in biological organisms” and
that (2) can be taken as an “essential mark of living organisms”. Evidently the transition to
fully-fledged organisms is slight. To that effect they offer a final ingredient to their view of
organismality: “reliable reproduction and control mechanisms”. The addition of control and
reproductive mechanisms is to “enable the organism to respond adequately and adaptively to
external perturbations”. While the inclusion of reproduction is a break with Maturana and
Varela (1972), the requirement for control and adequate response to “external perturbations”
is clearly in line with (b), (ii) and with self-maintenance generally.
Mossio and Moreno (2010) make two further restrictions on their view. They point out
that organizational closure is partial and context dependent. In other words, (1) holds “only if
3The approximate equivalent in Kant (2000) is his technical use of ‘perfection’.
4Kant (2000) says “manifold elements”.
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a given set of independent boundary conditions is also fulfilled” and (2) requires that “at least
some, but not all, the constraints under which a system can exist have a relation of mutual
causal dependence”. These are biologically realistic constraints on a theory of organisms,
but they each leave open the possibility that the theory of autonomy on offer might be unable
to provide an MOD. Partiality and context dependence, as well as being relativistic, also
admit difference in degree. The ability for autonomy so construed to provide an MOD
would then rest on whether there are contexts in which some machine might demonstrate
self-maintenance, closure, etc., to a degree comparable to the partiality of some organism.
This is the topic of § 3.4.
3.3 Analyzing Autonomy
3.3.1 Self-Directed Capacities
Discussions of autonomy involve its analysis into a number of capacities. These include
self-organization and self-maintenance (self-persistence), self-generation, self-regeneration,
self-constraint, self-repair, self-production, and self-reproduction. Preference for specific
synonyms differ between authors and sometimes publications. To this list we should add self-
regulation (Walsh 2015) self-development (when not covered by others), self-reorganization
(for metamorphic organisms), self-destruction (for apoptosis or, potentially, forms of “pro-
grammed aging”), and perhaps even self-evolution (to account for recently discovered
“evolvability” mechanisms (Janković and Ćirković 2016; Koonin and Wolf 2012)). Each
of these involve some capacity that is possessed by an organism (a particular “self”) and
directed towards it. I will refer to all of these as broad self-directed capacities.
The working assumption in theories of autonomy is that it requires joint possession of
some number of self-directed capacities, and that organisms are paradigmatic examples
of such autonomous systems. The distinction with machines is then provided negatively:
machines, lacking self-directed capacities, are non-autonomous. Machines may be organized
or do some organizational work, but they are not self-organizing; they may be maintained
or maintain something, but they are not self-maintaining; and they may be produced (and
reproduced) or produce something, but they are not self-reproducing. We, not machines, are
the reason that machines are produced, maintained and organized.5 When machines do seem
to possess a modicum of these capacities, they are considered marginal examples at best.
5Of course, it may be that some machine that repairs another one, but that chain will (so the working
assumption goes) quickly lead back to us.
48 Autonomy and the Machine Organism Distinction
Clearly not all paradigmatic organisms are capable of self-destruction, this being a
uniquely multicellular invention; some organisms are too ephemeral to heal large non-lethal
wounds; most organisms do not regrow severed limbs. So which particular set of self-
directed capacities make a system autonomous? Answers differ. Nicholson (2013) lists
self-organization, self-reproduction, self-preservation, and self-regeneration, as well as (more
difficultly aligned with the above examples) self-formation, and self-restitution. Mossio and
Moreno (2010) instead focus on “organizational self-maintenance”, but cite the need for
forms of self-regulation and self-reproduction. Maturana and Varela (1980) explicitly deny
that self-reproduction is essential, focusing instead on self-regeneration, self-maintenance
and self-organization.
In the absence of consensus I will focus on self-organization, self-maintenance and
self-reproduction. These broad self-directed capacities are not wholly distinct, but are nearly
universally shared in analyses of autonomy.6 They also most closely match the biologically
important notions of metabolism, homeostasis and reproduction. In the following section
I argue that these broad capacities should be analyzed into a much larger list of refined
capacities.
3.3.2 The Multiplicity of Self-Directed Capacities
Autonomy can be analysed first at a coarse grain into what I have called the broad self-
directed capacities. But that grain of analysis is not sufficient, I argue, to appreciate the
diversity in autonomy. For that, we need a more fine-grained analysis of autonomy, into
a collection of refined self-directed capacities. Mending a broken heart is different from
initiating cardiac tissue repair mechanisms. Both are forms of self-maintenance, but the latter
is self-maintenance considered at a more fine physiological grain of analysis. This section
argues that we must spell out a much larger multiplicity of such capacities, for each of the
broad self-directed capacities, if we are to properly understand diversity in autonomy.
Consider self-organization. Self-organization is, in part, about the capacity that an
entity has to recreate its components (or constraints). One of the primary endeavours
of biochemistry and physiology is the investigation of precisely how certain components
interact to accomplish this. These investigations usually aim to identify a particular metabolic
pathway or key reaction that has a given component (constraint) as one of its products. We
can look at these empirical investigations as providing us with a basis for an analysis of
6For an example of how they are not distinct: the synthesis of “heat-shock proteins” during adjustment
to increasing environmental temperature might be considered an example of self-organization, because they
assist in folding of other proteins, or self-maintenance, because they compensate for perturbations. Likewise,
synthesis of platelets is a form of self-organization, but platelets are required for repair of blood vessels.
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self-organization into a number of more refined self-directed capacities, interrelated self-
directed capacities of self-synthesis and self-degradation. Each metabolic pathway or reaction
provides a capacity (to synthesize or degrade something relevant to organization), possessed
by a self, whose product may be a component (or constraint) in other pathways. Analysing
the broad self-directed capacities allows us to do two things that were previously unavailable
to us.
Firstly, this analysis of self-directed capacities allows us to refine the question about
which capacities are required for autonomy. Since autonomy is defined in terms of self-
directed capacities, we see that autonomy is likewise analysable into a multiplicity of more
refined forms of autonomy. In the following sections this will be important, since it allows us
to talk about borderline, partial, or marginal cases of autonomy at a finer grain than possible
with the broad capacities alone. We can then supply more nuanced judgements than are
permitted with only a distinction between “fully-fledged” and “not fully-fledged” autonomy.
Secondly, analysis of the broad self-directed capacities allows us to consider their in-
terdependencies on a more individual basis. Mossio and Moreno (2010) are inclined to
treat autonomous capacities as “a distinct level of causation, operating in addition to the
physiochemical laws” [ibid, p.270], while Maturana and Varela (1972) say that autopoietic
machines are “defined as a unity”. I take these to be claims about the interdependence of
self-directed capacities, and this reading is upheld by the notion that more fully-fledged
autonomy requires organization-closure. Moreover, if these prima facie metaphysical claims
are best interpreted as about causal interdependence among self-directed capacities, then this
should not be established a priori. Considering a more refined list of self-directed capacities
allows us to substitute some metaphysical problems of biological causation with empirical
ones. What matters is that we can consider a given self-directed capacity, e.g. ‘an entity’s
capacity to synthesize its own alpha-tubulin’, and see if a given organism is capable of doing
this independently from another capacity or another organism. It is an empirical question
whether refined forms of self-maintenance are bundled together into a distinct-level, unity, or
whether they rather enjoy some forms of physiological independence.
Even certain broad self-directed capacities enjoy forms of physiochemical independence
at that coarser grain of analysis. That self-maintenance does not depend on self-reproduction
was a key motivation for Maturana and Varela (1972) for excluding the latter from their
account of autopoiesis. Neuter animals, eunuchs, post-reproductive females, and the last sur-
viving members of sexual species are autonomously self-organizing and self-maintaining, but
lack the possibility of self-reproduction. The same kinds of causal independence likewise ob-
tains for some of the refined self-directed capacities. Patients suffering from phenylketonuria
(PKU) have a lost or reduced capacity for the self-degradation-of-phenylalanine, due to a
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mutated version of the enzyme phenylalanine hydroxylase (Penrose 1951; Scriver and Waters
1999). Patients suffering from PKU have a buildup of phenylalanine, but not of other amino
acids, indicating the self-degradation-of-phenylalanine is independent of self-degradation-of-
other-amino-acids. On the other hand, phenylalanine hydroxylase is involved in the synthesis
of tyrosine, so self-synthesis-of-tyrosine is dependent on self-degradation-of-phenylalanine
(Payne and Loomis 2006). Tyrosine can only be self-synthesized when phenylalanine can be
self-degraded, in humans.
Evidently these analyses of autonomy have overstated some of the holism, collective
self-maintenance, closure, or unity of self-directed capacities, while their multiplicity has
been understated. The following section argues that an appreciation of the diversity in self-
directed capacities among organisms works against treating autonomy as their characteristic
feature, and diversity in the self-directed capacities of machines works against the MOD.
3.4 Diversity in Self-Directed Capacities
Before turning to counterexamples to MODs based on autonomy (4.1-2), we should be clear
about what autonomy contrasts with. I have been discussing autonomy one-sidedly, as if
entities were either autonomous, less autonomous, or non-autonomous. Like the autopoiesis-
allopoiesis distinction, autonomy has an opposite. Non-autonomy is only its negation;
anti-autonomy should involve reference to other selves. A rock is non-autonomous, but need
not have any particular relationship to selves.
What the opposite of autonomy is named seems to differ depending on what particular
broad or refined self-directed capacity is at issue. For instance, Wernegreen (2012) discusses
interactions between symbionts and their hosts as sorts of integration; Godfrey-Smith (2013,
p.70) discusses things that “reproduce with the aid of much external machinery” as scaffolded;
and Queller and Strassmann (2009) discuss social organisms in terms of cooperation. We
might also think of anti-autonomous relationships cybernetically, as involving dependence or
forms of external control (R. Kline 2009). So for instance, in Godfrey-Smith’s vernacular, we
should say that ‘autonomous reproduction’ is to be contrasted with ‘scaffolded reproduction’,
while Wernegreen would discuss this in terms of ‘reproductive integration’. This is a
confusing way to discuss contrasts with autonomy. I will be specific about precisely which
capacities are at issue, so will use the more theoretically neutral and directly opposite
‘allonomy’7.
7This term appears in Hirst (2008) in direct connection with the issue of autopoiesis and autonomy, though
therein only designates a rigid non-autonomy supposedly possessed by machines.
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We should not confuse allonomy with dependence on the abiotic environment. Of
course, every organism depends on its environment, but allonomy should be a more richly
biotic notion. Mossio et al. (2009) are correct to point out that “self-maintenance has
nothing to do with ‘independence’ from the environment or external conditions.” Mossio
and Moreno (2015) hold a similar view about self-organization. They allow for dependence
on the environment because of the need for influx of energy and material: “Autonomous
systems are...organizationally closed and thermodynamically open” [ibid, p.6]. But not
all dependence on the environment is abiotic and thermodynamic, some involves being
organizationally open. If self -maintenance has to do with independence from anything, it
should be independence from other-maintenance, and likewise for self-organization and
other-organization. Designations of allonomy should be made with respect to dependence on
the biotic environment.
I will also distinguish between what might be called material and mechanistic forms of
allonomy8. The distinction is helpful because some forms of allonomy involve a reliance on
materials from others, while some involve an outsourcing of mechanisms to others. These
will often be intertwined in real cases but can mark out interesting differences, discussed
below. While some reliance on others for material conditions is perhaps the norm in biology,
there are more complicated mechanistic forms of allonomy in organisms that seem to be
neglected in discussions of their autonomy.
The natural world, both biological and technological, is diverse, and part of this diversity
is manifest in differences on a spectrum from autonomy to allonomy. The following sections
are largely an empirical catalogue of allonomy in organisms and autonomy in machines. I
argue that the majority of organisms lack some of the central features of autonomy, or possess
them only marginally (4.1). Likewise, many machines seem to have autonomous features,
some spanning each of the broad self-directed capacities (4.2). Of course, there are different
ways to interpret this diversity. It might be taken to show that “fully fledged” organisms
are quite rare. I think it is best interpreted as showing that autonomy fails as an analysis
of organisms, since many are not fully autonomous, and as an MOD, since the difference
with machines then amounts to a contingent difference in degree on the autonomy–allonomy
spectrum.
8Here these terms are meant in their most metaphysically neutral senses and should not be taken to support
a neo-mechanistic worldview. If it turns out that a process ontology is the most appropriate to biological
phenomena, then this is a regrettable terminological choice, perhaps better replaced with a distinction between
‘substantial’ and ‘processual’ allonomy (see Ch.4).
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3.4.1 Organisms that Lack Specific Self-Directed Capacities
For a self-directed capacity lacking in an organism, lets first examine chemosynthesis and
the self-directed capacities of energy acquisition. At the extreme end of parameters for life
there are organisms capable of complete energetic autonomy. This title goes to some of the
chemolithoautotrophs and the photolithoautotrophs, organisms that use inorganic chemicals
(chemo) or light energy (photo), inorganic electron donors (litho) and inorganic carbon (auto)
as resources (troph). Ehrich et al. (1995) report a particularly interesting case of an obligate
chemolithoautotroph, an organism that cannot grow in the presence of other organic materials,
found growing on a rusty pipe in Russia. This is perhaps the pinnacle of autonomy—to
subsist on rust, light, and air—but it is not the norm. Autopoiesis and organizational closure
might work as theories of the autonomy of lithoautotrophs (see Jones et al. 2011, p.179). But
even the lithoautotrophs are not entirely autonomous, some such microorganisms depend on
others to acquire energy sources.
In the metabolic classification used above, each part of the name specifies a requirement
for metabolism. The order is – energy source – electron source – carbon source, and the
possible combinations are chemo/photo – litho/organo – auto/hetero/mixo. The chemo/photo
distinction separates organisms that gain energy from chemicals or light, yet the discovery
of fungi around the reactor at Chernobyl leads some to also include radiotrophy (Karpenko
et al. 2006; Dadachova and Casadevall 2008). The prefix ‘litho’ means that an organism
obtains electrons for metabolism from “inorganic” sources, here having the precise meaning
of “not containing carbon”, while ‘organo’ means that electrons are obtained from organic
sources. The auto/hetero distinction refers to whether the organism obtains carbon from
atmospheric sources or from consuming parts of other organisms. Given this classification, it
is apparent that some combinations of metabolic sources would allow an organism to survive
and reproduce without the presence of others (or their parts) provided a sufficient abiotic
environment. Lithoautotrophs can be “at the base” of an ecosystem or food chain, acting
as “primary” producers of organic compounds for others (Cavanaugh 1994). But note that
any of these metabolic sources can and sometimes are obtained from other organisms. Both
carbon-containing (“organic”) and carbon-non-containing (“inorganic”) energy sources and
electron sources are often obtained from other living organisms (by heterotrophy).
Cavanaugh (1994) describes the case of symbiotic interaction between sulfur-oxidizing
chemoautotrophic bacteria and marine invertebrates found both in deep-sea hydrothermal
vents and coastal sediments. The giant tube worm Riftia pachyptila, for instance, completely
lacks a mouth and digestive tract. Instead of digesting organic matter from its environment, it
relies entirely on the biomass generated by endosymbiotic sulfur-oxidizing chemoautotrophs.
This is quite a significant case of energy and carbon harvesting from chemoautotrophes;
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giant tube worms can grow up to 2m in length. Likely speaking of coral-algae symbioses
and drawing inspiration from Margulis and Fisher (1991), Cavanaugh (1994) proposes that
“invertebrates “become” photosynthetic via symbiosis with algae” [ibid p.79]. We might
likewise say that invertebrates become chemosynthetic via symbioses with sulphur-oxidizing
bacteria.
What the bacteria gain in return from their host is access to both an energy and electron
source. The blood of R. pachyptila contains a specialized form of hemoglobin capable of
transporting both sulphide and oxygen. Combined with carbon dioxide from the ambient
environment, this is sufficient for autotrophic growth. Interestingly, Cavanaugh (1994)
speculates that this relationship evolved because the concentrations of sulphide and oxygen
in seawater are often inversely proportional, requiring most sulphur-oxidizers to attach to
a mobile surface that passes between high-sulphide and high-oxygen regions—a form of
mechanistic allonomy for an organism that lacks a sufficient capacity to self-transport and
self-feed. In order to survive this bacterial endosymbiont depends on a giant tube worm to
provide it with sufficient access to energy. Even in “primary producers” we find symbiotic
interactions that produce forms of allonomy.
This is a clear case of other-maintenance of an organism’s energetic capacity: a form
of mechanistic and material allonomy that is ubiquitous and sitting at the base of many
ecosystems. Chemosynthetic symbioses provide diverse cases of marginally autonomous
organisms, cases where some of the refined capacities of organization are not entirely self-
directed. These cases satisfy part, but not all, of Mossio and Moreno’s (2010) account of
self-maintenance. By providing organic materials to the worm a sulfur-oxidizer “is able to use
its work to re-generate at least some of the constraints that make work possible”. But these
constraints are not “local”, some residing in the worm and others in bacteria. Moreover, self-
reproduction and self-synthesis-of-organic-material also come apart. The bacterial symbionts
of R. pachyptila are acquired ‘horizontally’ (from the environment) and largely retain their
free-living self-reproductive capacity. The worms themselves are dependent on the energy
and material provided by their temporary symbionts to reproduce at all—giant tube worms
have material reproductive allonomy. On the other hand, the chemosynthetic endosymbionts
of clams are transmitted ‘vertically’ (from parent generations), are not free-living and have
lost the capacity to self-repair and self-recombine-DNA (Dubilier et al. 2008).
For another example, consider the self-directed capacities of biosynthesis and biodegra-
dation. Most organisms cannot synthesize everything they need to survive and they cannot
degrade everything that hinders their survival. Up to 99% of microbes cannot be cultured in
isolation (Pham and Kim 2012). This “unculturability” of microbial life has received growing
attention from scientists and philosophers, interested both in devising new culture methods
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and explaining how this situation evolved (Dupré and O’Malley 2009; O’Malley 2014; Wolf
and Koonin 2013; Brunet and Doolittle 2018; Pande and Kost 2017). Importantly for us, this
phenomena shows just how common it is that prima facie organisms—microbial cells with
clear “boundary conditions” and a “topology”—are unable to survive by themselves.
One explanation for unculturability is syntrophy or “cross-feeding”: a relationship
between microbes where one consumes the waste products of another’s metabolism (Pande
and Kost 2017). Imagine that microbes A and B have a relationship where A consumes the
waste-products of B, and B consumes the waste-products of A. If we attempt to grow A on
a medium that contains all the essentials of A’s diet except for the waste-products of B’s
metabolism, then A will not grow. Likewise for B. But, if we grow both A and B together on
the same medium, both will grow as a community.
This kind of situation is a clear case of individual material allonomy and produces what
Pande and Kost (2017) call “obligate metabolic interdependencies”. W. F. Doolittle and I
have elsewhere referred to this more generically as ‘community interdependence’ (Brunet
and Doolittle 2018). Noting the existence of unculturability and community interdependence
shows that microbes very often strike a balance between autonomy and allonomy. Since
individual organisms within such communities cannot survive alone, cannot self-maintain,
while a community of interdependent microbes can, it would be best to see the balance
between autonomy and allonomy as an emergent community-level property (i.e. a property
not possessed at the organism-level).
Explaining how these relationships evolved goes further towards showing that allonomy
is a much deeper and widespread characteristic of life. There are two general explanations
for the evolution of interdependence: it could be selectively favored, or arise neutrally. The
first explanation has been championed by Morris et al. (2012) (and later by Fullmer et al.
2015) as the “Black Queen Hypothesis” (BQH). The latter by W. F. Doolittle and myself as
the eponymously named “Gray Queen Hypothesis” (GQH) (Brunet and Doolittle 2018).9 I
will here review these two ideas, focusing on how they bear on autonomy and organismality,
before showing that this sort of relationship applies to macrobes as well, ourselves included.
One reason that an organism might be dependent on its community is that it lacks a
specific gene, and thus the capacity to synthesize an enzyme or complete a pathway—a form
of mechanistic allonomy. The BQH and GQH differ in how they explain the loss of these
capacities. What they both agree on is that, when an organisms lacks a specific self-directed
capacity it can persist if another member of the community possesses this capacity in a way
that is other-directed, or at least other-available. Morris et al. (2012) phrase this by saying
9The name is intended to contrast “neutrally” with the “black queen”, but also after Michael Gray, who with
P. Covello published the first paper deploying a similar sort of explanation (Covello and Gray 1993).
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that a function (e.g. ‘to degrade H2O2’) is “leaky”; the function can benefit members of
the community that do not possess the genes for it. Recalling the arguments of Ch.2, we
might say that community interdependence can emerge when organisms already, fortuitously
perhaps, possess extrinsically valuable effects. They explain,
Gene loss can provide a selective advantage by conserving an organism’s limited
resources, provided the gene’s function is dispensable. Many vital genetic func-
tions are leaky, thereby unavoidably producing public goods that are available to
the entire community. The BQH predicts that the loss of costly, leaky functions
is selectively favored at the individual level and will proceed until the production
of public goods is just sufficient to support the equilibrium community.—Morris
et al. (2012) p.1
Allonomy due to gene loss can be selected for, under some circumstances. Indeed, ac-
cording to Koonin and his collaborators, the loss and gain of capacities is the primary driving
force behind microbial evolution (Koonin 2003; Koonin and Wolf 2012). Selection for con-
servation of resources by reduction of dispensable capacities is to be expected, and precisely
this kind of evolutionary process leads to unculturability, community interdependence and
both material and mechanistic allonomy. This is the selective or adaptive explanation for loss
of self-directed capacities.
The availability of non-adaptive explanations shows that the phenomena are more likely.10
Notice that once some organism B performs a leaky function (i.e. other-available capacity)
any other member of its community A can lose (or reduce) their capacity to perform that
function at no fitness cost. This also leads to interdependence, since now A cannot live in a
community without B. That is, it need not initially be advantageous to lose a capacity, only
non-disadvantageous, neutral. Add to this the fact that genes often mutate or are deleted at
random during replication and the loss of genes and resulting community interdependence
are likely outcomes even absent selection. This relaxation of the assumptions required to
explain gene loss is the essence of the GQH. It is worth restating the distinction,
[W]hile interdependencies can emerge from selection for genomic reduction,
they can also emerge from neutral changes that are biased more towards interde-
pendency than self-sufficiency (i.e. biased towards self-insufficiency)... At stake
is whether genome reduction is selected for (as “streamlining”) or is simply not
selected against (as in Muller’s ratchet).—Brunet and Doolittle (2018) p.18
10This is because assuming the conditions necessary for selection to take place restricts the cases that the
explanation (BQH) can apply to, and because an explanation (GQH) not so restricted, applicable to a wider set
of cases, is all-things-considered more likely to apply to an arbitrary case.
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Put another way, the biological world is error prone but redundant across many selves.
Self-directed capacities are constantly degrading or being removed entirely, but the presence
of others that still retain those capacities can often be sufficient for the maintenance and
organization of organisms. Selection may have a significant role to play, but mere neutral
variation can result in the eventual change from self-maintenance to other-maintenance, or
self-organization to other-organization. Biosynthesis does not occur in a vacuum separating
self from other.
It is tempting to construe this as a peculiarity of microbial life—a realm already fraught
with difficultly individualized entities (O’Malley 2014)—but analogously allonomous pro-
cesses occur in macroscopic heterotrophic animals, ourselves included. Consider Payne and
Loomis (2006) on the evolutionary loss of amino acid biosynthesis pathways,
When an organism becomes a consumer by eating other organisms, all of the
amino acids are available in the diet and no longer need to be synthesized. Unless
amino acid biosynthetic pathways serve other essential functions besides provid-
ing amino acids, they are unnecessary and dispensable. Genes in dispensable
pathways accumulate deleterious mutations, lose the ability to encode functional
enzymes, and are eventually deleted from the genome. –Payne and Loomis
(2006) p.275
Of the twenty amino acids required to assemble proteins only ten are universally con-
served across animal life, with humans able to synthesize only eleven. Why these particular
capacities could be lost is in part explained by the individual dependencies, or lack thereof,
between capacities. Humans, as noted above, have retained their capacity to synthesize
tyrosine because the capacity to degrade dietary phenylalanine depends on this. But these
interdependencies are species and context specific. For instance, the parasite Cryptosporid-
ium lacks both a tyrosine synthesis and phenylalanine degradation pathway, which Payne
and Loomis (2006) hypothesize is facilitated by the fact that phenylalanine can be rapidly
exchanged with its host. Here the loss of interdependent self-directed capacities and per-
sistence despite allonomy seems more appropriately attributed to organizational openness,
rather than closure.
Moreover, allonomy is not just a peculiarity of physiology, but also obtains in the for-
mation of lineages and self-directed capacities of reproduction. In line with the epigraph
from Maturana and Varela at the beginning of this chapter, when something is found to be
capable of self-reproduction “the naïve approach is to deem it alive”, and Mossio and Moreno
explicitly take self-reproduction to be involved in “fully fledged” biological systems. More-
over, when an entity is observed to have a loss, reduction or transition in self-reproductive
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capacity—such as in obligate endosymbionts—we tend to deny it other biological properties,
such as autonomy and evolutionary individuality (Godfrey-Smith 2013; 2015).
The idea that variation in reproductive mode blurs the distinction between organismal and
non-organismal biological systems has received much prior attention. Queller and Strassmann
(2009) point out why we are primed for conceptual confusion about organismality: a number
of closely related terms are given similar definitions grounded in intuitions about familiar
organisms. Our use of ‘unit of selection’, ‘vehicle’, ‘interactor’ and ‘individual’ all seem to
get us “unnecessarily tied up in issues that only philosophers love” [ibid p.3143]. Building
on the work on evolutionary transitions in individuality of Maynard Smith and Szathmáry
(1995), Queller and Strassmann (2009) begin with the idea that organismality hinges on
a balance of cooperation vs. conflict. They then proceed with a survey—not unlike this
chapter—of marginal cases of organismality. Importantly, they point out that cooperation
and conflict are common, vary widely and often involve reproduction.
There are two ways to interpret Queller and Strassmann’s (2009) survey of reproduc-
tive cooperation. Either we are equipped with a wide variety of marginal cases of self-
reproduction in organisms, or a variety of marginal cases of organismality in self-reproducing
systems. The first unquestionably supports the idea that organisms often lack self-directed
capacities of reproduction; the latter is more problematic. If one is inclined to deny organis-
mality to marginal self-reproducers, then it might seem as if we have vindicated component
(3) in Mossio and Moreno’s (2010) analysis of autonomy—non-self-reproducers (e.g. honey-
bee workers) would not be “fully fledged” organisms. This would be a misinterpretation of
Queller and Strassmann. What Queller and Strassmann (2009) mean to show is that collec-
tions of organisms each individually engage in obligate forms of allonomous reproduction,
and that this sometimes justifies also treating the collection as an organism. Organismality is
not denied to lower level units when they form one at a higher level. A colony of honeybees
is an organism, and so is a honeybee. Moreover, the cells of a honeybee are organisms on
their view, each displaying a high degree of cooperation and low conflict, each obligated
to reproduce cooperatively. In their words, “we have come to learn that all of our familiar
organisms are superorganisms” [ibid].
Another account of variation in self-reproduction is offered by Godfrey-Smith (2013;
2015). Godfrey-Smith takes himself to be providing a general account of reproduction that
can handle cases of symbiotic associations and transitions in individuality. I take him to
provide a typology of recurring biological entities on the basis of varieties of mechanistic
autonomy. Recurring structures can be first divided into reproducing and reconstructed.
The latter includes biological structures like hearts and ribosomes, things that do not form
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lineages and are recreated de novo by other things. Reproducing things can be further divided
into simple, scaffolded and collective. He describes these as follows,
A simple reproducer is something that can give rise to more objects of the same
kind largely through the operation of resources internal to it—through its own
biological machinery, in a broad sense—and further, is not made of smaller
parts that also have this capacity [e.g. a bacterial cell]. A collective reproducer
is a reproducing object that has parts that are themselves simple or collective
reproducers [e.g. a multicellular organism]. Third, a scaffolded reproducer is an
entity that reproduces (or is reproduced) in a way highly dependent on resources
external to itself [e.g. viruses or genes]. –Godfrey-Smith (2015) p.70
The notion of collective reproduction allows the introduction of a hierarchy of potentially
nested or cooperative reproducers, much like the reproductive allonomy described by Queller
and Strassmann. The distinction between simple, scaffolded and reconstructed entities pro-
vides a different spectrum from autonomous to allonomously reproducing organisms11. A
bacterial cell, perhaps only a non-symbiotic lithoautotroph, is a simple reproducer and is au-
tonomous, it possesses every self-directed capacity of reproduction. But as an organism loses
self-directed capacities and begins to depend on others it becomes a scaffolded reproducer,
such as a symbiotic lithoautotroph or an obligate parasite. Finally, if something loses every
capacity to self-reproduce and is entirely re-produced by another self then it is reconstructed
(e.g., a heart, or honey-bee worker).
Intermediate forms of reproduction are widespread. The typology offered applies to clas-
sification of present diversity and of different stages in evolutionary transitions. Evolutionary
history is full of simple-to-scaffolded transitions and marginal intermediates. Godfrey-Smith
recounts the now standard view of eukaryogenesis: an alphaproteobacteria is engulfed by an
archaeon, slowly loses reproductive capacities through selectively driven gene loss (BQH),
and thus ends up a scaffolded reproducer within a collective one.
Eukaryotic cells in different taxa today are at different places on a continuum
from collective to simple reproduction, and their mitochondria are on a contin-
uum from simple to scaffolded reproduction. –[ibid p.2]
The relatedness between the ancestral alphaproteobacteria and some modern intracellular
parasites suggests that the initial stages of eukaryogenesis involved an ordinary parasitic,
11Godfrey-Smith (2015) indeed endorses a view of organisms much like that presented by Mossio and
Moreno, where organisms are “metabolic units” and “systems that maintain their organization in the face of
thermodynamic tendencies”. He does not consider the possibility that an organism, in this sense, could be a
reconstructed entity.
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rather than fortuitous mutualist or physical “engulfing” interaction (Lynch and Marinov 2017;
Brunet and Doolittle 2018), so the origin of eukaryotes may have resembled the allonomous
situation of many present day organisms. Moreover, the transition from autonomous to
allonomous reproduction need not involve obligate intracellularity. Viruses are paradigm
cases of allonomous reproducers at present. However, one going hypothesis for the origin of
viruses—which have intercellular as well as inter-species stages in their life-cycles—likewise
involves their evolution from previously autonomous cellular parasites.12
The importance of these cases lies in the transitional stages between autonomous and
allonomous reproduction. Along these evolutionary paths we find more or less familiar
organisms, such as cellular parasites, that have lost specific capacities related to their self-
reproduction. None are “fully fledged”, since they must periodically return to the genomic or
multicellular nest, but are perhaps “fledgling” autonomous biological systems. The absence
of self-directed capacities often ties the reproduction of a “self” to one or many others,
producing a situation where allonomy can prevail over autonomy. These cases simply cannot
be understood as self-reproducing, autonomous, autopoietic organisms, yet they sit at the
ecological and phylogenetic basis of all complex life. If autopoiesis is supposed to be
the “organization which makes a living system a whole, autonomous, unity that is alive”
(Maturana and Varela 1972), then it is at best a sufficient condition.
3.4.2 Machines That Possess Specific Self-Directed Capacities
The mechanical world is also diverse. The aim of the following sections is to show that
machines are not totally allonomous or allopoietic, by examining some machines from the
science of robotics. Both robotics and virtual machines have received considerable prior
investigation as forms of “artificial life” (Bedau 2003); my intentions are different. For the
present purpose, it is of no concern whether these machines are “alive” according to any
of the myriad “definitions of life” that have been given (see Scharf et al. 2017; Mariscal
and Doolittle 2017) except insofar as those definitions pertain to autonomous organization.
Likewise for the origins of machines. It is equally irrelevant that these, and most, machines
were created by humans and are largely the product of their intentions—if intention was the
MOD (Ch.2) there would be no need to discuss autonomy. I concentrate on showing that
these entities possess forms of autonomy in a literal sense.
12Transitions from allonomous to (more) autonomous reproduction are also possible: another hypothesis
for the origin or viruses sees them as having “escaped” from early genomes, beginning as genomic parasites
such as transposable elements. Likewise, there are cases of multicellular lineages giving rise to contagious
unicellular cancer lineages in clams, dogs and Tasmanian devils (Forterre 2006; Metzger et al. 2015).
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Autonomous capacities in machines cannot be comprehensively surveyed here (see Fong
et al. 2003; Bedau 2003; Pfeifer et al. 2007). The field of contributions is wide, appearing in
Nature, Science, and specialized journals like Autonomous Robots, Robotics and Autonomous
Systems, various issues of Artificial Intelligence, and in the bulletins of private corporations
and governmental bodies. My focus is on providing examples of autonomy in machines
that contrast the forms of allonomy in organisms discussed above, under the headings of the
broad self-directed capacities.
Self-Maintaining (Self-Repairing) Robotics—Self-maintenance requires the ability to
regenerate some of the constraints (components) in a system while responding to external
perturbations.13 While simple forms of self-maintenance may be demonstrated by candle-
flames or gas-motors, robotics has equipped us with more sophisticated capacities: self-
healing materials, and self-repairing robotics. For instance, Markvicka et al. (2018) describe
a ‘elastic composite for soft robotics’, consisting of a stretchable material with embedded
liquid metal particles that “like natural skin or nervous tissue, are self-healing and remain
functional even as material is torn, ruptured or removed”. Hager et al. (2010) also describe
some healing materials as autonomous when their response to damage does not require
subsequent input from a human operator. A more mechanical form of self-maintenance or
self-repair has been developed in the robotic arm of the International Space Station, named
‘Dextre’ and produced by the Canadian Space Agency, which is capable of “self-healing” by
automatically replacing some of its parts.14
While being unable to regenerate specific components, some varieties of swarm robotics—
robotic systems composed of many similar units—can excise damaged units and reform
an approximation of their pre-damaged state. This type of self-maintenance was called
self-assembly and self-repair by Tomita et al. (1999) (also see Rubenstein et al. 2014).
Forms of self-maintenance that rely on a stockpile of available components to be replaced are
somewhat dissatisfying, being a kind of mechanistic autonomy with material allonomy. But
this same poverty of capacities is present in organisms, as in cases where absent amino-acid
biosynthesis pathways are offset by amino-acid consumption. Dextre cannot persist without
the availability of its components, but we cannot persist in an environment devoid of histidine.
While distinct mechanistically from organismal self-maintenance, these are nonetheless cases
where the existing constraints in a system help regenerate those same constraints and can
respond to external perturbations.
13There are many examples of robotics that can maintain some behavior despite exogenous interference:
Raibert et al. (2008) and Hutter et al. (2016) have both produced dog-like robots that can perform tasks despite
being struck, falling or being pulled by rope. This kind of cybernetic or homeostatic adjustment to external
stimulus is found in embryo in thermostats and any mechanical governor.
14Canadian Space Agency, January 2021, https://www.asc-csa.gc.ca/eng/iss/dextre/about.asp
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What Mossio and Moreno add to the notion of self-maintenance is an emphasis on the role
of energy flow. While a system may degrade from external damage, it might also exhaust its
energy reserves. Various companies produce robots that accomplish phototaxis to overcome
some energy loss. These are usually simple robots that can seek out sunlight and store the
energy necessary for movement. For example, there are light-seeking houseplant pots, and
robotic lawnmowers.15 A more interesting case is provided by Iropoulos and colleagues at
the Bristol Robotics Laboratory, who study “energetic autonomy” by linking robot behavior
to chemical energy acquisition (Iropoulos et al. 2005; Melhuish et al. 2006). These authors
have produced a robot called EcoBotII that can autonomously find sources of chemical energy
(sugar cubes, flies or slugs), digest them in specialized Microbial Fuel Cells (MFCs), and
store this energy for later use. Since microbes do most of the metabolic reactions required
for energy production, they describe this as a variety of ‘artificial symbiosis’. Here, the
mechanical portion of EcoBotII is much like the giant tube worm described above: in both
cases the resident microbes lose some energetic autonomy which is gained by the (robotic or
animal) host.
Self-Organizing Robotics—Recall that the highest form of biological self-organization
described by Mossio and Moreno requires that a set of constraints be collectively self-
maintaining, i.e. that a set of mutually dependent constraints be closed. But also recall that
this collectivity is partial: that only some of the constraints in a system are required to be
in relationships of mutual dependence. This is a weakening of the view, highlighted above,
that makes it possible to see many machines as engaged in—at least marginal—forms of
autonomy. The self-maintenance of the robotic arm Dextre was used to replace cameras, if
those cameras were required to measure or position arm movements, this would be a mutual
dependence between two self-maintaining constraints (components). Likewise, the MFCs
of EcoBotII require the constant input of energetic material to provide enough energy for
motion in search of this material. Both Dextre and EcoBotII exhibit, at least marginal, forms
of organizational closure between (some) pairs of their mechanical components.
A number of researchers in robotics claim to study both biological and technological
“self-organizing systems”—sometimes referred to as “self-assembling systems”—drawing
inspiration from the organization of tissues during cell differentiation or from swarms of
social insects. R. Nagpal and colleagues offer a case with a peculiar magnitude of collective
parts, KiloBot: 1000 small robots able to “self-assemble” into various shapes (Rubenstein
et al. 2014). This kind of mutual dependence and collective interaction is not unique. The
Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers has published volumes on “self-assembly”
15See article on houseplant robots by Amy McDermott (https://www.pnas.org/content/116/31/15313), and for
robotic lawnmowers see Valify project (https://hackaday.io/project/72497-valify-v2-robot-lawnmower) (January
2021).
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and “self-organization” since the early 2000s (see Yim et al. 2007). This self-organization
and self-reorganization is collective, involves massive mutual dependence between parts, and
partially regenerates some of the constraints that exist within a larger organization.
Self-Reproducing Robotics—The notion of a self-reproducing machine, automaton, began
with the work of von Neumann in the early 1950s (von Neumann and Burks 1966), but was
arguably not realized until 2003, when Suthakorn et al. (2003) produced “the world’s first
fully functional autonomously self-replicating robot”. They built this machine out of LEGO.
The robot is able to collect a number of parts, each corresponding to one of its subsystems,
and assemble them into a whole that is able to perform the same task. Why robotics engineers
would term this ‘self-replication’ instead of ‘self-assembly’ is evidently due to the fact that
the assembly of a new machine is caused, not by the parts, but by another similar machine.
Though this may be a form of self-replication, it is comparatively simple: there are only
four subsystems, and the machine cannot assemble any of the parts of these subsystems
themselves.
Some robotic systems surpass this and produce some of their parts. If we consider the
individual units within a robotic swarm to be its parts, then the “self-replicating cubes”
reported in Zykov et al. (2005) are a marginal form of self-reproduction or growth. The
authors present robotic cubes that, when interlinked with a few copies, can build more
such cubes from a number of parts provided—another case of mechanistic autonomy with
material allonomy. More impressive is the actual production of parts used in copies—i.e.
partial material autonomy as well. This was demonstrated in a proof of concept design by
Adrian Bowyer and colleagues at the University of Bath (Jones et al. 2011; in dissertation,
Sells 2009). The authors present what they call a ‘kinematic assisted self-replicating and
self-manufacturing machine’, a 3d-printer that is able to print a “significant fraction” of its
parts to be assembled by human operators. They call this machine RepRap.
The explanation of the genesis of RepRap is strikingly in line with my argument against an
MOD based on autonomy. Jones et al. (2011) claim, as many in the field of robotics do, that
their robot “was instigated by biomimetically considering extant naturally evolving strategies
for reproduction”. Interestingly, they do not locate inspiration for RepRap in an autonomous
reproducer, but in the phenomena of symbiosis, noting, as above, that the lithotrophic
microorganisms are the exception, not the rule, and that the vast majority of living things are
interdependent. Jones et al. (2011) take this to imply that most reproducers, like RepRap,
are ‘assisted self-reproducers’ (i.e. allonomous, scaffolded, or integrated reproducers). They
argue that it is a proven evolutionary strategy to engage in reproductive mutualisms—citing
Butler’s Erewhon—similar to that between bees and flowers. The machine provides some
additional parts useful to us in exchange for our symbiotic assistance in copying. The first
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machine was completed in 2008, and in 2011 there were 4500 across the world stemming
from this ‘ancestor’—an apparently successful mutualism for RepRap.
3.5 Conclusion: Spectra of Autonomy
All of the autonomous robotics evidenced today are semi-autonomous, none reach the level of
“fully fledged” autonomy. Neither do many organisms. The autonomy-allonomy distinction
spans and cuts across biological and technological diversity. Maturana and Varela were
correct when they said the “naïve approach” was to deem something alive if autonomous—
there are prima facie non-living things with some autonomy. And on the contrary, there
are living things with a significant degree of allonomy. When Mossio and Moreno talk
of increasing autonomous capacities of self-maintenance and self-organization or closure
leading to a “crucial transition between the physiochemical and the biological domain” or
“a fundamental property of... biological organisms”, this is only half of the picture—the
other half involving the “technological domain” or “automatons”. Autonomous machines
likewise possess forms of these capacities as “crucial transitions” or “fundamental properties”,
distinguishing them from their familiar relatives.
In this chapter I have addressed the diversity of autonomy and its distribution in machines.
The Kantian grounding of teleology (for Nicholson 2013) or autonomy (for Maturana and
Varela 1972; and Moreno and Mossio 2010) in reciprocal causation among parts, in features
of “organization”, is only applicable at a very coarse grain of analysis when applied to a
narrow sample of living and mechanical things. When we look at more fine grains of analysis,
to the refined self-directed capacities, and to a broader range of organisms and machines, the
gap between autopoietic and allopoietic, between autonomous and allonomous, begins to be
filled. I take this to show that an MOD cannot be made on the basis of autonomy.
But neo-Kantian accounts of organization are not the only way in which the internal
makeup of organisms has been used to distinguish them from machines. In the following two
chapters I discuss two other contemporary views of the MOD that trace back further than
Kant. First (Ch.4), Dupré (2018; 2017; 2013; 2012) and Dupré and Nicholson (2018) have
shifted the focus from the merely reciprocal nature of causation in organisms to its processual
nature, tracing this view back, much farther, to Heraclitus. Next (Ch.5), a cluster of views
falling under the umbrella of neo- or New Mechanism (Machamer et al. 2000; Bechtel 2011),
has also been argued to provide a metaphysics of biological causation, itself dating back
to older mechanistic ideas, most significantly to the mechanical philosophy of Descartes.
Perhaps, one may hope, Descartes or Heraclitus can provide the MOD that Kant could not.
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The following two chapters argue that they do not provide the MOD and, moreover, that the
metaphysics of process and mechanism are better off without it.
Chapter 4
Process Ontology and the Machine
Organism Distinction
Abstract
I argue against MODs lodged within process ontology, represented primarily by the views
of John Dupré and Dan Nicholson. Process ontology has encouraged philosophers to think
differently about organisms, though it has done so at times by advancing MODs. These
MODs fall generally under the headings of “constitutivity of processes”, “material flux”, and
“hierarchical stabilization”. I show that there are machines today that enjoy the properties
that Dupré and collaborators advocate as specifically organismal. I take this not as a rejection
of process ontology, but as an argument against the MODs thought to support it, and as an
argument for a processual ontology of technology insofar as a processual ontology of biology
is appropriate.1
Introduction
This chapter is much like Ch.2-3: I will consider another group of MODs on offer in the
literature and argue against them. It is also different in two ways. Firstly, this and the next
chapter are the first to deal with the MOD as a problem of metaphysics. Secondly, my aim in
this chapter is more synthetic and less negative than Ch.2-3.
Process ontology (AKA ‘processualism’, ‘process metaphysics’, or simply ‘process
philosophy’) and neo-mechanism (Machamer et al. 2000) are often positioned as as rival
metaphysics—each competing to provide the correct account of organisms, and each dealing
1This work was presented at the 2019 meeting of ISHPSSB, Oslo.
66 Process Ontology and the Machine Organism Distinction
differently with how to distinguish organisms from machines.2 A more in-depth discussion
of new-mechanism will follow (Ch.5), though it will sometimes be necessary to discuss and
contrast both here. The hope for processualism is that it can provide us with a metaphysical
account of organisms. In recent work by Dupré and collaborators, justifications for proces-
sualism have relied on MODs that are subject to naturalistic counterexamples. I see the
provision of MODs as an improper justification for process ontology, and argue against them
here. However, the merits of process ontology are much broader than the specific issue of
the MOD. Instead of pushing back against a processual-MOD by arguing against process
ontology, and for neo-mechanism, I argue that machines have a place within process ontology.
The overall aim of this chapter is to argue that being properly subjected to a processual
analysis is not an MOD.
This chapter consists of four main parts: In § 1 I provide an overview of process
philosophy of biology, arguing that it is a viable metaphysical account of biology, despite
some problems. In § 2 I explain how the metaphysics of process philosophy is connected
to the MOD. In § 3 I detail some of the MODs offered within process ontology, focusing
on those of Dupré and Nicholson (2018), and argue that these MODs are neither true nor
supportive of process ontology. Finally in § 4 I argue that, far from needing to exclude
machines from a process ontology of biology, we are better off by integrating machines into
a “process ontology of technology”, and I provide some elaboration of what that should look
like.
4.1 Process Ontology is a Contender
Modern proponents of process ontology in science make use of concepts of process origi-
nating from ancient, early-modern and modern sources. I begin with a short philosophical
history of processualisms leading up to its modern formulation within the philosophy of
biology. What is perhaps new in modern process philosophy is its application as an analytic
philosophy of science. The role of process philosophy in the philosophy of biology in
particular has been called a “trend”, “rise”, “turn”, “paradigm shift”, “revolution”, “recon-
ceptualization” and even “revisualization” (Seibt 2018; Dupré and Nicholson 2018). It has
received substantial attention in the literature and its advocates have replied to a variety of
criticisms (see § 4.2). It finds one of its most prominent defenders today in John Dupré, who
has become the modern champion of a specifically biological process ontology (Dupré 2018;
2Since my issue is only with the latter, I will not directly address the disputes between these philosophies
except insofar as it bears on the provision of an MOD by either.
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2017; 2013; 2012; Dupré and Nicholson 2018; Dupré and Bapteste 2013; O’Malley and
Dupré 2005; also see Woese 2004).
Outside the philosophy of biology, general process philosophy is often characterized
as a rising underdog. This is not quite right: process philosophies broadly speaking are
coeval with the origins of philosophy, and processual concepts coexist with substance and
mechanistic ones throughout scientific and non-scientific discourse. Processualism of some
form has been around since antiquity. Rescher (1996) traces process philosophies from the
‘flux’ of Heraclitus in the 5th century BCE, through Plato and Aristotle, Leibnitz, Hegel,
Peirce, James, Bergson, Dewey and Whitehead. It is common to attribute the origin of
process philosophy to Heraclitus. The attribution is based on a single fragment of his
writing, the so-called river passage, which is variously translated and perhaps even originally
ungrammatical.
On those who enter the same rivers, ever different waters flow. —Heraclitus (c.
470 BCE)
The river passage, though prima facie an innocuous comment about the non-identity
of successive portions of moving fluid, is interpreted by process philosophers as offering
the first profound claim about the identity of certain kinds: some things stay “the same” by
constantly changing.3 Though an ancient source for contemporary process philosophy, it
is dubious whether Heraclitus should mark the origin of process philosophy. For one, it is
plausible that Heraclitus was not advocating an idiosyncratic metaphysical view of change
at all, but was instead merely providing another example of his broader philosophy of the
“unity of opposites”. In connection with other fragments of Heraclitus, e.g. “The way up and
the way down is one and the same” (Burnet 1908, fr.69), the river passage can be seen as just
another attempt to unify the opposites of “sameness” and “difference”. And there are other
ancient sources, less mired in interpretive difficulties.
Even before Heraclitus, in India (c. 480 BCE), the last words of the historical Buddha are
sometimes reported to begin as “Conditioned4 things are by nature perishable. . . ”. And later,
in Japan (c. 1210 CE), the Buddhist monk Chomei left notes with a passage nearly identical
to Heraclitus’s river passage, almost surely of independent origin.
On flows the river ceaselessly, nor does its water ever stay the same. —Chomei,
c. 1210 CE
3The above translation is, perhaps, a more accurate rendering of the river quote: “One cannot step into the
same river twice.” This is not found in the fragments of Heraclitus. The river quote seems to be preferred by
some since it makes a stronger claim about the impossibility of identity over time for changing entities.
4There is a vast literature on the correct interpretation and translation of ‘Sankharas’, above rendered as
‘conditioned things’.
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These early philosophies leave us with processualism in an innocent form: change is empha-
sized over stasis. Later versions of process philosophy elevate it to a metaphysics in its own
right and almost invariably position themselves in opposition to another metaphysics. That
rival, depending on the advocate, is either essentialist (substance) metaphysics, mechanical
philosophy, or neo-mechanism—Locke, Descartes, or Machamer et al. (2000)5.
The next major leap in process philosophy came with the speculative metaphysics of
Alfred North Whitehead’s (1929) Process and Reality. Though largely impenetrable,6
Whitehead’s philosophy does contain perhaps the first modern and general formulation of a
tenet of process philosophy that was—in Heraclitus and Chomei at least—only gestured at.
How an actual entity becomes constitutes what that actual entity is. . . Its ‘being’
is constituted by its ‘becoming’. This is the ‘principle of process’.—Whitehead
(1929) p.31
Whitehead’s formulation of this principle of process is a more explicitly processual version
of the earlier statements of Heraclitus, Chomei and the Buddha.7 Whitehead termed his view
the ‘philosophy of organism’. Perhaps processualism as a philosophy of biology begins here,
although his processual ‘philosophy of organism’ was hardly what we would think of today
as a process-based account of organismality. His view instead presumed a kind of processual
nature to organisms and provided a re-description of even non-biological things—the cosmos,
god—in organismal terms. His view was panpsychist and organicist, attributing mind- and
organism-like properties to non-minds and non-organisms.8
In a sense, process ontology today is a neo-processualism. It has abandoned Whiteheadian
(and Bergonsian) metaphysical terminology, and largely—though not completely—separated
itself from organicism and panpsychism.9 Although the move from the mechanical philos-
ophy of Descartes to neo-mechanism was an almost total metaphysical refurbishment, the
5More on mechanism below, in § 4 and Ch.5
6Apparently in all seriousness, Dupré (2013) remarks on the worry that ‘process’ is poorly characterized
that “it is widely feared that taking processes seriously as a basic ontological category will require reading
Whitehead, who is rumored to be unreadable and possibly unintelligible”, but maintains that that biological
pay-offs of the notion are so great that “we have a real motivation to think seriously about process—even if it
does mean reading Whitehead” [ibid, p. 31].
7Even this comparatively succinct statement in Whitehead requires some disambiguation and unpacking.
The reference to ‘actual entities’ could easily be misinterpreted as a concession to mechanism, especially since
neo-mechanists make ‘entities’ part of their dualist ontology. Whitehead is rife with synonyms for ‘a specific
process’, which are indeed sometimes called ‘entities’. Likewise, though ‘becoming’ certainly includes the
more narrow notion of “the origin of something” it should not be restricted to that use. Whitehead seems to treat
‘becoming’ as a general word for what might be better, and sometimes is, rendered as ‘processes of change’.
8It was ‘organicist’ only in retrospect, since ‘organicism’ proper came after Whitehead.
9Though Dupré and Nicholson (2018, p.11, fn.8) are careful to distance themselves from parallel projects
that have attempted to flesh out a process based philosophy of biology from Whitehead’s more panpsychist
comments, Dupré (2017) concludes with a “speculative” thought that “agency is a much more natural attribution”
to processes, rather than things or substances. Denis Walsh (Dupré and Nicholson 2018, p.167) comes to similar
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change to process ontology of biology from earlier process philosophies is more continuous—
as is fitting. Dupré (2017) makes use of Rescher’s (2004) general process philosophy, and
Dupré and Nicholson (2018) acknowledge some antecedent roots (of inspiration at least) in
both Whitehead and the organicists.
[I]t is perhaps more appropriate to describe organicism as a philosophy of biology
that was inspired by Whitehead than as a genuinely Whiteheadian philosophy of
biology... We regard the organicists as kindred spirits and consider our project to
be continuous with the earlier tradition in the philosophy of biology to which
they belong.—Dupré and Nicholson (2018) p.11
There are other process ontological views—process theists and various process philosophies
of physics—but in Dupré and collaborators we find a process ontology of biology. The
following section dissects that philosophy into four features that are thought to apply specif-
ically to organisms, to prepare for the arguments § 4.4 that indeed these features are not
specific to organisms but apply to some machines also.
4.2 Four Key Features of Process Ontology Today
In this section I will spell out what I take to be the main features of processualism, with
attention specifically on its consequences for our analysis of organisms.
4.2.1 Constitutivity of Process
Aside from metaphysical precursors, Dupré (2012) pins some antecedents of his view in the
Developmental Systems Theory (DST) of Griffiths10 and Gray (1994).
DST teaches—or reminds—us that there is much more than the passage of
genes needed to transmit living form from one generation to the next. . . [DST]
points us towards a fundamental fact about organisms: they are not properly
understandable in terms of one set of properties, say those of the adult organism,
but are ultimately processes.—Dupré (2012) p.2, my emphasis
Clearly, one can “understand” a great deal about organisms by simply looking at the
static characteristics of adult specimens—perhaps by freezing them and taking cross sections,
conclusions under his heading of “methodological vitalism”. While certainly not panpsychist, this kind of
description of processes by analogy with agents is a sort of “panagentialism”.
10Griffiths and Stotz (2018) furthermore trace their emphasis on developmental systems and de-emphasis of
adult forms to Waddington (1952).
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or basing theories on photographs taken in the wild. Moreover, there are plenty of scientific
contexts where precisely this kind of understanding of organisms would be “proper”—such
as in anatomy, or demography. I take Dupré’s point to be about a deeper, more fundamental
understanding. When Dupré (2012) says that organisms are not “properly understandable” in
terms of one set of (adult) properties, it is best to interpret him as offering a claim about how
processes of change are constitutive of being an organism. Perhaps, in a slogan: ontogeny is
organismality.
This is plausibly a biological instance of Whitehead’s “principle of process”, that an
organism’s being is constituted by its becoming. That it is (often cyclic) living processes and
not particular, static, sets of properties that are the proper objects of biological inquiry is
perhaps the most fundamental claim of process ontology of biology.
[T]he organism encompasses the entire life cycle; indeed, it is the life cycle itself
that constitutes the organism. —Dupré and Nicholson (2018) p.19
When one studies static sets of an organism’s properties, one just isn’t studying everything
that organism encompasses. For example, when one studies the anatomy of adult graylag
geese, one is explicitly not studying graylag geese in toto. An organism in perpetual stasis
ceases to be the organism that it was (in a sense to be explicated in § 4.3.1). When a
hibernating frog is caught in glacial ice, instead of temporarily frozen pond mud, it is no
longer going through the seasonal changes characteristics of its life cycle. It is not just
the properties of the adult that count. The changes in development (and degeneration) are
fundamental aspects of what it means to be an organism.
We apparently cannot escape this DST/processualist conclusion in molecular biology
either. That we cannot properly understand an organism in terms of one set of properties
holds for genetic properties too, according to Dupré (2011; 2017; 2018). While a gene-
essentialist approach to studying organisms with changing life cycles might identify them
with the constant properties of the genome, Dupré (2011) argues that it cannot serve this role,
since the genome also changes with development. Dupré (2017) summarizes this position by
pointing out that,
[G]enome sequence is as much the consequence of organismic stability as it
is its source. For a process. . . no such constant property is required.—Dupré
(2017) p.2
A processual view of organisms does not see them as “things”, constant or persisting sets
of (essential) properties, either at the level of gross phenotypic nor molecular and genomic
traits.
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4.2.2 Hierarchical Stabilization
While process ontologies are resistant to seeing organisms or life cycles as “things”, sub-
stances, or entities, certain processes nonetheless enjoy varieties of individuality, holism,
temporal extension, persistence, and re-identifiability. To the process ontologists, we simply
do not need things or substances to support these latter, important, concepts. For instance,
that there are no constant characteristics shared by different stages of a life cycle does not
prevent us from considering these stages as parts of a whole or “individual process” (Dupré
2017).11 Process ontology of biology nonetheless does differ in how individual processes
are explained.12 For things, the major problem is explaining how and why they change. For
processes, change is a given, so we need an account of their stasis or “stability”. Process
ontology of biology demands an explanation of the stabilization of organisms as individual
processes.
At the level of general process philosophy, the outline of an explanation for the stability
of an individual process is quite clear. Since all processes are thought to be “dynamic” or in
“flux”, the explanation for the apparent stability of a given process will need to be provided
in terms of particulars about the dynamicity or flux of other processes. Stable processes are
thought of as a confluence of (near) equal and (near) opposite effects of other processes,
themselves potentially unstable. Dupré and others moreover claim that only relative stability
is available; stability is only ever apparent over a given timescale. Some processes will be
stable, entity-like, though this is an abstraction justified only in cases of scientific explanation
where that stability is constant over the timescale of the explanation (Dupré 2017). All
apparently stable processes are, over a longer timescale, unstable. Explanations of the
stability of particular processes over a given scale then depend on their treatment within a
specific science (§ 4.5).
Consider a vortex. A vortex forms when fluid moves in a rotating path around some axis.
In a whirlpool or tornado the axis meets the center point; in a smoke-ring or mushroom-cloud
that axis is curved into a circle. A vortex is certainly something we individuate (more or less
precisely) as a pattern of flux.13 Unlike comparatively more static entities of the same overall
shape—a single candelabra or a metal ring—explaining a vortex requires an account of how
it stabilizes in that particular configuration (during a given time period). This explanation
will differ depending on the vortex, but will invariably require reference to both the internal
processes within the vortex (such as the rotation of air) and to external processes in its
11Seibt 2018) works towards defining a “processual mereology” along similar lines to the traditional
mereology of substances.
12This is Dupré’s terminology, inspired by the use of “individuals” as opposed to “classes” in Hull and
Ghiselin.
13The term ‘flux’ in its mathematical sense is defined via motion through a surface or body.
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environment (such as the formation of temperature gradients in the atmosphere). It may also
require reference to processes at different temporal and physical scales, such as the molecular
characteristics of the fluctuating substance or seasonal variation in atmospheric conditions.
In the specifically biological context, this idea that processes require explanations for
their stability has been unified with an account of the biological hierarchy to provide an
account of “hierarchical stabilization”.
[A]n organism is not organized as a hierarchy of structures (as a machine is), but
as a hierarchy of processes. . . Accordingly, the stability of a multicellular organ-
ism as a whole derives from the continuous regeneration of its tissues, which are
themselves maintained by the incessant renewal of their cells, which are in turn
stabilized by the ongoing replenishment of their molecular constituents.—Dupré
and Nicholson (2018) p.16
Organisms conceived as processes are stabilized over diverse timescales at different
hierarchical levels. During its life cycle an organism is stable, homeostatic, in the face of
changing internal and external conditions, such as metabolic activity and environmental
changes. Moreover, species or lineages may remain stable over evolutionary timescales—
consider the relative evolutionary stability of Crocodylus. Dupré (2018; 2017) and Dupré
and Nicholson’s (2018) Manifesto For A Processual Philosophy of Biology, address two
important aspects of this view, one below and one above the level of organisms. These will be
addressed in turn before turning to the relationship between the MOD and process ontology
(§ 4.4)
4.2.3 Material Flux
Process ontologists consider the flow of matter during metabolism to be both evidence for
their view and, more strongly, correctly understood within it. Dupré and Nicholson (2018,
p.15) say that metabolic turnover is “one of the strongest motivations for adopting a process
ontology” and that “from a metabolic perspective, it is simply a matter of fact that, in an
organism, everything flows” (ibid, p.17). The guiding idea is that some aspect of the flow of
matter and energy through the bodies of organisms, such as its metabolic or thermodynamic
nature, suggests a processual over a substance, thing-based or machine-based ontology.
Notice that this simply follows from a rejection of a thing-based ontology if we consider
machines to be paradigm things, and not processes. Nicholson (2018) at times says as
much: “After all, what are machines if not persistent material things with determinate sets of
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properties. . . ” (in Dupré and Nicholson 2018 p.141). Carl Woese,14 a founder of molecular
biology, points to precisely the same thing.
Machines are not made of parts that continually turn over, renew. The organism
is. Machines are stable and accurate because they are designed and built to be
so. The stability of an organism lies in resilience, the homeostatic capacity to
re-establish itself.—Carl Woese (2004) p.176
Process ontologists cite the often surprising rates that biological structures are replaced
or repaired. Moreover, processualists note how these rates only seem to increase as we move
down the (organizational) hierarchy, from tissues to cells and finally macromolecules. Dupré
and Nicholson (2018, p.17), citing the New York Times article Your Body Is Younger Than
You Think by Nicholas Wade (2005), point to the fact that the liver as a whole is replaced
annually, the entire skeleton is replaced on average every 10 years, and the protein turnover
rate is approximately 8% daily.15
The significance of a processual understanding of metabolic turnover is easily underesti-
mated. Non-processualists plainly do not deny the events of turnover and often explain it
mechanistically, so it is hard to see why turnover would support an alternative metaphysic.16
To process ontologists, the importance of metabolic turnover is not simply a shift in em-
phasis towards the replacement or renewal of parts over their constancy or persistence—the
persistence of parts is precisely what the process ontologsts believes is most in need of
explanation. Instead, it can be taken as a call for metaphysical reform in analyzing claims
about physiology, metabolism and cell biology (see Nicholson 2019). Indeed, if the flow
of consumed and metabolized material is supportive of process ontology, then some claims
about flux within modern molecular biology seem deeply confused.
The term ‘metabolic flux’ is used in molecular biology to refer—sometimes equivocally—
to both the rate and actual event of biochemical transformation or movement of metabolites,
either between states or between compartments. For example, the (rate of) transformation of
fructose-1,6-bisphospate (FBP) to fructose-6-phosphate (F6P) during gluconeogenesis by the
enzyme Fructose-1,6-Bisphosphatase (FBPase) is the metabolic flux of FBP through FBPase
to F6P. Kochanowski et al. (2013) have shown that this reaction is governed by a “flux
sensor”, i.e., that the rates of production and overall concentration of FBP reciprocally affect
14Woese’s evolutionary theory is addressed in Ch.6.
15These results indeed require more cautionary interpretation than Dupré and Nicholson provide. For
instance, a 8% /d protein turnover rate might mislead that all proteins in the body are turned over on average
every 12 days, but that would require more metabolic activity than any human body is capable of. I will discuss
these and similar results critically below.
16I take it that “events of change” is metaphysically ambiguous between “mechanism of change” and “process
of change”, which I intend here to avoid begging any questions against either side of that debate.
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the production of the protein FBPase. Consider the admixture of computational, cybernetic,
metabolic, mechanistic, and processual concepts in their discussion,
Flux-sensing mechanisms can be integrated into regulatory control circuits: a
nutrient flows into a cell and realizes a metabolic flux that is being measured and
used for regulation of protein expression, which (in the case of enzymes) will in
turn influence flux, overall resulting in robust control loops.—Kochanowski et
al. (2013, p.4)
If Dupré and others are correct that material flux through organisms is a strong motivation
for adopting a process ontology, then mechanistic claims like that of Kochanowski et al.
(2013) above are, at least, suspect targets for reform. A (neo)-mechanist explanation of
metabolic flux in terms of persisting entities will apparently be incorrect if any constituent
entity is dynamic. According to Dupré this poses a problem if the entities are dynamic over
the timescale of the events explained. Likewise, Nicholson (2019) notes the non-mechanistic
nature of gene regulation of the sort needed to regulate FBP flux. In this case of regulation of
flux, and similar, the dynamic changes in an enzyme is an event to be explained: enzyme
concentrations are dynamic over the course of FBP metabolic flux. On the processual
perspective, the phrase ‘the mechanism of a metabolic flux sensor’ is a misnomer: in reality,
there are only lower level metabolic processes that stabilize higher level ones, such as the
process of FBPase inhibition stabilizing the metabolic flux through gluconeogenesis.
4.2.4 Top-Down Evolutionary Stabilization
[I]t is self-evident that evolution is a process, it is less clear how we should
think about the nature of the entities that participate in this process.—Dupré and
Nicholson (2018) p.34
I have up to this point considered hierarchical stabilization of individual processes with
respect to external environmental processes and internal metabolic ones. What remains is the
processual account of stabilization at levels higher than the organism: in species as evolving
lineages. It is obvious from the forgoing that the evolving entities will turn out to be processes:
some developmental systems or life cycles are sufficiently integrated to form lineages, which
are temporally extended processes that are the participants in evolutionary change (Dupré
2018).17 What is interesting about including the reference to evolution as a process is seeing
17Dupré is somewhat loose as to which life cycles are sufficient—in Dupré (2017) he argues that only
sexual species are individuals, whereas Dupré and Nicholson (2018) seem to follow (and expand on) the more
traditional line of the Hull-Ghiselin thesis in arguing that all species are individual processes, including perhaps
asexual ones. Although, this fits well within the scheme of Dupré’s overall commitment to promiscuous realism.
4.3 Relationship Between Process Ontology and the MOD 75
evolution as imparting stabilization on lower levels of the biological hierarchy.18 Essentially,
process ontologists note the processual nature of stabilizing selection.
Trans-generational or lineage stabilization is in part affected by biochemical processes
that ensure reproductive fidelity and can repair some forms of genetic alterations. The process
ontologist points out that this bottom-up explanation of lineage stability is insufficient. DNA
repair mechanisms are imperfect, and reproductive fidelity is too limited to produce the
kind of stabilization enjoyed by lineages over long periods of time. Think crocodiles again.
Additionally, we must account for the top-down effects of stabilizing selection, i.e. the
death or reduced reproduction of un- or less-fit variants taking place continually as they
arise. Indeed, lower-level biochemical processes also introduce variation, most of which is
deleterious and destabilizing for lineages. This must be selected away “at a higher level” to
maintain stability. Moreover, for asexual species at least, we must expect that stabilizing
selection contributes significantly to the explanation of stabilization, sufficiently at least to
oppose the constant introduction of mutations—stabilizing selection must be able to wrench
Muller’s ratchet.
In the above I have uncritically stated what I take to be the major points of process
ontology (as advocated by Dupré and collaborators). We are given a monist metaphysics
where the fundamental ontological category consists of processes, which are seen by proces-
sualists as providing the identity or individuality conditions for familiar entities (organisms,
lineages) and explained using a hierarchical framework that focuses on their stabilization, as
opposed to stasis, in the face of otherwise constant flux. In the following section (§ 4.3) I will
show how process metaphysics has been connected with the specific project of defining and
defending an MOD. Essentially, process ontology together with the assumption that there
is some MOD leads to the conclusion that it is within a process ontology of biology that
such an MOD should be made. In § 4.4 I will examine specific MODs offered by process
ontologists, arguing both that they fail and that, even were they true, they do not speak in
favour of process philosophy.
4.3 Relationship Between Process Ontology and the MOD
In this section I argue that the provision of an MOD by process philosophers amounts to a
specific and independent processualist theory under the broader heading of process ontology
18This seems to be “self-evident” when we consider the alternative “evolution is a thing”, a patent category
mistake. But when we consider the alternative that “evolution is a mechanism” there certainly are biological
discussions of “mechanisms of evolution” (see Rose and Doolittle’s (1983) Molecular biological mechanisms
of speciation).
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of science. Thus, we can argue against processual MODs without denying process ontology
in general. To begin, we should separate out three theses of process philosophy (MT, ST
and DT below), the latter two of which relate directly to the philosophy of biology. The
distinction thesis (DT), last below, is connected to the MOD and will be my primary concern.
MT Metaphysical Thesis: The world is ontologically composed of processes, i.e. not of
mechanisms, things or substances.
ST Scientific Thesis: The correct ontology of biology is a process ontology, i.e., ontologi-
cal questions about biology are successfully settled by processualism.
DT Distinction Thesis: Process ontology successfully distinguishes biological entities from
mechanical ones. Process ontology of biology successfully analyses the distinction
between machines and organisms.
Each thesis has defenders. Whitehead’s philosophy of organism and Bergon’s Creative
Evolution are both metaphysical and scientific theses. Dupré (2018; 2017; 2013) often
defends both MT and ST. Although with coauthors, such as Dupré and Bapteste (2013) and
O’Malley and Dupré (2005), Dupré has focused more directly on processual varieties of
specific scientific theories in biology—microbiology and systems biology, respectively. Since
(neo-)mechanism is the de facto rival scientific ontology, many authors offer something in
support of ST (e.g. Dupré 2018; 2013; Dupré and Nicholson 2018, c.f. Austin 2016). I will
concentrate on the versions of the MOD and DT advocated in Dupré and Nicholson (2018).
The ordering of the above theses is important. If we assume that machines and organisms
are really ontologically distinct (i.e. MOD, not DT itself), then justification runs up the list
while implication runs down: DT justifies ST, which in turn justifies MT, while MT implies
ST, and assuming the MOD, ST implies DT.
4.3.1 Justification of Theses
The distinction thesis is used as justification for the scientific, and the scientific for the
metaphysical—although none implies the next in this order. In the first case, if process
philosophy can settle the issue of the distinction between machines and organisms, this give
us reason to think that process philosophy provides the correct ontology of biology. Were it
the correct ontology of biology, then it should settle any real distinctions between elements
of that ontology (organisms) and others (machines). This seems to be the implicit reason for
many to address machines in advocating for a process ontology of biology (see Austin 2016,
and § 4), but few are more explicit about it than Nicholson (2018).
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Demonstrating the ontological inadequacy of the MCO [machine conception
of the organism] is a necessary first step if we are to come to terms with the
processual nature of life and lay the foundations for a processual philosophy of
biology.—Nicholson (2018, in Dupré and Nicholson 2018, p.141)
This kind of justification is abductive in the sense that it justifies on the basis of (hypothet-
ical) best explanations. It is not inductive, in a more probabilistic sense: the correct ontology
for theories is certainly not often or always determined on the basis of its ability to distinguish
its objects from machines. Instead, we are invited to think that the correct ontology of biology
should be one that is at least capable of distinguishing machines from organisms. Thus, if
processes ontology can do that, it satisfies at least this necessary condition.
Secondly, the scientific success of process ontology of biology provides a reason that it
is the correct metaphysical account of reality. Dupré and others also point to the apparent
success of processual theories in others sciences, such as physics, for truly inductive support.
This latter justification for process metaphysics is less contentious. Surely, if we intend to
be naturalistic about reasons for theory choice in metaphysics, then we ought to look to the
ontologies actually or ideally used by natural sciences. If biology and many other sciences
are best analyzed with an ontology of process (ST), then a good (naturalistically: the best)
explanation for this is that every domain of the world is processual (MT). In the final section
(§ 4.5) I in effect bolster this claim myself by arguing that, insofar as we accept a process
ontology of biology, we have reason to accept a process ontology of technology—further
reason to favour the overall metaphysical thesis.
4.3.2 Implications Between Theses
Arguing that, given process metaphysics, process ontology of biology ought to establish the
MOD is easier. The central tenet of process metaphysics is that processes are the fundamental
ontological category; the MOD is, in general, simply the claim that machines and organisms
are ontologically distinct. Together these imply that the MOD will be, fundamentally, about
processes. This can be cashed out more fully in terms of the three theses above.
Firstly, if the world is ontologically composed of processes (MT) and not things, then the
correct account of any particular domain of the world will require an ontology of process.
So (ST) biology, being a theory about a particular domain of the world, requires a process
ontology. If everything is a process, biological things are. Secondly, if machines and
organisms are in fact ontologically distinct (MOD) and process philosophy is the correct
ontology of biology, then (DT) it is within process ontology that the ontological distinction
between machines and organisms will be settled (presuming it is settled at all). Assuming MT
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and the MOD, this is straightforward. Nonetheless, note that we need to assume the MOD to
move from ST to DT. That is because the correct ontology cannot distinguish what is not
ontologically distinct, under pain of inconsistency. Simply claiming that the correct ontology
of organisms is processual does not, by itself, imply that machines are non-processes. This
is often overlooked when opposing machines to organisms on processual grounds. In § 4 I
will argue that indeed DT fails. For the moment, consider what this would mean for process
ontology of biology.
Consider any specific theory under process ontology of biology, dealing with a specific
sort of biological phenomena. Take Barwich (2014; in Dupré and Nicholson 2018), who
argues for a processual account of olfaction. Though we may think that process ontology
must provide some theory of olfaction if it is indeed the correct metaphysics of biology
generally, we would also not want the truth of MT to hang on the correctness of that particular
account. This is reminiscent of the debate between Harvey and Descartes on the correct
account of the movement of blood though the heart (Gorham 1994). Although strange
today, Descartes believed that certain tenets of his metaphysical system turned on details
of his theory of the pumping of blood—which involved the heating of blood “drop by
drop”. Specifically, it seemed to Descartes that the alternative implied vitalism and denied
his mind-body dualism. While perhaps laudable as naturalistic metaphysics, this tying of
metaphysical to physiological details is unnecessarily foundational. Descartes simply did not
recognize that his theory of the motion of blood was just one of many possible Mechanistic
explanations, not a keystone issue. Likewise, we would not want the truth of MT to hang on
the correctness of Barwich’s processual account of olfaction, since it is one of many potential
processual accounts of smell. The ways that process ontologists attempt to distinguish
machines from organisms are not integral parts of process philosophy of biology, but rather
specific processual theories under that umbrella.
This fits well with the arguments of previous chapters: if we tie our establishment of an
MOD to scientific theses about the ontology of biology, then we unnecessarily make our
biological ontology dependent on (largely) historically contingent facts about the present
diversity of mechanical forms—in this case, their diversity in comparatively processual
features. This is a mistake we can avoid, on the one hand (§ 4.4) by keeping the MOD and
biological ontology separate, and on the other (§ 4.5) by showing that any sufficiently general
processual scientific ontology can apply to technology as well.19
19In § 4.5 I define what I take to be two necessary criteria for general process ontologies of science.
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Organisms, due to their thermodynamic nature, are metabolizing entities that
must continuously act to continue to exist, machines can do nothing (for lengths
of time) without ceasing to exist. While you can leave your typewriter unattended
for a decade, you cannot do so with your hamster.—Dupré and Nicholson (2018)
p.15
There is an internal tension in the recent process ontological turn in biology. If process
ontology of biology is to secure a special place as a metaphysic of biology, then it seems
as though it must displace or supersede alternative approaches, one of which being the
conception of organisms as machines (see Nicholson 2013; Nicholson and Dupré 2018; c.f.
Machamer et al. 2000, who argue that processualism and substantivalism are unified by new
mechanism). But the broader metaphysical project of process ontology would be furthered
by providing a processual account of machines as well. I begin with this general tension
before turning to specific processual MODs.
Confronted with the problem of providing an MOD that justifies process ontology of
biology, one could of course deny panta rhei (‘everything flows’)—that is an analytic option,
but one not taken by processualists for good reason. One can see why: if process ontology of
biology rested on a more restricted panta (biological) rhei then it would need to define the
conditions for being a biological thing, an unhappy demarcation problem to solve before the
larger efforts of process ontology of biology could begin. On the other hand, even equipped
with demarcation – such as teleology (Ch.2) or autopoiesis (Ch.3) – it would need to defend
the odd claim that biology demanded a special fundamental ontology.
Much to the contrary, in order to gain traction for a process ontology, Dupré and Nicholson
(2018) and others look to the success of a process view in other sciences. Specifically, the
success of a process ontology within physics is seen as a reason that process ontology should
be taken as a viable scientific metaphysics. This is a powerful naturalistic reason to accept
process philosophy, but leads process ontologists back to a monist metaphysics: panta
rhei. The countercurrent that process ontologists face is clear. The influence of Cartesian
mechanical philosophy has been an overwhelming tendency to see every natural event as
“mechanical”, organisms in particular being see as “machines”, and so it is often thought that
we should study machines to understand organisms. If process ontology is going to secure its
status as the ontology of biology, it seems as though it will somehow have to displace the
mechanical, “machine” conception. That is reasonable, but problems arise once this panta
rhei conflicts with the machine based understanding of organisms.
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Organisms, it is often said, are processes if anything is. Organisms are paradigmatic or
obviously processes. The familiar or paradigmatic machines are not paradigmatic or obvious
processes. In supporting a process ontology of organisms it makes some sense to distinguish
them from machines, non-paradigmatic processes, but supporting process ontology as a
metaphysics requires the view that machines are processes. Machines are processes, it must
maintain on pain of inconsistency, since everything is. This is enough to show that the MOD
cannot be established on the basis of the mere applicability of process ontology. This means
that the process ontologist who wished to propose an MOD must shift to a method of arguing
against machine ontology that is based on something else, beyond merely being or not being
a process. What remains is for the process ontologist to argue that machines are not the
same sort of process as organisms, and to offer specific MODs to this effect. Many different
MODs can then be made on the basis of differences between sorts of process—Nicholson
(2018) provides a volume of such differences.
But this strategy can also miss the mark, depending on which difference is proffered.
One way that processual MODs go awry is being too general for their aim of advocating a
process ontology. In an effort to displace a machine ontology of biology without giving up
on panta rhei, process ontologists go through the trouble of offering an MOD interpreted
within process ontology that could just as well have been offered without it. This is doubly
bad for process ontology: if these MODs turn out false, they don’t thereby offer any support
to process ontology; if they turn out to be true, they are thereby just as supportive of other
ontologies. The upshot of this is that “processual-MODs” can turn out to not be “specifically-
processual-MODs”.
For example, Nicholson (2018) locates an MOD in thermodynamics, arguing that “the
second law allows us to see why [organisms] are fundamentally different from machines”.
He says the difference follows from the fact that organisms are systems that are “far from
thermodynamic equilibrium” while machines are “equilibrium or near equilibrium” systems.
Even assuming that this were a fundamental difference between them, this MOD could just
as well be founded on (neo-)mechanism.20 Indeed, non-equilibrium thermodynamics can be
and often is presented as a theory about the activities of entities and as facts about (the rates
of) chemical mechanisms. It might be right that thermodynamics is impossible to interpret
within neo-mechanism—a very serious charge—but barring this, a thermodynamic-MOD
sits outside process ontology in particular.
In searching for more specifically processual MODs it will help to look at those distinc-
tions offered by advocates of processualism, but this in itself is insufficient. We are better
20I.e. one would need to assume that no organism were a near equilibrium system and no machine a far
one, and assuming that non-equilibrium thermodynamics could itself be given a satisfying process ontological
interpretation (there is no reason to assume it cannot).
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off looking at distinctions offered specifically in the context of defences of those features
of process philosophy thought integral to the contemporary (neo-)processual account of
organisms. In § 4.1 I argued that these are (1) constitutivity, (2) hierarchical stabilization, (3)
material flux, and (4) top-down stabilization. These will now be addressed in turn.
4.4.1 Constitutivity of Process and the MOD
The processes of an organism’s life cycle are supposed to be constitutive of being that
cycle—something cannot be the organism it is without also being a process. In connection
with the constitutive aspect of processes for organisms (§ 1.2) we find two formulations:
(1) organisms are not “properly understandable” in terms of one set of properties, but are
ultimately processes, and (2) the life cycle (not its stages) is the organism. Without disputing
this, we can see that there are also machines that cannot be understood in terms of a single set
of properties, and for which a changing set of (sometimes cyclical) processes are constitutive
of being that machine.
Life cycles (organisms) may appear stable during some period of observation, but this
is a figment of brief observation. Dupré (2013) makes this dynamism of living processes
explicit in a comparison to inanimate matter.
At the cellular and molecular level it is even clearer that nothing stands still: a
static cell is a dead cell. . . [Biological processes] require some kind of internal
change to continue to be the processes that they are. A process, as mentioned
above in the case of cells, needs activity to sustain it. One can imagine a rock
undergoing no changes at all for, say, a minute without thereby ceasing to be a
rock; a mouse in the same state of stasis is an ex-mouse.—Dupré (2013) p.30,
my emphasis
Here Dupré highlights the importance of internal changes for the identity conditions for
biological processes: being something or other requires changing internally. However, the
same can be said of inanimate matter, under the right time and physical scale of examination.
If a period of stasis significantly longer than a minute is considered, even a rock can lose
its identity. Recall that the more general ‘principle of process’ (Whitehead 1929) sees the
becoming of all entities as constitutive, suggesting that a rock in perpetual stasis ought
also to cease to be the rock that it is. This is true for some: igneous rock cannot form in
stasis.21 Which sorts and durations of stasis are important is left somewhat open above.
There are temporarily spore-forming microbes, desiccation tolerant animals, and plenty of
21Formed by cooling of molten lava.
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aquatic animals that can be temporarily frozen solid without dying or losing their identity.
Indeed, for some, going without periods of low-temperature or low-solvent stasis would be
uncharacteristic of their lifestyles. And perhaps techniques may eventually exist for placing
any multicellular organism in stasis artificially.
Fig. 4.1 Time Flow Water Clock,
Artist: Bernard Gitton.
Of course, these really should not count against a
processual understanding of organisms. Dupré need
only point to periodic processes or larger timescales.
The whole life cycle constituting a mouse cannot oc-
cur in stasis. A temporarily static cell may not be a
dead cell, but the larger point about the constitutivity
of life cycles remains. ‘Static life-cycle’ is a self-
contradiction. Nonetheless, the identification of or-
ganisms by internal activities works against the MOD.
If a mouse in stasis is an ex-mouse, then machines in
stasis are ex-machines. If we want an MOD to fol-
low from the identification of entities by their internal
changes, then it must latch on to some present pro-
cesses that make an entity active or functional, and not
to their ability to come out of stasis unharmed. Both
machines and organisms can enter and exit stasis. If
a clock is a machine that more or less accurately tells
the time, a clock in stasis is an ex-clock. The entire sets of effects that functionally consti-
tute a machine, for cyclic machines, cannot occur in stasis; most require internal changes
to continue to be what they are. A static machine is also an ex-machine. Machines can
often be brought out of stasis, unfrozen with little damage, whereas organisms must either
evolve systems for survising stasis or else be frozen and unfrozen under highly demanding
conditions. However, some machines cannot be cycled through stasis without changing
fundamentally—the thin glass tubes of Gitton’s clock, pictured above, would shatter from
the internal pressure of expanding ice, if frozen—just as some organisms are irremediably
dead once static. The ability to move in and out of stasis is not an MOD.
For another example, a computer must be able to undergo a series of internal and precisely
timed switching operations in order to be the machine it is—these processes are constitutive
of computation. Moreover, that process philosophy can include aspects of computation
within its wide descriptive and explanatory scope is, according to Seibt (2012), one of the
powerful reasons to adopt it. We can look to computer “viruses” if a more clearly cyclical
example is desired (see Ch.3 § 3.4.2). One would not understand what a particular virus was
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without seeing how it copied itself and infected other computers—a copy of the “Love Bug
worm” saved on an static hard drive is arguably not a virus at all. Processualists say much
the same about biological viruses.
Even viruses have life cycles. . . Viruses pass through an intricate sequences of
stages as part of their life cycle. Some of these stages are highly stable (for
instance, the virion stage, which is what most people have in mind when they
think of viruses). Crucially, however, the very existence of these stable states
can only be accounted for by referring to their role in the larger cyclical process
that is the virus.—Dupré and Nicholson (2018) p.19
While perhaps most people have something comparatively more stable in mind when
they think of computer viruses (such as the storage of the virus as data), if we wanted to
explain why that particular data exists at all we would have to refer to an “intricate sequences
of stages” that generate stable virus copies as part of a cycle of viral copying. Moreover, if
we wanted to “properly understand” a computer virus, we could not do so without placing
these stages in context of the computational processes that sustain their storage and numbers.
Once we allow that processes can be constitutive of having a certain identity—such as being
an organism, cell, or biological virus—we can likewise find examples of machines with
precisely the same sort of constitutive relationship with internal changes.
Lastly, in keeping with Dupré’s non-metaphysical inspiration for process ontology of
biology, we can likewise draw from DST’s relatively permissive notion of “developmental
resource”. Specifically, the notion of extended inheritance offered by DST provides a
potential bridge between processual ontologies of biology and technology.
DST views both development and evolution as processes of construction and
reconstruction in which heterogeneous resources are contingently but more
or less reliably reassembled for each life cycle [p.1]. . . [p.4] DST insists on a
definition of inheritance that explicitly recognizes the wide range of resources
that are “passed on” and are thus available to reconstruct the organism’s life
cycle. Some of these resources are familiar—chromosomes, nutrients, ambient
temperature, childcare. Some are less familiar. . . —Oyama, Griffiths & Gray
(2001) p.1-4
In a techno-society like our own, it is much more than “genes and childcare” that are
transmitted between generations and serve to reconstruct developmental systems. Some of
the developmental resources that are more or less reliably reassembled in life cycles are
machines or artefacts (see Ch.7). We simply would not be the people we are without them;
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an ox would not be the organism that it is without the plough. Likewise, the construction and
design of mechanical systems themselves requires a range of resources far beyond merely
schematics and material constituents. This should also point us to a “fundamental fact”
about machines, that they cannot be understood in terms of one set of properties, such as the
completed machine, but are rather constituted by processes.
4.4.2 Hierarchical Stabilization and the MOD
An organism is not organized as a hierarchy of structures (as a machine is) but
as a hierarchy of processes.—Dupré and Nicholson (2018) p.16
Here we suffer from a clash of primitive notions: ‘process’ is a fundamental category
to process ontologists, thus undefined. Likewise, process ontologists are laboring against a
structure-ism of sorts, so happen not to define ‘structure’. This makes it initially difficult to
see what kind of distinction is being offered. Presumably, the above could be reinterpreted as
a processual claim: machines are a hierarchy of very stable processes, organisms not so.
Machines are indeed not paradigmatic processes because they are too stable, but it is
explanations of stability instead of change that process ontologists offer. This would suggest
that machines, as comparatively stable processes, require an explanation of how they remain
stable “structures”. Recall that it is precisely the apparent stability of certain organismal
features that demands an explanation in terms of hierarchical stabilization.
[T]he entities that form the hierarchy of biological ontology are not stable. They
are, rather, stabilized over a very wide range of timescales, and the processes of
stabilization are a fundamental part of the explanation of the activities of living
systems.—Dupré (2013)
Since organisms display stability over some durations, presumably what is meant is that
organisms are not intrinsically stable. This makes the distinction packed into the “structure
vs. process” MOD clearer: organisms are stable because they are stabilized, machines just
are stable processes already, without accompanying processes of hierarchical stabilization.
Put another way, “[hierarchical] processes of stabilization” are not “a fundamental part of the
explanation of the activities” of mechanical systems. In § 4 I will discuss hierarchical stabi-
lization explanations within a general process philosophy of technology, but here concentrate
on their role in the MOD.
The portion of this claim that is about organisms is reasonable. Much of the work
explaining traits of organisms involves showing how these traits persist in the face of changing
environmental conditions or internal degradation of components (§ 3.3, homeostasis being
4.4 Against Processual MODs 85
a stabilizing process taking place at a lower hierarchical level), and against the constant
introduction of deleterious mutations (§ 3.4, so-called “stabilizing selection” being a process
at a higher level). When it comes to machines we can afford to be more particular.
Clearly some machines require little explanation of their stability but others are, like
organisms, subject to effects which stabilize and destabilize their organization. To these
effects, a machine may be more or less resistant, and more or less “actively” counteract
them. Indeed, to hold to the idea that machines are somehow intrinsically stable, or stable
simpliciter, goes against the central tenant of process ontology: that all processes are dynamic,
“stable” only when stabilized. On whether these stabilizing effects are a “fundamental part”
of explaining mechanical systems, this surely depends on how important we believe it is
to have an explanation of why certain machines or mechanical forms remain stable, and
which sorts of questions we ask about them (see § 4.4). In Ch.3, plenty of examples of
self-maintenance in machines were offered, and surely some of those processes would be
required to explain the activities of the maintained machine.
Perhaps the greater difficulty is interpreting what it means to be “hierarchical” in the
case of machines. The theory of the biological hierarchy, though with some difficulties
aligning organizational-levels with levels-of-selection, is largely uncontentious. Reproducing
entities are nested, and successively larger inclusive biological objects have common names:
gene, genome, cell, tissue, organism, species, etc. To my knowledge, no strictly analogous
theory of the technological organizational hierarchy exists (see § 4.4). There clearly is a
mereological hierarchy applicable to machines (Crilly 2013; 2015; see Ch.7). Machines
consist of parts—stable processes—and collections of machines exist for longer or shorted
times depending on intra- and interactions. Moreover, causal explanations of technology do
involve different levels of explanation (Rapp 1983; see Crilly 2015 for an account of levels
of functional explanation). In the following sections I will discuss processes of stabilization
that are, in this sense, below and above the level of individual machines.
4.4.3 Material Flux and the MOD: Two Dogs and Empiricism
Dupré and Nicholson (2018) offer a thought experiment about hierarchical stabilization. It
involves two dogs, one “living”, the other robotic, and an extraterrestrial humanoid “whose
mode of visual recognition was based on the enumeration of the material components that
make up particular tokens of general types rather than on the identification of general types
that are instantiated by particular tokens” [ibid p.16]. It suffices to say that this humanoid is
somehow only attentive to material composition. The humanoid comes to earth, observes the
dogs, presumably enumerates their material components at the molecular level, and returns
again in a few years.
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Despite being in the presence of the same two dogs, the alien’s cognitive appa-
ratus is such that he is only able to identify the robotic dog and not the living
one. From the alien’s perspective, the living dog of the first trip has faded out of
existence, and an entirely different living dog has taken its place. . . If one focuses
on matter rather than on form and allows for a sufficiently extended period
of time, the stream-like nature of macroscopic organisms becomes perfectly
evident.—[ibid p.16]
This thought experiment would be a way of showing that identification by material
composition suffers temporal limitations were we to assume that organisms (for instance) are
subject to this kind of total material flux over a sufficient period. Instead, this is something
we are supposed to accept as justified on empirical grounds, due to recent results about the
turnover rates of tissues, cells and macromolecules. This justification is overstated: “In
general, none of the parts of the organism are as old as the organism itself” (Dupré and
Nicholson 2018, p.17), and “[the machine] serves as a channel that facilitates the exchange
of material as fuel is converted into waste. An organism, in contrast, changes wholly and
continuously” (Dupré and Nicholson 2018, p.146). This is incorrect, and overly cynical
about the possibility of re-identification by material composition.
The biological details speak against this extent of material flux. Many cells are not
replaced and certain macromolecular complexes therein persist as long as the organism does.
The title of Wade’s article, Your Body Is Younger Than You Think, is a double entendre. It
also reports “a fact that explains why people behave their birth age, not the physical age of
their cells: a few of the body’s cell types endure from birth to death without renewal, and this
special minority includes some or all of the cells of the cerebral cortex” [ibid]. Some of the
parts of you that think are older than some of the rest of the body. Returning to the thought
experiment, we would actually expect the extraterrestrial to see a more or less clumpy, vague,
living dogly blur. A living dog would be at least in part re-identifiable until its death, no
matter the elapsed time.
On the other hand, that a robotic dog would be totally re-identifiable surely depends on
which robotic dog is under consideration. The “BigDog” robot released by Boston Dynamics
is powered by gasoline, and so even a minimal runtime between extraterrestrial visits would
have purged at least some of the material fuel constituents. Most robot dogs have replaceable
batteries, or at least require the turnover of electrons (as all respiring dogs would). A more
interesting example comes from the culture surrounding repair of the robot dog Aibo, released
by Sony between 1999-2006.
In an article for the New York Times series Robotica, Soble (2015) follows Aibo owners
and repair-people who replace the damaged parts of the (now discontinued) Aibos. Recently,
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Fig. 4.2 Aibo, robotic dog released by Sony. Image from patent # US 7,200,249 B2
Sony decided to stop repairing Aibo, so owners have switched to private means for keeping
their robotic companions in working order. This has been framed as a concern for the coming
mortality of Aibo.
The Aibo fell victim to company restructuring, as Sony sought to refocus on
more profitable businesses. Still, Sony continued to repair Aibos until March of
last year. But by then spare parts were becoming too scarce, the company said,
forcing it to end the service and turn owners away. —Soble (2015), A Robot
Dog’s Mortality
There are Aibo today with a (partly) different material composition from what they had
in 2006 and moreover, eventually, may differ completely in the material composition of their
parts—unlike a living dog, which will likely retain parts of its cerebellum regardless of age.
This may cause problems for our account of identity of Aibo over time, but no more so than it
would for a living dog.22 It is unsurprising that we should encounter a robot dog of Theseus
problem on the basis of replacement of robotic parts. Repairing is a process and Theseus had
a ship to fix, not a whale. The force of that through experiment is intended to encourage us to
focus on “matter rather than on form” over a “sufficiently extended period of time”. Though
it is far clearer that a machine can change wholly in matter without changing in form, at least,
in antiquity, clearer than it was that an organism could do so. Indeed, it is overstatement of
22Note that we are to assume a criteria of identity that is sufficient to say that we are indeed “in the presence
of the same two dogs” (Dupré and Nicholson 2018) regardless of this flux
88 Process Ontology and the Machine Organism Distinction
the differences between living and non-living things that makes the views of old-fashioned
biological mechanists seem comparatively sensible, as Needham (1928) said,
The mechanist, after all, never asserted as [is] against common sense that there
was no difference between a stone dog and a real live dog ; he only insisted that
the processes going on in the living dog were extremely complicated special
cases of the processes known to occur in the inorganic world. —Needham (1928)
p.34
This capacity to replace parts (see Ch.3 § 3.4.2) is thought relevant to distinguishing
process ontology from both machines and neo-mechanism. Dupré (2012) is concerned with
establishing a difference with new-mechanism and its emphasis on termination conditions
(Ch.5). Organisms, Dupré argues, are processes that need not end in principle.
Paradigmatic machines—cars, dishwashers, computers—consist of a number of
parts, typically more or less rigidly connected. The constituent parts gradually
wear out and the machine lasts as long as they are replaced piecemeal. . . One
thing we add when we move to biological systems is that these, organisms for
instance, constantly rebuild and replace their parts. Contrary to some versions
of mechanism, there is no a priori reason why the process should end, hence
no terminal condition. Lineages of organisms have no mechanistically inbuilt
tendency to terminate.—Dupré (2012)
It is not clear that organisms can perpetuate themselves indefinitely by repair and re-
placement of parts—there is ongoing debate about the status of “programmed aging”, i.e.
an “inbuilt tendency to terminate” in some organisms (Goldsmith 2012).23 Moreover, it is
certainly the case that organisms “constantly rebuild and replace” some of their parts, but
there are non-replaced and irreplaceable parts, and there is irreparable damage. An organism
likewise must contend with gradual wear and lasts as long as it can repair and replace its
essential parts, or they remain undamaged. Even if an ideal organism needn’t terminate in
principle, such beings are not the common stock. Likewise, some machines—such as Dextre,
the space robot (Ch.3)—can replace and repair some of their parts, even though these may
not be as common.
We need not conclude that organisms are in part a hierarchy of structures. It is hard to
see how persistence of cerebral cortex cells over the course of a life-cycle implies that the
23The target seems to switch in the last sentence above: presumably the reason that lineages do not necessarily
terminate is that they exist so long as any one of their members does, and that only requires the parts of the
lineage to reproduce at least once before death. But lineages are plainly not organisms. If the claim where that
life-cycles have no mechanistically inbuilt tendency to terminate, that would be an empirical hypothesis, and
testable.
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cerebral cortex is a “structure” as opposed to a process. We should, however, recognize
that the “hierarchy of structures vs. hierarchy of processes” MOD, that is supposed to be
established by turnover, fails. Some machines exhibit turnover processes at lower levels of
organization and some organisms fail to be able to turnover their parts. Both are mortal; both
face lower level flux.24
To address top-down stabilization, the last of the four aspects of processualist view of
organisms under consideration here, it is necessary to have some conception of stabilizing
selection in technology, and this will be taken care of in Ch.6. For now, I conclude by
addressing hierarchical explanations within general process philosophy, since this is required
for hierarchical explanations of stabilization of technology.
4.5 For A Processual Account of Machines
In the above (§ 4.3) I argued that many of the features thought central to a process ontology
of biology are also enjoyed by some machines. Though characteristically organismal features
of processes are perhaps “unparadigmatic” in machines, they are present, and this paradigm
may shift. In this final section I will examine some features of process philosophy generally
in an attempt to lay a foundation for a process ontology of technology. I will conclude with a
diagnosis of the provision of processual MODs, itself in the spirit of processualism.
Notice that a mechanistic or machine based understanding does not, in itself, need
to be placed at such a distance from process ontology. Indeed, most often, they are not
as rigidly opposed as their advocates might like. Neo-mechanists (e.g. Machamer et al.
2000) and working biologists25 are generally unafraid of admixtures of processual and
mechanistic concepts. An extreme case can be found in Friedrich Rapp’s (1981) definition of
a “mechanistic viewpoint”.
(1) The root metaphor is no longer naturally occurring processes, but rather me-
chanical processes, artificially generated with the aid of appropriate apparatuses
and instruments
(2) The conceptual inventory for the description and analysis of all natural phe-
nomena is no longer obtained from the ‘higher’ and complex organic processes,
but rather from the ‘lower’ and simpler inorganic processes.
24Moreover, if this form of self-maintenance were really the essential bit distinguishing organisms from
machines, it is hard to see why process ontology specifically hangs in the balance: autopoiesis or autonomy
might have done just as well (Ch.3).
25Recall Kochanowski et al. 2013, § 2.4 above.
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(3) The synthetic and teleological perspective, which focuses on the final result
of processes, is now replaced by the analytic investigation of the functional
relationships between spatially and temporally contiguous states of affairs.
—Rapp (1981) emphasis mine
Rapp (1981) defines mechanism essentially as a rejection of organicism and teleology
(Ch.2) and final-causation, together with an emphasis on reductive (or, more charitably,
bottom-up) explanations, analysis and artificial experiment. It would be hard to find a
neo-mechanist today who denied any of these elements in their philosophy, though there
are some who would wish to add something (e.g. holism, Ch.5; Austin 2016). Rapp’s
Analytical Philosophy of Technology could be read as a foundation for a process ontology
of technology.26 We can also take formulations like the above to indicate just how much of
mechanism one can retain without having need to oppose this to process ontology. Dupré
himself is also not “hostile to neo-mechanism”, so long as its explanations are constrained
by a general process philosophy view of stabilization. Neo-mechanist accounts can be
successful, it is just that “the parts appealed to in machine explanation must be sufficiently
stable over the time scale of the process you want to explain” (Dupré 2017). If Rapp had been
writing a little later, one can easily imagine this constraint as a 4th feature of the mechanistic
viewpoint.
Constraining scientific explanations via process philosophy leads to a pair of general
principles for particular sciences. Let us call whatever non-process ontology deployed by a
science or theory its “nascent ontology”. Then, the move to a process ontology should obey
at least the following constraints:
GP1 The entities referred to in the nascent theory are interpreted as processes.
GP2 The modes of causal explanation in the nascent theory should be augmented to provide
explanations of stabilization of entities.
GP1 is the bare minimum for a process ontology. It involves attempting to construct
a theory, or reinterpret a nascent one, such that static entities are analyzed as more or
less stable processes. GP2 provides a further constraint on the explanatory structure of
theories. A general process philosophy satisfying only GP1 might see some processes as
stable simpliciter, but this would be to give up on an explanation of their stability. Instead,
a good scientific theory should explain how stable processes become so, it should offer
stabilization explanations—in effect, partially justifying entity-talk in nascent, pre-process,
26Though it would be a potentially equivocal undertaking to attribute too much genuine process philosophy
to Rapp on the basis of his preference for the term ‘process’.
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theories. Dupré provides such a justification when explaining, in processual terms, the
conditions under which mechanistic explanations can be successful.
Mechanistic explanations will be successful only to the extent that the con-
stituents identified are sufficiently stable on the timescale of the phenomenon
under investigation.—Dupré (2017) p.3
The move to hierarchical stabilization explanations among process philosophers can
also be justified by appeal to GP2. Many modes of explanation in biology deploy some
concept of a “biological hierarchy”, so a mature process philosophy of biology should be able
to augment these nascent explanations to employ the biological hierarchy in explanations
of stability. Much of the work of process ontologists of biology is directed to show that
many hierarchical biological explanatory strategies are processual already (e.g. homeostasis,
stabilizing selection) and thus that process ontology is not imposed on biology, but instead
arises naturally from a “proper understanding” of it. Likewise, whatever hierarchical modes
of explanation exist in our nascent theory of technology should, by GP2, be augmented to
provide stabilizing explanations.
The biological hierarchy can be interpreted as a form of hierarchical classification,
where “levels” like macromolecule, cell, species and family serve book-keeping roles within
biological theory. It can also be interpreted as a hierarchy of levels of selection, where
levels from macromolecules to higher-taxa (e.g. genus, kingdom) are interpreted as units
of selection.27 Finally we can consider a mereological or organizational hierarchy, where
inter-level relationships are part-whole or part-individual. Constructing a processual analysis
of these hierarchical modes of explanation is well underway (many details of which are
covered in sections above and in Dupré and Nicholson 2018), but incomplete. That is simply
because process ontology cannot have a complete reinterpretation of an unfinished theory.28
Lacking a processual account of these modes of explanation, process ontology of biology is
only partway to satisfying GP2 for hierarchical explanations.
The problem for a process ontology of technology is, then, identifying the existing
analogous modes of causal explanation in technological theory and augmenting them to
supply stabilization explanations. Even holding to the standard set by work in process
ontology of biology, we should be lenient enough to allow these explanations to only partially
27Typically the only macromolecules under consideration as levels of selection are specific fragments of
the genome (genes, cistrons), but there is increasing recognition that specific proteins (prions) and even RNA
fragments can be selectable units.
28Post facto, it is interesting to look at Dupré’s (1995) The Disorder Of Things as an attempt to spell out the
consequences of a process ontology for the classificatory hierarchy. Dupré now sees many of the substantial
points about classification in Dupré (1995) as explained by a general process philosophy (Dupré, personal
communication 2019, also see Dupré 2018).
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satisfy GP2. For the specific case of the MOD, that requires identifying the role of top-down
hierarchical explanations. For instance, explaining the success of some machines will require
identifying the causally relevant features of their design process, which will surely require an
explanation for why the parts of a machine remain sufficiently stable over the course of their
functioning. Such a stabilizing explanation might come “from below”, via a materials science
explanation of the durability of design components or via in-built self-repair mechanisms.
But it can also come “from above”, via explanations of other-maintenance, repair processes
or the stabilizing effects of collections of machines (e.g., the effect of anti-virus software on
the relative stability of a given computer in a network).
That the hierarchical stabilization explanation for technology involve selection requires
digression to a discussion of whether certain technological processes are analogous to natural
processes of evolution by selection. To my mind, here is nothing wrong with giving a
“bare-bones” selectionist explanation of technology change; disagreement only seems to
arise as to the significance of this explanation. That is enough to imply that there ought to
be “stabilizing selection” during technology change, however (in)significant in extent or
explanatory scope. That is, insofar as selectionist explanations apply to technology at all,
the fact that potentially deleterious or damaging changes are introduced into technology
“from below” implies that stabilizing selection will play some role. An account of stabilizing
selection in machines will need to come from an account of technological evolution. I save a
sustained treatment of this contentious topic for the penultimate chapter (Ch.6).
4.6 Conclusion: Poorly Defined Targets of Process Philos-
ophy
Contra Dupré and Nicholson (2018), GP1 demands that we see machines not as a hierarchy
of structures but as a “hierarchy of processes”. One way of seeing GP2 is as a requirement
that we use this hierarchical understanding to explain why it is so tempting to see machines
as “structures”. Recognizing this takes us towards both an understanding of, and possible
reconciliation with, attempts to provide an MOD on the basis of process ontology. I conclude
with a process philosophical diagnosis of the provision of processual MODs.
Austin (2016) offers an hypothesis as to why process ontologists have directed arguments
against mechanism.
[T]he contemporary dialectic against organisms qua ontologically composed
of mechanisms appears to be often focused on objections to organisms qua
machines.—Austin (2016) p.659
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He goes on to say that this is reasonable, justified by the claim that machines are
“ontologically outmoded” and “outmatched by our contemporary science” [ibid]. This
sociological hypothesis about the origin of anti-neo-mechanistic discourse might be correct in
some cases—it surely is for Woese (2004) and Nicholson (2018)—but Austin’s justification is
not. Machines have been around in philosophical discourse much longer than neo-mechanism
and their development is a very large part of our contemporary science. They are not
outmoded, since they are consistently outmoding their previous incarnations. Instead, the
best processual critiques of neo-mechanism are just the same as those for machines: the
(apparent) relative stability of the “entities” involved in explanations.
Since machines are stabilized, we can explain their activities without reference to their
processual nature at some time- and organizational-scales. This is also true of organisms, but
our interest in explaining the activities of organisms has delved into phenomena at different
scales—physically smaller metabolic processes and temporally extended evolutionary ones.
So progressively more processual understandings of organisms became important in biology.
Since it is sometimes acceptable to explain mechanical activity without an explicitly proces-
sual understanding (since machine parts are more often stable over the duration we wish to
explain), and since we are more inclined to provide processual understanding of organisms,
we are thus disinclined to provide a mechanical explanation of organisms. I suggest that
this is the true reason why process ontologists of biology tend to construct MODs as if they
supported general process ontology, when in fact they do not.
This could have gone differently. Instead of arguing, given process metaphysics as the
right view of organisms, that the analogy with machines must be rejected, one could have
argued that since machines are much like organisms and a process ontology is the right view
of biology, that there is reason to expect it would be the right view of technology also. That
is, we might just as well have sought out a process ontology of technology to parallel the
process ontology of biology. This would not contend with the old machine metaphor but
update it, in light of a naturalistic ontology of organisms and examples of comparatively
more processual contemporary machines.
In similar fashion, the following chapter (Ch.5) shows that neo-mechanism has also
become unnecessarily embroiled in the MOD, by both its critics and advocates.

Chapter 5
Mechanism and the Machine Organism
Distinction
Abstract
In this chapter I examine MODs advanced in the context of neo-mechanism, both by advocates
and critics. Like process ontology (Ch.4), neo-mechanism offers an ontological framework for
analyzing both machines and organisms, so some further MOD must be provided within that
framework. I examine two cases, one by critics of new-mechanism and one by an advocate.
Skillings (2015) and Godfrey-Smith (2016) offer similar critical views: that neo-mechanism’s
reliance on the non-stochastic nature of machines makes mechanism inappropriate as an
analysis of organisms. I argue against this firstly by showing that new-mechanism is not
strongly committed to non-stochastic mechanisms, and secondly by showing that there are
many machines that operate in a fundamentally stochastic way. Austin’s (2016) MOD is that
neo-mechanism can account for the holistic phenomena observed in organisms, while the
earlier, “machine-based”, mechanistic ontology cannot, since machines are not holistic. I
show that Austin is mistaken, since even on a fairly restrictive account of what it takes to be a
“holistic phenomenon” there are holistic machines. This chapter concludes my metaphysical
engagement with the MOD.
Introduction
This chapter, like the previous, addresses the MOD as a metaphysical issue. A variety
of metaphysics, Mechanism, bears on the relationship between machines and organisms.
Mechanism is a diverse collection of views. Running from the “Mechanism” of Descartes (i.e.,
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mechanical philosophy) to the “New-Mechanism” of the new mechanists (e.g., Machamer et
al. 2000; Bechtel 2011), there is perhaps not a single unifying thread. I will bring some clarity
to this group of views by setting apart the different senses of ‘Mechanism’, specifically as they
pertain to the MOD. I will write ‘Mechanism’ when the broad, diverse, amorphous collection
of views is intended and will define subsequent refinements of this term as necessary.
To critics, appealing to the “mechanical” or “mechanistic” nature of organisms seems to
incorrectly or unjustifiably equate or reduce them to machines (Moore 2012; Skillings 2015;
Godfrey-Smith 2016; Austin 2016). That this equation or reduction is problematic presumes
some kind of background MOD. Thus, many criticisms of “Mechanism” tend to advance or
rely upon MODs. This reliance is particularly apparent in criticisms of “new-mechanism”,
a view stemming from Machamer et al. (2000). For its proponents, new-mechanism does
not confound organisms with machines. Rather, new-mechanism offers a metaphysical
framework for analysis of both machines and organisms. New-mechanism thereby almost
completely distances itself from machine-based analogies and metaphors. But critics of
new-mechanism see it differently: they think that a connection to some of the properties
of machines fundamentally limits new-mechanism, and prevents it from being equal to the
task of analyzing organisms. I first consider how contemporary critics and advocates of
new-mechanism rely on MODs (§ 5.1).
Here critics of new-mechanism go astray. By confining their understanding of mecha-
nisms to those that are typically realized in a narrow class of machines (clocks, clock-work),
they fail to understand the true expressiveness of the new-mechanistic framework and
thus attack a straw-man. Specifically, Skillings (2015) and Godfrey-Smith (2016) criticize
new-mechanism on account of its supposed inability to account for some of the stochastic
micro-phenomena of organisms—taking the ribosome as an example. They attribute this
to the relative importance of “regularity” and “productive continuity” in new-mechanisms,
using disanalogies between machines and organisms in support—Skillings taking clocks
as an example, while Godfrey-Smith prefers Leibniz’s mill. Whether this disanalogy is
rhetorical or doing logical work is somewhat obscure. I begin by showing that, if it is a
rhetorical device, then it is dispensable and false on independent grounds. Next I show that,
if the disanalogy with machines is doing logical work—if it is indispensable—then it is false
on account of a failure to consider the true diversity of mechanisms, and the machines and
organisms that they apply to.
Remarkably, both new-mechanists and their critics often point to the very same MOD:
that organisms are “holistic” and machines not so. In previous debates between Mechanists
and Organicists, this holistic nature of organisms was a common Organicist retort to the
emphasis on reducibility on the part of Mechanists. Today, this criticism has been taken on
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by Austin (2016) as speaking, still against Mechanism, but also for new-mechanism. Austin
(2016) holds the view that new-mechanism can accommodate “holistic” phenomena, which
cannot be done with a machine-based Mechanism. Whatever one’s view on holism, this is
a specifically new-mechanist MOD and fits well with the overall new-mechanist project of
offering a framework for analyzing organisms. Nonetheless, this unnecessarily associates
justifications for new-mechanism with an MOD based on holism. In keeping with previous
chapters I argue that, even on a fairly restrictive account of what it means to be an holistic
phenomenon in organisms, there are also holistic machines (§ 5.2).
That is the extent to which I will discuss contemporary involvement of Mechanism in the
MOD. Nonetheless, there is a temptation that should be forestalled afterwards. It is tempting
to conclude that, while modern metaphysical theories have been reformulated sufficiently
to escape criticism by MODs, that their predecessors at least must have been susceptible
to these machine disanalogies. Put another way, although perhaps new-mechanism is safe
from disanalogies with (modern) machines, the Mechanism of the early 20th century, or the
mechanical philosophy of Descartes at least, must not have been. I conclude this chapter,
and my treatment of metaphysical MODs generally, by arguing that in fact Mechanism has
never been about reduction to machines (§ 5.3). Claims that organisms are “mechanical”
within Mechanism turn out to be contingent hypotheses that neither equate organisms with
machines nor establish an MOD.
5.1 MODs Against New-Mechanism: Are Machines even
Mechanical Anymore?
The “new-mechanists”, stemming from Machamer et al. (2000) offer a novel metaphysical
framework for thinking about the ontology of organisms. New-mechanism provides an ontol-
ogy that has received substantial attention from the philosophical and scientific communities
alike. To some, it seems to come with implications about their relationship with machines.
This section outlines new-mechanism and some of the criticisms of it that rely on MODs.
New-mechanism entails at least an ontological commitment to both entities and activities,
with the addendum that mechanisms are arrangements of the former that are connected by
the latter that together show how some phenomena to be explained proceeds from some
initial to terminating conditions (Glennan 1996; Machamer et al. 2000; Austin 2016; Craver
and Darden 2013). The philosophy of new-mechanism is essentially an analytic project
concerned with providing an analysis of familiar mechanistic diagrams that is consistent
with a broadly materialist metaphysics. There are different definitions of mechanism coming
98 Mechanism and the Machine Organism Distinction
from different contributors to the field, but it seems natural to group them together not only
because they label themselves similarly, but because their concepts are roughly the same.
Consider parallel definitions from Glennan (1996), Machamer et al. (2000) and Bechtel
(2011),
A mechanism underlying a behaviour is a complex system which produces that
behaviour by the interaction of a number of parts according to direct causal laws.
—Glennan (1996), p.52
A [basic] mechanism is construed as generating a phenomenon (e.g., protein
synthesis) through a start-to-finish sequence of qualitatively characterized opera-
tions performed by component parts.
—Bechtel (2011) p.534
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of
regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.
—Machamer et al. (2000) p.3
New-mechanists have good reasons to see mechanisms as definable independently from
machines. ‘Mechanism’ for new-mechanists is not a metaphysicalizing of the notion of
machine. It may have its intellectual antecedents in thinking about machines, but today it
is a fledged metaphysics of its own, unfortunately wedded to ‘machines’ etymologically.
It is perhaps better to think of it as an entities and activities-ism, for it is those rudiments,
not familiar machines, that serve as its fundamental notions. They have overcome one of
the significant obstacles of earlier Mechanisms: being confused for a naïve view wherein
mechanisms are simply equated with machines.
New-mechanism nonetheless has critics who believe that its close association with
machines makes it a poor or insufficient theory of organisms. Godfrey-Smith (2016) and
Skillings (2015), both relying on the discussion of Moore (2012), argue that many of the
features of new-mechanisms are too restrictive to apply to organisms and their parts. Both
draw special attention to emphasis on regularity in the definitions that new-mechanists
supply for mechanisms, arguing that this limits these accounts—without modification—from
accounting for the stochastic nature of organisms. I will examine this stochastic MOD first,
as it leads naturally to a renewed interest in holism.
Citing Moore’s (2012) discussion of the ribosome as a molecular “device”, both Skillings
and Godfrey-Smith point to the comparatively random, probabilistic, or stochastic nature of
its movements as opposed to the “productive regularity” of new-mechanisms. Both offer their
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critique of new-mechanism alongside/using disanalogies with macroscopic machines—clocks
and Leibniz’s mill1. Skillings’ discussion is the more compact, presented as follows,
Think of a machine like a mechanical clock. The workings of the mechanical
clock are explained by looking at how the physical parts of its mechanism
interact... [here follows a description of the movements of a clock]. . . The
movement and interactions of the parts of the watch explain how the watch
works... The parts of a protein, like a ribosome, do not stand in the same
relations as the parts of a mechanical clock. The mainspring of a watch can
reliably turn the gear train. Macromolecules immersed in liquids are at the mercy
of frictional and thermodynamic forces... the ribosome is randomly pushed
into different conformational states by external forces, rather than moving in
sequence according to the activity and interactions of its parts. Thus, all the
functionally significant activities of the ribosome, both internal and external, in
protein synthesis are probabilistic. —Skillings (2015) p.1145
The intended take-away is clear: “The mechanism of protein synthesis does not fit neatly
into the basic [new-] mechanistic account. There is no productive continuity between stages,
where earlier stages produce later stages. Rather, the mechanism proceeds stochastically”
[ibid, pg.1146]. Earlier, Skillings points to this as one (of three) criticisms of the adequacy
of new-mechanism for explaining biological processes. New-mechanisms apparently come
with such a strong requirement for “regularity” that they are unable to explain stochastic
biological processes, such as some of those involved in protein synthesis.
First, for my purposes it is helpful to separate the critique of new-mechanism as much
as possible from the claims about machines. Above, when Skillings says for us to “Think
of a machine like a mechanical clock”, presumably what is at issue is the likeness of clocks
alone to new-mechanisms, so that the logic of his criticism can be put something as follows:
(1) to be explanatory, new-mechanisms must have regularity and productive continuity (as
for example clocks do), (2) some biological processes do not have these features but instead
have the contrasting or opposite features of stochasticity and/or productive discontinuity,
therefore (3) some biological processes cannot be correctly explained by new-mechanisms.
On this reading the (dis)analogy with machines broadly, and with clocks in particular, is idle.
That said, (1) is dubious. Skillings (and Godfrey-Smith) have taken the “productive conti-
nuity” of Machamer et al. (2000)—which is an oddly defined term of art—and interpreted it
in narrow physical terms as non-stochastic, non-probabilistic, “deterministic” etc., when the
1I will primarily follow the discussion in Skillings (2015) since Godfrey-Smith (2016) is concerned with the
bearing of this issue on the emergence of mental properties. Though I have dealt with this latter issue separately
(Brunet and Halina 2021).
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interpretation actually offered by new mechanists relates to the completeness of mechanistic
descriptions and the existence of explanatory gaps. Machamer et al. (2000) say,
Complete descriptions of mechanisms exhibit productive continuity without
gaps from the set up to termination conditions. Productive continuities are what
make the connections between stages intelligible. If a mechanism is represented
schematically by A → B → C, then the continuity lies in the arrows and their
explication is in terms of the activities that the arrows represent. A missing
arrow, namely, the inability to specify an activity, leaves an explanatory gap in
the productive continuity of the mechanism. [ibid, p.3]
Likewise “regularity” is a Humean property and not equivalent to determinism or non-
stochasticity.2 It is closely connected to “productive continuity” (indeed, nearly synonymous
with it) as follows: “The regularity is exhibited in the typical way that the mechanism
runs from beginning to end; what makes it regular is the productive continuity between
stages” [ibid]. What the new mechanist has issue with is not stochastic activities, but absent
activities. If a mechanism for protein synthesis were missing an arrow, for instance the arrow
representing the translocation step (wherein an aminoacylated tRNA moves from the A to
P sites following hydrolysis of ATP), then it wouldn’t be complete or, perhaps, it would be
cut into two separate and complete mechanisms, one leading up to and another following
translocation.
It is difficult to see why a new mechanist would have any trouble providing “stochastic
mechanisms” by specifying “stochastic activities”, and thus difficult to see why a new
mechanist would have to provide mechanisms that are anything like those of clockwork.
This is standard practice in the drawing of biochemical mechanisms: arrows are written with
the thermodynamic (statistical) conditions under which they proceed at an appreciable rate.
Since Machamer et al. (2000) and other avowed new mechanists are explicitly engaged in the
project of providing an analysis of mechanisms from molecular biology and biochemistry,
it would be very odd for them to be committed to a strong view of ‘regularity’ wherein
activities were never stochastic. Consider the following mechanistic diagram (Fig.5.1) from
McAdams and Arkin (1997), with the accompanying description.
Each competition is an independent event with a probabilistic outcome. A
transcript is initially in state 1 and thereafter in one of the five states shown in
B.—[ibid]
2Although Machamer et al. (2000) disagree that intelligibility is reducible to regularities, offering the
contrary view that it is explanations (of course, in new mechanistic terms) which “produce” or “sustain”
regularities.
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Fig. 5.1 Stochastic mechanism presented in McAdams and Arkin (1997), in section “Statistics
of the Number of Protein Molecules Produced per Transcript”. Here the activities ai, j indicate
the probability of a transition from state-i to state-j for states 1-5.
The idea that new-mechanisms are wed to determinism insofar as (familiar) clocks are is
simply untenable given the state of mechanistic diagrams within biochemistry. Moreover,
these sorts of mechanistic depictions / interpretations are not uncommon or marginalizable:
GoogleScholar returns 7, 520 results containing the exact phrase ‘stochastic mechanism’.3
Skillings’s (2015) overall claim is nonetheless quite acceptable: that whether a biological
process can be explained by new-mechanisms is more-or-less. Though, admitting the
ubiquity of mechanisms with stochastic activities in scientific practice, the metaphysical
picture offered by new-mechanism can probably account for more, rather than less.4
All of this sits aside the clock-analogy, making the place of this (dis)analogy within
criticism of new-mechanism all the more questionable. Notice that there is an ambiguity in
Skillings’ analogy: if the reference to clocks is not meant to single out clocks in particular,
but instead uses clocks as a representative of the entire class of machines—as is a viable
interpretation of the sentence “Think of a machine like a clock.”—then the analogy is making
a far stronger claim about machines. If the reference to clocks is not idle, that is, if it
forms an integral part of the argument, then the logic should be something as follows: (1’)
new-mechanism can correctly explain only those things which are like machines in their
possession of productive continuity and regularity (and clocks are an arbitrary representative
of this class), (2’) some biological processes are not like machines in these respects, since
3January 2021
4Notwithstanding processual criticism discussed in Ch.4. My aim here is not to argue for new-mechanism.
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they are not like clocks in these respects, therefore (3) some biological processes cannot be
correctly explained by new-mechanisms.
Again, we may have reasons within new-mechanism to reject (1’), but even outside of
a defence of new-mechanism we have reason to reject (2’): some organisms are just like
machines with respect to their continuity and regularity, since some machines are unlike
clocks. It is this latter point that concerns me most, since unless we interpret the analogy to
machines as dispensable, idle, then we are pushed into an interpretation wherein an MOD,
based on productive continuity and stochasticity, serves as a justification for critiques of
new-mechanism—and my aim is only to defend new-mechanism insofar as criticisms thereof
rely on or imply an MOD.
Fig. 5.2 Lottery machine for selecting numbers
printed on balls (1) using fan (4) and enclosed
vessel (2) to generate randomized selection.
US patent # 4,961,578
Put another way, the starkness of the con-
trast between biological processes and new-
mechanisms is an artifact of the selection
of the artifact: clocks are not much like ri-
bosomes, but that says little about the over-
all likeness of organisms or ribosomes to
machines generally speaking. Indeed, a dis-
analogy with clocks says even less about
what a new mechanistic account of protein
synthesis should amount to. If instead we
considered the comparison of ribosomes to
machines that do include elements of ran-
domization or stochastic processes, such as
the lottery machine (Fig.5.2), the contrast
becomes harder to establish. Merely being
probabilistic or stochastic is not a distinction
between machines and biological parts. If
this disanalogy with machines is going to
serve as criticism of new-mechanism, we
will need to include more aspects of new-mechanisms in the disanalogy. But the Moore-type
counterexamples actually become weaker as we do so. For instance, if we include the idea
that ribosomes are “randomly pushed into different conformational states by external forces,
rather than moving in sequence according to the activity and interactions of its parts” [ibid],
then we can find watches with just such stochastic functions.
Admitting that being “randomly pushed into different conformational states” is itself a
matter of degree, the ribosome is surely not completely deformed during normal functioning.
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Evolution is remarkably good at generating molecular structures that tend to produce some ef-
fect under normal physiological conditions of excitation and external forces—thermodynamic
and electric, but also Newtonian—by exploitation of so-called “molecular ratchets”. In ATP-
synthetase, the stochastic flow of H+ ions through one component results in a regular circular
motion of another, due to a similar molecular ratchet. More or less random conformational
disturbances (or ion flux across a gradient) are transformed into productive and regular
movements. This is remarkable, but not unique to biology—the name of this sort of process
of course derives from the name of a common tool.
Fig. 5.3 Self-winding clock.
In the self-winding clock (Fig.5.3), part
(5) is able to move randomly in either di-
rection. It does so according to the move-
ments of the wrist—when removed from
one’s pocket—on which it is fastened. As
it does so, the parts (8a-b) tend to result in
an overall counterclockwise movement of
part (11), which itself turns (13) and con-
tributes torque to a spring. The “regular”
unwinding of the spring powers downstream
movements of parts of the clock that require
a constant output of energy. This is an ef-
fective way of transforming the stochastic
movements of the entire clock into regular
movement of the dials.5 Moreover, if it is
the nature of these external forces that is at issue, suffice it to say that the dependence of the
watch on Newtonian gravitational forces is a contingent aspect of the design of this particular
machine. One can just as well construct mechanical ratchets that operate on thermodynamic
or electrostatic principles, to be used in environments with sufficient external forces of that
variety. Tide-turbines, rotating wind-mills or fastening magnets to the poles of component
(5) would all do just that. Again, contra (1’), it is hard to see why a new mechanist would
have trouble devising a new-mechanism for this clock—the above image (Fig.5.3) is nearly
all that is required.
5It would be nice if we could here extend the analogy by saying “just as the structure of the ribosome is an
effective way of transforming stochastic thermodynamic and electric forces into the movement of the bound
mRNA” but this is actually achieved by the perhaps even more new-mechanistically tractable process of GTP
hydrolysis driving protein conformational-state change. In short, the ribosome may be deformed during normal
functioning, but this is far more accidental than the deformations during the functioning of molecular ratchets
like ATP-synthetase, or the self-winding watch.
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This is enough for my purposes: in arguing against new-mechanism on the basis of dis-
analogies between machines and the parts of organisms, critics either use these disanalogies
in a dispensable way—in which case they should be dispensed with—or rely on MODs
that turn out false on account of mechanical counter-examples. On the other hand, even
if (1) and (1’) turned out to be fatal to new-mechanism, i.e., these Moore-type cases are
counterexamples to new-mechanism after all, then new-mechanism would also fail to be a
theory of explanation in machines.6 Interpreting productive continuity as non-stochasticity
entails that new-mechanism cannot explain stochastic machines, that it cannot handle lottery
machines, inter alia. If it cannot handle ratcheting of random conformational changes due
to external forces then it cannot handle self-winding clocks—or sailboats. If it really were
inapplicable to organisms due to their stochastic behaviour at the molecular level, it would
also be inapplicable to machines, and so does not establish an MOD.
More is at issue. In Godfrey-Smith (2016) the biological predominance of randomness
and trends (“ratcheting”) is connected explicitly with the critique of mechanism via holistic
phenomena.
If we were observers of a living system at an intracellular scale, we would
see some “parts that push one another,” but not in the manner of macroscopic
machines, and we would not only see pushes. We would see a storm of activity
biased by charge and shape, generating partially random walks that, on average,
tend in orderly directions. The processes are more causally holistic, noisier—
more a matter of “herding molecular cats”—than a push-pull model allows.
–Godfrey-Smith (2016) p. 189
The opening remarks of Machamer et al. (2000) contain the following cautionary remark:
“one should not think of mechanisms as exclusively mechanical (push-pull) system” [ibid,
p.2], and so we can safely say that this disanalogy with macroscopic machines misses the
mark. New-mechanism is just not restricted to push-pull systems. Moreover, Godfrey-
Smith does not offer an analysis of what is ‘causally holistic’ about biochemical processes.
That is probably for the better: the analogy with “herding molecular cats” is derived from
explanations of statistical mechanics, so it seems that “causally holistic, noisier” refers back
to the statistical, stochastic nature of biological processes. We will require a more substantial
reading of holism if it is to provide a special MOD. However, it is somewhat unsurprising
that a contemporary critic of new-mechanism would take up a concept (holism) that was
6Moreover, new-mechanism would also fail even to be an account of textbook mechanism, such as that of
the Krebs cycle. This is primarily because new-mechanisms are apparently confined to sequential processes
(Skillings 2015), which the Krebs cycle is not. Although, one wonders why a cyclical process is not simply two
(sequential) new-mechanisms jointed head-to-tail-and-tail-to-head.
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historically reserved for organicists. In the following section I will show how an MOD based
on holism has been taken up in a contemporary defence of new-mechanism, and argue that
there are holistic machines.
5.2 MODs For New-Mechanism: Holism
5.2.1 Has New-Mechanism Become Retro-Mechanism?
Unlike the previous chapter, where it was advocates of process metaphysics that tended to
supply or rely on MODs, up unto this point I have discussed cases where arguments against
Mechanism have done so. I put this first because these criticisms pick up on a common
theme: stochasticity is prima facie problematic to new-mechanism and seems to imply a
need for a holistic treatment. In this section we return to the previous tendency: the use of an
MOD when advocating for new-mechanism.
Consider the perspective of Austin (2016), an avowed new-mechanist, on the rise of
process ontology.
The contemporary dialectic against organisms qua ontologically composed of
mechanisms, appears to often be focused on objections to organisms qua ma-
chines. . . A contemporary mechanistic ontology is not an ontology of machines,
and the conflation of the two seems to function as an implicit cause of much of
the process theorists’ ire.—Austin (2016) p.16
Austin is right that new-mechanism is not an ontology of machines, but some of his reasons
for this claim are distinctly organicist (more in § 3). On Austin’s (2016) view, the dialectic
of organisms qua machines implies the “rejection of holistic phenomena” [ibid], while that
of organisms qua mechanisms does not. Insofar as an analysis of organisms requires holism,
the new-mechanist can supposedly provide what machines lack.
Unlike Godfrey-Smith (2016), Austin (2016) provides two examples of organismal
holistic phenomena: “self-replication and self-regulation” (p. 659). These have been
addressed previously as features of autonomous capacities and intrinsic teleology (Ch.2-3),
so I will not rehearse any specific objections to them here. Perhaps they are “holistic”. If
so, then Ch.3 shows that there are holistic machines. However, Austin’s main project is
showing that new-mechanism can accommodate another yet unaddressed (“higher-order”)
phenomenon: developmental modularity.
[For] the higher-order phenomenon associated with developmental modules—
namely, their multiple realizability. . . we require an ontology that can account
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for the persistence of those modules throughout substantial variation in the
constitutive collection of entities and activities. . . entities and activities are no
doubt of central importance to our contemporary conception of ‘mechanism’,
but so is a particular dynamism.—Austin (2016) p.12
Austin argues that, since new-mechanisms can display the right kind of dynamism with
respect to variation in constitution, they can allow for multiple realizability (of a module)
over many different constitutions. Austin (2016) requires this to show the sufficiency of a
mechanistic view with respect to the ordinary variation in constitutions of organic parts—
that certain developmental events obtain regardless of variation in underlying genetic or
biochemical entities. It is clear why a new mechanist would need this: if the framework for
new-mechanisms cannot accommodate underlying variation during development, then so
much the worse for the empirical adequacy of new-mechanism.
This is an important point to defend when advocating for a mechanistic view of organisms,
but does not directly imply any particular MOD. So far Austin has only, to my mind rightly,
argued that new-mechanism can account for variation in the constituents of multiply realizable
biological modules. In this respect Austin’s project is much like mine (§ 5.1), he aims to show
that new-mechanism suffices for the analysis of a sort of phenomena that its critics say it does
not. Although, he endorses new-mechanism. To further distinguish new-mechanism from the
old, Austin claims that the machine conception cannot account for this: “unlike machines,
contemporary mechanisms. . . allow for holistic phenomena arising from the collective activity
of parts” (Austin 2016).
This is a drastic change in advocacy for mechanism. Organicist critiques have apparently
been taken on board and incorporated. Holism, as an MOD, has been brought into the fold
as a reason in favour of new-mechanism and machine analogies are explicitly the target
of mechanistic criticism. Moreover, the reductionist hallmark of mechanism is explicitly
excluded.
‘Machine’, being exhaustively dissectible into sets of entities whose activities
can be studied in isolation, are strongly associated with the philosophical project
of reductionism and the rejection of holistic phenomena. . . [U]nlike machines,
the activity of contemporary mechanisms does not consist wholly in step-wise
successions through linear series of clockwork-like connectives among their
parts.—Austin (2016) p.16
Whether new-mechanisms can actually live up to these revisionary desiderata is beside
the point of the present connection. What is interesting for me in Austin’s (2016) approach
is that holism is presented as an MOD and cast within a new mechanistic ontology. His
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rejection of the “organism qua machine” stems from a rejection of “machine qua holistic
mechanism”. To show that this MOD also fails I turn to arguing that Austin’s reasons for
rejecting the “organism qua machine” furthermore stem from a limited view of machines
and organisms: organisms are assumed to all be equally holistic and clocks are treated as
representative of the entire class of machines.
Admittedly, the parts of most organisms do not much resemble clockwork. But there
are organisms with parts that do. Consider the insect Issus that uses interlocking gear-like
structures in its legs to coordinate movements (Burrows and Sutton 2013).7 Here it is the
diversity of organisms and their mechanisms that is being neglected: “We usually think of
gears as something that we see in human designed machinery, but we’ve found that that
is only because we didn’t look hard enough” (Sutton, interview).8 Evolution by natural
selection rarely produces structures with such functional likeness to our simpler machines,
but of course there is nothing naturally preventing it from doing so on occasion.
Fig. 5.4 Gear-like structure used to time movements in Issus.
This case is more than a quick counter-example. If the failure of reductionism and neces-
sity of holism are supposed to be empirical claims about the biological realm—i.e., derived
from contemporary knowledge about variation in biological processes like development—
then they ought to be so for machines as well. We too often forget that machines are also
empirical phenomena (Rapp 1981; Ch.1). Instead of beginning with a fundamental difference,
echoing Ian Hacking9 (1998, p.208) we should ask, “well, have we in fact made any holistic
machines yet?” The claim that machines fail to display the right sort of holistic and emergent
properties cannot be settled by examining only Descartes’ favourite examples—clocks and
7Which were found eating the ivy vines around a garden in Cambridge.
8http://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/functioning-mechanical-gears-seen-in-nature-for-the-first-time
9“Even questions such as ’Can machines think?’ might be answered, in the spirit of his writing, ‘Well, have
we in fact made any thinking machines yet?’ We have to ponder the matter, but we should not start from a
fundamental opposition between machine and organism.” [ibid]
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waterworks—since there are other sorts of machines. The remainder of this section is de-
voted to arguing that there are indeed machines that are holistic and that even some familiar
machines are likely included in that lot.
5.2.2 Holistic Machines
Consider the positive view of machines: that they are exhaustively dissectible into entities
and activities that can be studied in isolation. This would not be a very interesting MOD if it
were just a claim about the inefficacy of dissection and anatomy in organisms. That MOD
would seem to turn on what surgical skills we happen to have at present, and not on any
metaphysical aspects of new-mechanism. Rather, it is best seen as a claim about the absence
of higher-order, system-level properties in machines: studying their particular constituent
entities is sufficient to understand their wholes (unlike, supposedly, organisms with their
“multiply-realizable developmental modules”). Machines are totally assembled from entities
and activities that were designed in isolation, one might read. But this is false. There are
cases of machines that were not so assembled and whose design did not proceed isolated-part
by isolated-part. I discuss these first.
Lewens (2013) points to cases from “Evolutionary Electronics” where a microchip design
is obtained by rounds of randomly generated configurations until a working whole is obtained.
Interestingly: “some sections of the best-performing chip couldn’t be altered without loss of
function, even though they were not connected (in the usual way, at least) to the output of
the chip” ([ibid] p. 645). In such cases, entities emerge whose activities cannot be studied
in isolation, since their system-level effect (on the performance of the chip) depends on
interactions between unintentionally and distally connected components. Moreover, for this
holistic phenomenon to also be multiply-realizable would require only that some equally-
well performing chips have different configurations. We may never see such behavior in
clockwork, but that’s no worse for the holism of machines generally.
Even outside an evolutionary design context the construction of a machine can result in
holistic contributions of entities to system-level activities—features that were not designed in
isolation. This need not be argued by appeal to any special positive characteristic of the design
process, but can be seen as arising from the limitations of human intellect and intervention
on our ability to prevent the emergence of that kind of holism. Holistic interactions can arise
naturally in machines due to our ignorance. It is not without reason that Jacob (1977) and
Jacob and Bendall (1983) referred to evolution as “tinkering”: in a workshop the design
process is less than ideal and can produce unexpected system-level effects from even small
and unintentional modifications. There may be holistic interactions that arise accidentally in
machines even when we do our best to design and assemble them part-by-part.
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Considering the evolved chip again, we might reject this source of holistic phenomena in
machines on the grounds that those effects were created by artificial selection, by imitation
of organisms. But just as in organisms, artificial selection cannot create alone. As Godfrey-
Smith (2014 p.41) notes, “it is only the combination of selection and mutation that is creative”.
The selection of chips with better performance takes place after the creation of chips, some of
which already have beneficial non-connected system-level effects. Those effects themselves
are the result of a process analogous to mutation—the random creation of chips with different
configurations of components. What the artificial selection process does do is increase the
likelihood of those random beneficial effects appearing in the final chip produced.
If the artificial selection process itself does not create non-connected effects, then we
have reason to believe they appear in familiar machines as well, albeit at an unknown base
frequency. As Lewens (2013) points out, “innovators may have unwittingly failed to reduce
forms of cross-talk that, unknown to them, make an important contribution to the overall
operation of the artefact”. Non-connected parts can have a positive effect on the function of a
machine, and since they emerged in that context merely from the diverse arrangements of
electric components, they may also appear outside the evolutionary design context whenever
diverse configurations do, e.g. the microcircuitry of common household teachnologies like
radios and computers.
That fact is all that is required for a counterexample to the non-holistic view of machines.
Overall contributions of unintentionally modified parts to the operation of a machine are
holistic activities of constitutive entities to the higher-order phenomena of machine activity.
Although the ordinary design process makes “exhaustive dissection” and “study in isolation”
more likely—since it is the rational intent of the designer—it cannot ensure non-holistic
behavior in the resultant machine. The new-mechanist rejection of the organism qua machine
on the grounds of a poverty of holism is empirically unjustified, since system-level effects
are not unique to biological systems. That of course does not mean that we should return
to any sort of naïve mechanism—an analysis of organisms qua entities that are literally or
functionally identical to machines (more below, § 5.3.1)—it just means that the sort of holism
wanted as justification for new-mechanism is not going to suffice as an MOD.
If the MOD provided by Austin’s (2016) new-mechanism is one that relies on the
reducibility and dissectibility of static machines contra the emergence of dynamic and
multiply-realizable organisms, cases like those involved in evolutionary electronics remind
that there are or could be evolved or unintentionally holistic machines. The holistic-MODs
in support of new-mechanism fail, just as the stochastic-MODs against it do. Therefore, if
the metaphysical framework provided by new-mechanism is sufficient to analyze both sorts
of phenomena then a new-mechanist as such would not need to defend an MOD. Austin
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may be right about the sociological causes of processualist critiques of mechanism, but
both processualists (Ch.4) and Austin have advocated MODs unnecessarily. That said, if
machines can be holistic, new-mechanism will need some other way to distinguish itself
from old-mechanism, since “organism qua (holistic) machine” is a not unattractive source of
justificatory analogies in biology.
5.3 Mechanism Has Never Been Machine-Reductionism
Some retrospection at this point is helpful. The debates that have concerned us in the
preceding sections (§ 1-2) and chapter (Ch.4) are not sui generis, but simply the most recent
developments in a tradition of debates. The present cases of New-Mechanist vs. Critic, or
Processualist vs. New-Mechanist, etc., have a long history. Most recently, these debates find
antecedents in debates between Mechanists, in a broader sense, and their critics, Organicists
or Vitalists. Moreover, we can trace them back at least as far as debates about the mechanical
philosophy of Descartes.10 While there is perhaps no single persisting debate at the core
of this generation-spanning opposition between “Mechanists” and their critics or opposers,
there is a persistent theme: the contentious role of machines in metaphysics of science.
It is thus tempting to believe, with the advent of the modern versions of these views, that
this contention has been resolved.11 That is, it is tempting to think that our modern grown-up
new-mechanist metaphysics has overcome the vices of its antecedents, specifically the vice
of equating machines with organisms. Since I have (above and earlier) argued that both new
mechanism and processualism do not depend on MODs—despite how some have advocated
or criticized them—I am at risk of contributing to this misinterpretation. In this final section
I hope to set this straight: our new metaphysics have not outgrown the MODs they once
depended on, since they never did depend on MODs.
5.3.1 Naive-Mechanism: A Persistent but Idle Straw-Man
It is both insufficient and naïve to characterize Mechanism as the view that being mechanical
is a matter of being functionally or causally identical to machines. Let’s call the view that
mechanism is simply a claim about being identical to machines “naïve-mechanism”. I call it
‘naïve’ not simply as a pejorative, but because it seems to be the view that we often consider
first, and because ‘native’ or ‘nascent’ would come with other unintended connotations.
Adopting naïve-mechanism is a vice on par with committing the virtus dormativa and
10See Riskin (2016).
11Perhaps exemplified by the processualism of Dupré and new-mechanism of Machamer et al. or Bechtel.
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survives, in the public consciousness at least, in claims like “the body is a machine”. It
can only be half of the picture of mechanistic explanation in science, since it is only a
non-trivial claim when made about non-machines. Clearly, naïve-mechanism vacuously
explains machines—machines are mechanical because they are identical to machines. It may
say something non-trivial about organisms that they are (more or less) analogous to machines,
but then we must flesh this out by giving an account of machines and the properties they
have that are ripe for analogy.
That said, naïve-mechanism is a far more idle view than is perhaps presumed by critics
of Mechanism. It is a favourite straw-man; though not harmless. It sits in the background
during contemporary discussions of Mechanism. For example, when Hacking (1998) praises
Canguilhem for recognizing “how central to Descartes was the idea that animals are machines”
(p.203), the naïve view, indeed, the naivety of the view and the apparent implication for the
naivety of Descartes is background to the following joke,
Chomsky (1962) found in Descartes just the man to be his predecessor, and
used the title Cartesian Linguistics. So that distinction [between humans and
animals, and thus machines] is very present to recent thinking about language.
The more general doctrine, that animals are machines, does not rate high in
today’s consciousness. We think of it as vaguely quaint. It summons up images
of Descartes kicking dogs downstairs.—Hacking (1998) p.203
This is not a slip specific to Hacking. It is common to attribute the origin of Mechanism as
a metaphysics to Descartes’ Treatise on Man, with its corresponding “mechanical philosophy”
seen as an ontology—though there are historical antecedents who predate Descartes.12 It is
thus tempting to conclude that Descartes at least must have held to naïve-mechanism.
The problem is that this is not what Descartes says. After a very extended thought-
experiment / description of the workings of a hypothetical machine, built by god, Descartes
says explicitly what we are to take from this exercise.
I desire that you consider that all the functions that I have attributed to this
machine. . . and in this they imitate as perfectly as possible the movements of
real men. I desire, I say, that you should consider that these functions follow
in this machine simply from the disposition of the organs and wholly naturally
as the movements of a clock or other automaton follow from the disposition
of its counterweights and wheels. To explain these functions, then, it is not
12Rapp (1981) attributes the first instance of interpreting the “universe as a giant mechanical clock” to
Nicholas Oresmus in the 14th century, but calls Descartes’ mechanical philosophy the first “authoritative
formulation” of such a view.
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necessary to conceive of any vegetative or sensitive soul, or any other principle
of movement or life. —Descartes (1972) p.169, my emphasis
We are not told that real men (or animals) or their movements are those of machines,
nor even that they even enjoy the same dispositions. We are told that a machine which
imitates us in a manner as perfectly as god can create will have functions that follow from
the dispositions of its organs. Since god can, presumably, create an exact copy of our bodies
this implies that our functions also “follow from the dispositions of our organs”. What we
are given beyond this is a simile: our functions follow from the dispositions of our organs
“wholly naturally as” the functions of a clock or other automaton follow from the dispositions
of their parts. What is the same between us, or animals, and machines is not the functions
nor the dispositions, but the naturalness of how functions arise from dispositions of parts,
organs. Riskin (2016) notes the same tendency to misinterpret Descartes (embedding what I
take to be an ontological point into the explanatory context of ‘understanding’) as follows,
Descartes’s proposal that an animal is a machine has sounded to most people. . .
like saying that an animal is essentially inanimate. . . But it is a misreading of
Descartes. . . By describing animals as automata, Descartes did not mean to
reduce them to lifelessness. On the contrary, he meant to declare that one could
explain every aspect of life in terms of machinery, and so could understand the
workings of living beings as fully as a clockmaker understands a clock. —Riskin
(2016) p.44-45, my emphasis
This is not an exercise in charitable Descartes-rereading. Descartes certainly gets a
lot wrong.13 Nonetheless, what he desires we take from his mechanical philosophy is not
naïve-mechanism. What we are actually given in the mechanical philosophy of Descartes is
something like reductionism, grounded in dispositions, where the analogy with machines
serves the rhetorical role of highlighting an analogous case where (presumably) we are not
inclined to imagine a non-reductive explanation in terms of “vegetative or sensitive souls”.14
Modernizing Descartes, we might rephrase by saying that organisms are reducible to their
parts, like machines are. This is good rhetoric insofar most people are already reductionists
about machines; “holistic” machines were not on Descartes’ or his reader’s radar.
We may of course still disagree with this mechanical philosophy, in at least two ways:
(1) we may not believe that our functions arise only from the dispositions of our organs, or
13He is unaware of statistical mechanics and so fails to understand the movement of gasses and fluids
(although one would imagine he could have concocted analogies were he to have known); the sorts of things he
believes are included in the body are not, such as spirits in the blood and literal fire; and many of the processes
he believes in, such as the heating of the blood in the heart, turn out wrong.
14How seriously we are to take the reference to ‘dispositions’ is hard to assess. Suffice it to say this debate
does not likely turn on the correct metaphysical account of dispositions.
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(2) we might not believe that the arising of our functions from the disposition of our organs
happens as naturally as it does in artificial machines. That is, we might hold an MOD based
on a rejection of reductionism, or find Descartes’ analogy a poor justification. But this is
plainly a very different sort of debate to the one invoked by naïve-mechanism. This is a trend.
Mechanisms turn out to rely on similes with machines for justification, but are substantive
claims of some other sort. The topic of the next section is how this manifests in Mechanisms
advocated post-Descartes and pre-new-mechanism.
5.3.2 Mechanisms not Mechanism
It is somewhat misleading to refer to “new mechanism” as if it were univocal, as if it were a
single theory. As seen above (§ 5.1), there are a variety of presentations of new mechanism
that we are sometimes licensed to treat as unified just when we discuss features that are
common among them. This multiplicity is magnified as we step back to earlier Mechanisms;
in the beginning of the 20th century and earlier, there were a lot more theories going around
with the name ‘Mechanism’ than there perhaps are called ‘New Mechanism’ today. This
presents a problem of identifying what features are common to these diverse views that
license sometimes talking about them as a unity, and thus a problem of determining whether
there is any single MOD troubling them all. I argue that, if we are looking for a core or
center-point around which to amalgamate or unify past Mechanisms, it is reductionism and
not machine-analogies or metaphors that best serves this role.
What makes this reductionist core less than obvious is that their inclusion in Mechanism
often comes with other substantive metaphysical claims. What those substantive claims turn
out to be is varied. Some common themes for this extra bit include:
0 Dispositionalism (in Descartes)
1 Mathematical modeling
2 Materialist atomism or “corpuscularianism”
3 Narrow sense Mechanics, i.e. the study of movement
4 The scientific method
5 Determinism
These five aspects of Mechanism appear together in various combinations and with
different proportions of emphasis. For instance, Needham (1926) sees mechanism as a claim
about physical reductionism and the in principle efficacy of the scientific method.
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If all things in heaven and earth could really be thought of as capable of being
fully and finally revealed to man by the scientific method ; if physics was not
only the most fundamental science but also the most fundamental of philosophies
; if, indeed, there could exist no metaphysic but science, then of course the world
would be safe for mechanistic biology, and a place fit for biochemists to live in.
—Needham (1926)
For another example, consider Bennett’s (1986) characterization of the state of natu-
ral philosophy in the 1600s. Though abiological, Bennett’s characterization is typical of
discussions of Mechanism.
[T]he seventeenth century was a time of growing consensus in natural philos-
ophy. . . based on an experimentally practiced mechanical or corpuscularian
philosophy of nature. . . [Wherein] the mathematical qualities fully characterized
ultimate particles or corpuscules, though there was no narrow commitment to a
rigorous metaphysic [e.g. Cartesian], and sensible phenomena resulted from the
purely mechanical interactions of particles—interactions that were in principle
fully exampled by gross machines. —Bennett (1986) p.1
Here mechanism is practically equated with corpuscularianism. Mechanistic views are
defined as those where (i) mathematical modeling applies to (ii) particles together with a
reductionist account of how phenomena arise therefrom. Again, it is only after the view
has been described that the analogy with machines is given: “mechanical” interactions are
those that are “in principle fully exampled by gross machines”. This is not a concession
to naïve-mechanism: Bennett’s aim is a history of the involvement of mechanics (people
who make machines15) in the course of early science, so the assumption of analogy with
“gross machines” is really emphasizing a part of (iv) the scientific methods of the time. In
any case, this is a claim made about the physical analogy between machines and corpuscules,
not organisms.
Mechanism and its criticism has too long a history to make this point by the multiplication
of instances. For my purposes it is only necessary that we avoid making mistakes in assessing
the relationship between mechanism and the MOD. To that end I will state what I take to be
the two major vices affecting the debate, so we can avoid them.
The first vice is limiting the class of machines used for analogy to a narrow and familiar
group, usually clocks and clock-like machines (Ch.1). “Clockwork” analogies and metaphors
15Speaking critically of how the history of “mechanical philosophy or corpuscularianism” has been parochial-
ized by a focus on customary distinctions between “scholar and craftsman, or the intellectual and the mechanic”
Bennett (1986) says that these terms have essentially biased the debate because “the ‘mechanic’ or ‘craftsman’
has been understood as someone unconcerned with higher science.”
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can be carelessly used by advocates of mechanism and are thus often the target of critics. This
is a vice of parochialism: even if (when) comparisons to machines are important justifications
for Mechanism, this should hardly turn on those features of machines instantiated only in
16th century clocks. If there is a deep connection to be found (denied) in the relationship
between Mechanism and machines, it ought to be stable in the face of (at least minor)
advances in engineering. Nonetheless, this vice is the easiest avoided. We need only broaden
our comparison class—of machines, but also organisms—when placing weight on such
comparisons. For example, if the aim is to criticize Mechanism via a disanalogy with clocks,
even if the Mechanist takes this seriously (i.e., they do not point out at the real issue is about
dispositions, or reduction, etc.), then they can always simply respond with an analogy to a
non-clocklike machine.
The second vice is specific to critics of mechanism: presuming that Mechanism in general
stands or falls with its most flawed characterization, here called “naïve-mechanism”. This
often takes the form of overestimating the place or significance of machine analogies in
mechanism qua metaphysics (Austin 2016). In these arguments, the straw-men are clocks.
The right view of this analogy, to my mind, is that it is entirely idle or dispensable unless it is
serving as a justification for one or more of the substantial theses (i-v) typically associated
with Mechanism. Criticizing this analogy in isolation thus both fails to get to the crux of the
matter and to seriously address the substantial claims of Mechanists.
5.4 Conclusion: Poorly Defined Targets of Mechanistic Phi-
losophy
In this chapter I have tried to demonstrate two things (i) MODs based on stochasticity and
holism in support or criticism of mechanism have empirical counterexamples, and (ii) that
despite the persistence of machine analogies and disanalogies in advocacy and criticism of
Mechanism, these are dispensable or else false. My arguments for (i) should dispel remaining
worries that rejection of MODs entail the adoption of a (potentially fraught) metaphysics.
Argument for (ii) should go some way to explaining why the place of machines is so hotly
contested in debates about the correct metaphysics of the biological sciences, and hopefully
encourage some pause at the introduction of contingent facts about clocks into metaphysical
debates about organisms. Both of these points, in their own ways, depend on recognizing
that Machines–physical objects like clocks and waterworks—have been mistargeted in what
is otherwise quite clearly a metaphysical debate.
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A final word on this oddity in conclusion is helpful, before we leave metaphysics mostly
behind in the subsequent chapters. Surely, if a theory claims to be metaphysical in the sense
that it offers an ontology for the sciences, then it must at very least be empirically adequate.
We should thus expect that any broad metaphysics of science, such as Processualism or
Mechanism, should not turn on the analysis of machines or organisms, precisely because they
are both empirical phenomena and thus things that these metaphysics should be adequate
to analyse. Any MOD at the level of metaphysics would need to turn on whether a given
metaphysics were adequate to one (machines) while inadequate to another (organisms),
but this would, if true, be an argument against the metaphysics. Thankfully, in the cases
examined in this chapter, this is not true: no MOD falls out of Mechanist metaphysics, since
both machines and organisms can be analysed in Mechanistic terms.
Chapter 6
Evolution and the Machine
Organism-Distinction
Abstract
Is evolution or evolvability the MOD? Organisms evolve, but do machines evolve; and if
so, how? In this chapter I argue that an account of evolution broad enough to include all
cases of biological evolution will admit cases of technological evolution. To support this, I
examine two established accounts of biological evolution. The first, due to Lewontin (1970),
defines evolution in terms of heritable variation in fitness. The second, advanced first by
Dawkins (1976) and Hull (1980) and elaborated by Sterelny et al. (1996), defines evolution
in terms of replicators and interactors. In both cases I show that there are technological
changes that satisfy the definition of evolution. I then respond to a single counterargument:
that machines fail to form the kinds of reproductive/replicative lineages required by both of
these accounts of evolution. To respond to this counterargument I consider another account
of the evolutionary process, due to Woese and Fox (1977) and Woese (1998), that defines
evolution in terms that do not require lineages of organisms. If unclear reproductive lineage
relationships are a problem for technological evolution, they are just as much of a problem
for biological evolution. I take this to show that no MOD can be made on the basis of a
sufficiently broad account of evolution.
6.1 Introduction
[A]t an abstract level technology change can be described as “evolutionary”.
However... this fact does not entail that evolutionary approaches to technology
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will revolutionize the way we understand this domain. At present, there is no
reason to expect the creation of robust, general models of technological evolution
except at the most abstract, uninformative level.—Lewens (2006) p.140
What does it mean for technology to evolve? Since there are a number of accounts of
biological evolution, there are a number of different things that it might mean for technologies
to evolve. This chapter addresses three accounts of evolution: (i) evolution as individuals
satisfying the Lewontin conditions, (ii) evolution as parts satisfying the conditions for being
an (extended) replicator and, more unusually, (iii) evolution as collectives of entities satisfying
conditions for being what Woese and Fox (1977) termed ‘progenotes’, what I call Woese
conditions.
Perhaps most technology change does not occur by processes even — pace Lewens’
charity — “abstractly” evolutionary. Though, sometimes it does, and it is those times that
this chapter addresses. We may think those times so few or so abstract that they are not
worthy of examination, and I present some cases to show that this is not so. However, to
accept infrequency or abstractness as criticisms of evolutionary approaches to technology
change would be a double-standard, since many biological evolutionary processes are also
infrequent and abstract. Perhaps most biological changes are not evolutionary, and those that
are are always at some more-or-less high level of abstraction. Speciation is quite infrequent
and is abstract enough to cover manifold very different mechanisms, but knowledge about
speciation is essential to understanding biology. It is enough to reject an evolutionary MOD
that some (infrequent, abstract) cases of technology change are evolutionary.
The more serious problem with providing an evolutionary account of technology is the
relationship between technological evolutionism and traditional theories of technological
change. It is often argued that fitting instances of cultural change to evolutionary frameworks
does not explain much, if anything, besides what is explained on rational, historical, anthropo-
logical, and/or sociological grounds (see Lewens 2015). However, rejecting an MOD based
on the applicability of evolution to machines does not require the evolutionary framework
to explain much besides what can be explained in other disciplinary frameworks. It only
requires determining whether evolutionary frameworks are in fact appropriate to the phe-
nomenon to which they are applied. In a rebuttal of an article1 defending cultural evolution,
Fracchia and Lewontin (2005) make a perennial point about the success vs. appropriateness
of evolutionary explanations outside biological systems.
The real issue... is not whether explanations can be successfully manufactured on
the basis of paradigmatic assumptions, but whether the paradigmatic assumptions
1Runciman, W. G. (2005). Culture does evolve. History and Theory, 44(1), 1-13.
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are appropriate to the object of analysis. The selectionist paradigm requires the
reduction of society and culture to inheritance systems... with society and culture
thus reduced to inheritance systems, history can be reduced to “evolution.” But
these reductions, which are required by the selectionist paradigm, exclude much
that is essential to a satisfactory historical explanation.—Fracchia and Lewontin
(2005) p.14
I am not concerned here with what Fracchia and Lewontin (2005) call the ‘selectionist
paradigm’, within biology or outside it, and leave questions about society and culture to others.
I am concerned whether “paradigmatic assumptions” of various theories of technological
evolution—those due to Lewontin, but also others—are “appropriate to” machines, and
whether they exclude much that would be required of successful explanations. If theorists of
cultural evolution have, in response to what they see as a lack of evolutionary explanations of
technology, been exclusionary of other approaches, that is their error (Lewens 2015). But it
is a rectifiable error. When evolutionary frameworks genuinely apply to objects of inquiry—
whether machine or organism—they need not exclude the application of other theories.
Evolution never supplanted physiology, ecology, etc. Technological evolutionism should
likewise not supplant social sciences or history of technology. Disciplinary territorial dispute
may be inevitable, but in-principle exclusion of non-evolutionary theories by evolutionary
theory can be avoided.
This penultimate chapter only claims that evolution will not establish an MOD, since
three of our best general accounts of evolution sometimes apply to machines. The first two
accounts of evolution addressed here are familiar, the last is less so. In § 6.2 I examine the
case for the evolution of machines conceived as individuals satisfying Lewontin’s (1970)
conditions for evolution by natural selection. There I argue that there is a subset of machines
that fairly straightforwardly possess heritable variation in fitness. In § 6.3 I examine the
case for evolution of machines conceived as replicators satisfying Sterelny et al.’s (1996)
extended replicator framework. In the final § 6.4 I take up a more heterodox view of evolution
advocated by Carl Woese, proposed to apply to the time before the divergence of the major
kingdoms of life. This theory explicitly drops features thought key to defining evolution of
present organisms by the other accounts. Significantly, it drops the requirement for organismal
lineages. Woese considers the evolution of ‘progenotes’—instead of organisms, true genotes.2
There I argue that even if lineage-formation is a major problem for technological evolution,
it is also a problem for biological evolution.
2From pro + genote, an entity yet to possess a modern genotype-phenotype connection. Sometimes
incorrectly assumed to derive from ‘progenitor’ and ‘prokaryote’.
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6.2 Evolution of Machines as individuals
This section argues that some machines, like some organisms, evolve as individuals due to
their possession of heritable variation in fitness. Clarifying an analytic definition of evolution
has been a “struggle for existence” among philosophers and biological theorists. The most
famous condensation is due to Richard Lewontin (1970), as follows verbatim.
L1. Different individuals in a population have different morphologies, physiologies, and
behaviors (phenotypic variation).
L2. Different phenotypes have different rates of survival and reproduction in different
environments (differential fitness).
L3. There is a correlation between parents and offspring in the contribution of each to
future generations (fitness is heritable).
Lewontin says that these are “three principles embody the principle of evolution by natural
selection” [ibid p.1] (hereafter, Evolution by Natural Selection (ENS)). He then immediately
asserts their sufficiency: “While they hold, a population will undergo evolutionary change”
[ibid].
Does ENS in this sense apply to machines? This question requires some qualification.
I think it is best qualified by taking a step back: What variable are we substituting for
‘machines’ when we check the applicability of the conditions? That is: Are machines
supposed to be checked against L1-3 as “Different (Xs) individuals in a population...” or as
“Different (Ys) phenotypes...”? If we were asking about the applicability of ENS to birds, we
mean to substitute birds for the individuals that evolve (Xs), while if we are asking about the
applicability of ENS to colouration we are asking about phenotypes (Ys), i.e. the sorts of
things which may vary in a population of evolving individuals. The remainder of this section
(§ 6.2.1-3) considers those machines to which ENS applies as individuals, the applicability
of ENS to machines considered as (extended) phenotypes occupies the following section (§
6.3).
6.2.1 Phenotypic Variation in Machines
ML1. Different machines in a population have different morphologies, physiolo-
gies, and behaviors (phenotypic variation).
Different machines are variable in their shapes, internal processes or mechanisms, actions
and interactions. Moreover, they are so variable at present that they cannot be distinguished
from organisms by any of the features thought fundamental to being an organism (Ch.2-5).
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However, we might still worry that machines are barred from satisfying L1 if ‘morphol-
ogy’, ‘physiology’, and ‘behaviour’ are given readings as specifically biological terms. I take
the work of previous chapters to marshal against this worry, since it requires some MOD to
define what is ‘specifically biological’. That said, we can give independent reasons not to
take L1 to be overly contingent on the biological connotation of ‘phenotype’ for organisms.
This is because the Lewontin conditions are not thought to apply solely to organisms, but to
other variable entities as well. Lewontin says that replacing ‘individual’ with ‘population’
and (re)interpreting phenotype in a “distributed” way suffices to make L1-3 applicable to
the evolution of populations. L1-3 are, by proponents of MLS at least, thought to apply to
genes, as well as species and even higher taxa (Okasha 2003; Godfrey-Smith 2009; Doolittle
2017). If genes or species, for instance, have ‘morphologies’ and ‘physiologies’, it is in quite
a different sense than that for organisms. So we cannot bar an entity from having variation
simply because that entity is a non-organism on Lewontin’s account. Insofar as machines
have ‘morphologies’ and ’physiologies’, it is in a different sense from that of organisms.
However, this is no reason to preclude machines from satisfying Lewontin’s criterion of
variation.
6.2.2 Differential Fitness of Machines
ML2. Different characteristics of machines have different rates of survival and
reproduction in different environments (differential fitness).
Different machines persist for different lengths of time, and cannot help but do so on the
basis of their particular characteristics. As discussed in Ch.4, this persistence is sometimes
less “active” and more a matter of the durability of their components, but the same is true
of organisms. Nonetheless, some machines also actively engage in processes that maintain
them in the face of interactions with their surroundings. Computer viruses encode different
processes that help evade detection and deletion by host software; computers contain anti-
virus software that allows them to persist for different lengths of time in the presence of
viral attacks. Likewise, examples abound of robotics—such as the Canadarm discussed in
Ch.3—that are able to maintain themselves by replacing or repairing damaged components.
More questionable is the role of reproduction or replication in machines. In this section I
am only concerned with showing that there are machines satisfying L2—not that machines
generally or even often do—so it is only necessary to concentrate on the best cases of machine
reproduction and the mechanical and digital self-reproducing automata are those best cases.3
Perhaps the most interesting cases come from self-reproducing automata—robotic machines
3For a discussion of the more general problem of culture-level replicators see Lewens (2015).
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that can copy themselves (see Ch. 3)—but the most frequently replicating are the digital,
virtual, or in silico machines.
There appear to be programs that can
reproduce... but which are not viruses. These
‘computer organisms’ may be a serious
security problem...
—Aldeman (1989)
von Neumann began the work on self-
reproducing robotics, but his ideas also
spawned a number of computational self-
reproducing entities. These were called
“self-reproducing automata”, and have taken
many forms since their initial hypothetical
introduction (see Stahl 1965). These com-
putational automata, as well as later entities
such as computer viruses, worms, and the “computer organisms”’ mentioned above, are
often attributed features of autonomy (Ch.3) such as self-maintenance and self-reproduction
(Bedau 2003; Mange et al. 1996; Aldeman 1989 von Neumann and Burks 1966; Stahl 1965;
Cohen 1987). Varieties of these autonomous capacities have been studied in computational
systems since their introduction (see Penrose 1959), in both computer science and artificial-
life research (see review Bedau 2003). These are perhaps the best cases of machines with
appreciable rates of survival and reproduction.
Though not explicit in the L2, there is often a background assumption that reproduction of
the sort required by ENS is self -reproduction. Considering Godfrey-Smith’s (2004) typology
of forms of reproduction, including “simple”, “scaffolded” and “collective” varieties ([ibid],
see Ch.3 § 3.4.1), the sorts of reproduction we see in machines is on the spectrum from
simple to scaffolded reproduction, and arguably much closer to the scaffolded pole. Should
this bar them from satisfying L2, from varying in their rates of reproduction? Arguably,
no. Firstly, this typology of marginal forms of reproduction was developed for evolving
biological entities, and there are plenty of evolving biological individuals that are scaffolded
reproducers as well: genes and (biological) viruses most prominently. Moreover, some
evolving organisms are also scaffolded reproducers, such as obligate parasites and other
obligate forms of symbiosis. Secondly, argued previously (see Ch.3, § 3.4.2), there are
examples of machines that are more simple, “self” or autonomous reproducers, and a growing
number of theoretical examples on the horizon.
Less technologically sophisticated examples also include artefacts which are produced
by consecutive rounds of copying. Perhaps all familiar machines are scaffolded allonomous
reproducers, the survival and reproduction of which, in different environments, differs
depending on both their make-up and scaffolding, both by ourselves and other machines
(more in § 3-4 below). Ancient tools likely enjoyed short lineages of faithful copying;
manuscripts were once copied by hand; arguably “memes” in the sense of digital media; and
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generally whichever machines are simple enough to be produced by emulation from observed
cases. All provide examples of technological objects that differ either in their persistence or
how frequently they are reproduced.4
This is enough to show that there are machines with sufficiently autonomous or simple
reproductive capacities to endorse ML2 in some cases (e.g. computer viruses and self-
replicating automata) and, if we are inclined to admit other sorts of reproduction, that a
scaffolded version of L2 also applies to both machines and organisms.
6.2.3 Fitness is Heritable in Machines
ML3. There is a correlation between parent and offspring machines in the
contribution of each to future generations (fitness is heritable).
Lewens (2015, p.14) provides a reading of “technological replicators” as “items whose
function it is to preserve resemblance between artifactual parents and their offspring”. Sat-
isfying L1-3 does not require replicators, though they are a plausible cause of individuals
satisfying L3. In the context of L1-3, what we require is at least these “artifactual parent-
offspring relationships”, and those machines with marginally autonomous reproduction
capacities, discussed above, are the better candidates. The question is just: When machines
do reproduce, is there correlation between the parent and offspring?5
In silico machines with reproductive capacities tend to enjoy near-perfect heritability of
their characteristics when compared to the imperfect physio-chemical mechanisms deployed
for copying and error correction in biological systems—so much so that the creation of
“evolvable” computer viruses often requires the design of systems that introduce variation
(Iliopoulos et al. 2011), periodically violating heritability rather than maintaining intergener-
ational correlation. Likewise, when familiar machines are produced by rounds of copying
there will be correlation between the product and the copied machine. More appropriately for
4This reproduction, moreover, cannot always be dismissed as explainable strictly in terms of our ends (Ch.2).
Some machines will be reproduced whether or not they offer any intended benefit to the scaffolding system.
For analogy, in a pair of canonical papers for Nature, Orgel and Crick (1980) and Doolittle and Sapienza (1980)
described their notion of selfish DNA. They sought to explain both why there is so much DNA in genomes and
why most of it seems to do nothing whatsoever for the organisms bearing it, i.e. why there is so much junk
in the genome (Ohno 1972). Their explanation is that most of the DNA is or was selfish, being copied and
degrading without any significant effect on the organism. Since computational viruses and worms likewise have
no, or mildly detrimental, effects on the systems harbouring them, the notion of selfish in silico machines might
likewise help explain the presence of digital junk. If we were to look across all computer systems effected by
malicious in silico machines, we would likely find that “traces of the virus were left on the system” (Cohen
1987) following unintended replication events.
5I imagine I am not alone in finding Lewontin’s phrasing of L3 odd. To my mind the essential bit is the
correlation between parent and offspring, and expectations of contribution to future generations stems from this.
I concentrate on L3 with this reading in mind.
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the sophisticated and mass manufactured technologies, the clearest cases of intergenerational
correlation will occur when copying of individual machines proceeds by production on the
basis of a plan (design or schematic) that is itself copied. Here there remains some question
whether it is the plans or the machines that satisfy L3. However, the Lewontin conditions do
not specify the mechanism of correlation between parent and offspring.
***
What does this say about the significance of Lewonton’s treatments of evolution for
machines generally? Although there is a class of machines satisfying ML1-3, this class
is restricted. That said, the number and rate of evolving entities might be underestimated,
simply from considering the proportion of machines satisfying ML1-3. Someone wanting to
understand the history of technology who was unwilling to grant the efficacy of technological
changes wrought by machines satisfying ML1-3 would be missing a significant part of that
history (e.g. every change caused by in silico evolution). The class of Lewontinian changes
might not explain a significant proportion of technology changes, though it arguably still
explains a very large absolute number of instances of technology change.
The deeper problem is what we should say about cases where the causal histories of the
production and change of technologies do not occur in neatly separated parent-offspring
intergenerational relationships, when the parent-offspring relations are many-to-one or many-
to-many. This question is addressed more fully in § 6.4, where I argue that the massively
reticulated nature of the historical processes of production and change of machines may
justify a different, non-Lewontinian, account of the evolutionary process, but does not
establish an MOD. Before that, the following section takes a different recipe for ENS and
argues that it also is satisfied by a number of machines, though suffers from the same problem
of entangles causal histories.
6.3 Evolution of Machines as Parts
Instead of Lewontin’s conditions, this section considers accounts of evolution stemming
from Hull’s (1980) replicator-interactor framework (see [ibid] p.318). Hull’s (1980) account
proceeds by the definition of two types of entities (replicators and interactors) then defines
selection in terms of them, as follows,
Replicator: an entity that passes on its structure directly in replication.
Interactor: an entity that directly interacts as a cohesive whole with its environ-
ment in such a way that replication is differential.
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...[The] selection process itself can be defined:
Selection: A process in which the differential extinction and proliferation of
interactors cause the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced
them.—Hull (1980) p.318
[U]sing Dawkins’ own style of teleological
argument one could claim that the bird is the
nest’s way of making another nest.
—Bateson (1978)
Hull’s ideas have already been applied to
artefacts. Dawkins’ gene-vehicle distinction
is nearly the replicator-interactor framework,
and his 1982 Extended Phenotype spurred a
debate about the place of animal-artefacts in
gene-centrism or, more generally, replicator-
centrism. Bateson’s view, quoted page-right,
is iconic of the strong conflicting intuitions in this arena. Bateson himself evidently treated it
as a criticism, reductio, of Dawkins, Dawkins responded in kind, while Sterelny et al. (1996)
later took it on as a positive consequence for the analysis of animal artefacts. This section
argues, in effect, that sometimes we are a machine’s way of making another machine. In a
Batesonian reversal, or Saturnalia of the neo-Kantian view of organisms and machines (Ch.2-
3), we can shift our focus to machines and treat organisms as a means to their replication.
Bateson’s criticism’ is that Dawkins’ selfish gene is merely a shift of perspective: the
role of genes (replicators) in the creation of present and future phenotypes is one possible
focal point, but not a privileged one, thus not justifying treating genes as a special and unique
factor in development. At least, not justifying that focus to the exclusion of all else. We could
likewise privilege our focus on the role of a phenotype, such as the behavioural consequence
of nest-building, in the creation of future phenotypes. Sterelny et al. (1996) largely accept
this criticism of the privileged role of genes and take a middle way: genes are special, since
they are replicators, but not unique, since other things besides are also replicators. They call
this view the Extended Replicator Framework (ERF). I elaborate this view briefly before
showing its relevance to machines.
The ERF has the consequence that some animal artefacts are replicators. Bateson’s claim—
changed from a modus tollens to modus ponens—is correct, “perhaps always” (Sterelny et al.
1996, p.398) or for some nests and some birds at least. On the ERF, when an animal artefact
is a replicator, it is an “active replicator”, since “their properties... influence the probability
of being reproduced” [ibid]. Such artefacts “form lineages” via their builders or makers, who
“carry information through which the nest is replicated” [ibid]. The ERF is also etiological,
requiring that such artefacts be “adapted” [ibid], sufficiently linked for “cumulative selection”
[ibid, p.391], and that it must be the case that “the explanation for their existence and nature
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is that earlier copies played a similar role” [ibid, p.393]. These are all claims about a subset
of non-human animal artefacts. Nonetheless, they apply to some human artefacts as well.
Sterelny et al. (1996) aim to distinguish their view from the “holism run amok” of DST,
so are quick to point to cases of animal artefacts that are not replicators. Most importantly
are cases where an artefact does not increase the probability of artefacts (of the same sort)
appearing in the future—no matter how significant that artefact may be in the lifecycle of the
organism. Garbage cans are vital to opossums, though do not affect their future existence
via opossums; “possum behaviour does not result in the net flow of new cans” [ibid, p.392].
Likewise, despite their evident biological significance, hermit crab shells are not replicators
“precisely because the hermit crab is unable to influence the availability of a critical resource
in the next generation” [ibid, p.397]. Since at times the unavailability of such a resource can
drive extinction, Sterelny et al. (1996) refer to this as “sad evolutionary dynamics”.
Genes and some non-human animal artefacts are special, since replicators, but not unique,
since some human artefacts are also replicators. Importantly, human artefacts are able to
influence their availability in the next generation—we make trash cans, perhaps especially
the ones we like, and to maintain a flow of shells we farm snails. If we go extinct for artificial
reasons, it is far more likely to occur precisely because we are so very able to influence the
availability of things that are, for now at least, resources. Our sad evolutionary dynamic
is wrought by our lack of forethought, not ineffectuality. Opossums might not be able to
influence the availability of garbage cans but, in Bateson’s form: sometimes a human being
is a garbage can’s way of making another garbage can. Complex machines are perhaps
especially plausible extended replicators. They are the sort of things that are unlikely to
arise ab initio, instead owing their existence in large part to the existence of earlier “copies”
playing similar roles. Their properties influence their probability of being reproduced; and
we carry information, in a very literal way, by which such machines are replicated.
In the remainder of this section I address possible objections to applying the ERF to
machines: (a) whether the process of replication of machines is too complex for there to be
lineages of machines and, relatedly, (b) whether the sort of replication process for machines
is fundamentally different from the case of animal artefacts.
I address (a) more fully in Ch.7 when discussing Dawkins’ Extended Phenotype Theory
(EPT). Dawkins enjoins us to think of the difference between the causal pathways leading to
conventional phenotypes and those to extended phenotypes as being a difference in degree
of complexity. In Ch.7 I argue that we can generalize on this approach to view all artefacts,
human and non-human, as extended parts of the organisms that are causally responsible for
them. What we have on that view is a great diversity of artefacts varying in the complexity
of the causal processes leading to their re-existence. But we do not obtain a fundamental
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difference between, e.g., nest-making and clock-making. Both sorts of artefacts can be
seen as (complexly generated) parts of organisms and thereby extended phenotypic parts of
organismal-lineages. On this view, complexity of the process of replication is just not relevant
to lineage formation. Machine replication is of an incredibly allonomous sort (Ch.3, see also
§ 4 below), perhaps highly scaffolded reproduction (Godfrey-Smith 2014), or complex and
“indirect” copying. But that is not problematic on biological grounds. Though Sterelny et al.
(1996) agree in principle (quote below), a sustained defence of this view will need to wait for
Ch.7.
We do not see complexity as problematic; for an e-mail copy of this paper is very
indirectly produced, and depends essentially on many elements additional to the
Word document... Nor need we suppose that genes, nor any other replicator, are
“self-replicating”.—Sterelny et al. (1996) p.396
On the second point (b), even if complexity itself is not a problem, the sort of complexity
may be. One sort of complexity of replicative causal chains pertains to the level of autonomy
compared to allonomy, the involvement of other entities. In the language defined in Chapter
3, there is complex variation in allonomous self-directed capacities of artefact production.
Thus we might think that it is not complexity alone, but the allonomous sort of complexity
introduced into machines that makes the ERF inapplicable to them. This same problem will
also arise in connection with the EPT in Ch.7. However, complexity of the sort involving
others in “indirect” causal chains does not prevent something from being a copy, either in
the case of genes or other replicated entities. Moreover, most animal cases—beavers and
termites especially—do not enjoy an autonomous production of extended phenotype. In most
cases of the EPT, the causal processes leading to a conventional versus extended phenotype
differ in complexity and differ in allonomy, so allonomous causal chains do not distinguish
the production of machines from that of phenotypes. No particular beaver, only families of
beavers, are a lodge’s way of making another lodge. Perhaps no particular human, but only
groups of humans, are a clock’s way of making another clock.
To my mind, the problem for machines and non-human animal artefacts is application
of accounts of evolution for individuals in cases where the more appropriate account is
about parts. Lewens (2004) raises a related objection that human artefact evolution does
not proceed by reproductive chains of artefacts—which is appropriate provided we interpret
these as chains of individuals.
The problem of applying the evolutionary model to mass-produced artefacts
becomes apparent when we notice that successive “generations” of artefacts
typically do not give rise to each other through chains of reproduction, but
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instead owe their production to a common cause. A batch of [cars] in 2003 is not
produced by cars from 2002: rather, both batches of cars come from the same
production line. —Lewens (2006) p.142
A bird’s nest in 2002 is not produced by a nest in 2001. But most parts of organisms are not
produced by those parts in earlier generations. A nose in generation F1 is not produced by a
nose in F0; successive samplings of proteins do not arise from one another through chains
of reproduction but owe their production to a common cause. Individual cytochrome-450
molecules in one organism are not produced by those in its parent; they are not even produced
by those present earlier in the same organism.
Furthermore, one might think that the applicability of the ERF to machines would thereby
supply an evolutionary MOD, since organisms generally are not phenotypes, not parts of
organisms. However, some organisms are best seen as parts of evolving lienages, rather
than whole lineages themselves. Social insects, for instance, do not give rise to each other
through chains of reproduction, but instead owe their production to the queen. This tells
us that being a member of a reproductive chain is not necessary or sufficient for evolving
in either organisms or machines. Sometimes merely being a part of a reproductive chain
suffices, and both machines and organisms occasionally are such parts (Ch.7).
***
The difficulty is not with seeing machines as parts of some reproductive or persisting
chain of wholes but with identifying precisely what they are parts of. A Kantian ornithologist
would stress reciprocal causation with artefacts (Ch.2, Ch.7.4.1), that nests are simultaneously
common causes of birds and commonly caused by birds. If we think of machines as animal
artefacts, as parts of a whole “the manifold elements of which are related to each other
reciprocally as end and means” (Kant 2000), then we had better be able to identify that whole.
It is much easier to claim that machines are sometimes extended replicators than to identify
the interactors that they produce, those cohesive wholes that ensure replication is differential.
This is because the history of technology change is highly entangled, with specific
machines sometimes cohering better with different wholes at different times. Put another
way, to evidence that selection is operative in technological changes, on Hull’s (1980) account,
it seems that we must be able to individuate the “proliferation of interactors”, and the history
of technology is not obviously organized into such things. Indeed, this is very similar to the
deeper problem with applying the Lewontin conditions to machines: the causal histories of
the production and change of technologies do not occur in neatly separated parent-offspring
intergenerational relationships. For both accounts then, there seems to be a problem with
identifying the historical pattern of descent: that it is too tangled, too reticulated to support
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ENS. However, in § 6.4, I argue that although this is generally a problem for applying
these evolutionary accounts to reticulate entities, it is not an MOD. This is because there is
reticulation in the histories of both organisms and machines, and moreover, there are good
ways of providing an account of the evolutionary process even in these cases.
6.4 Evolution of Machines as Collectives
This section argues that the theory of progenotes, conceived primarily by Woese as a theory
of the evolution of early life, is appropriate to the present evolution of machines. I argue
that progenote evolution is distinct from the accounts of evolutionary change given by the
Lewontin conditions (§ 6.2), in Hull or the ERF (§ 6.3), and is helpful in understanding the
evolution of present technologies. I begin by showing that the problem of highly reticulated
histories is already a problem in biological evolution. This is especially so in evolutionary
microbiology and genomics, where community interdependence and horizontal gene transfer
(HGT) tie non-autonomous organisms together into groups with scrambled genealogical trees.
I then describe Woese’s view (§ 6.4.1), situating it with respect to the problem of reticulated
genealogies. Woese’s view of progenote evolution rejects the requirement for “organismal
lineage”, yet still suffices to explain forms of cumulative evolution. Different genealogies
conflict, on Woese’s view, because the evolving ancestors of modern life did not occur in
organismal lineages, so there were no true genealogies. The problem is then explaining
how evolution can take place without genealogies (§ 6.4.2). To do this, I reframe Woese’s
theory in terms similar in form to the recipe of the Lewontin conditions, as three Woese
conditions. Finally, I show how some machines, conceived analogously as “pro-automata”,
evolve according to these Woese conditions (§ 6.4.3).
The scrambled history of cultural entities is also lodged as criticism of Dawkins’ meme
theory—that memes do not have clear ancestor-descendent relationships (Wilkins and Bourrat
2001) or that “if there are too many parents then there are no parents at all” (Godfrey-
Smith 2012 p.2164)—and the same might be said about technologies. Gould likewise
emphasized the difference between biological and cultural evolution in terms of their different
topologies, arguing that branching trees are appropriate to biological evolution (except in
certain marginalizable cases) while reticulation is the norm for culture (Gould 1988; Gray
et al. 2007). I have argued above that some machines form lineages to a degree, though
the most lineage-like cases are not very common (in silico entities, § 6.1) and the most
common cases are not the most lineage-like (tools as replicators, § 6.2). These are the best
cases where technologies, like many cultural items, “stand in recognizable genealogical
relationships” (Lewens 2020, sec.12). That said, even these best cases suffer from problems
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with applying accounts of evolution; even among the most lineage-like technologies their
genealogies are highly reticulated, deviating significantly from a tree-like pattern of descent
with modification.
However, this does not mark a fundamental difference with biology, since much of the
history of biology is reticulated as well: viruses, HGT, endosymbiosis and hybridization all
have a reticulating effect on life (see Doolittle and Brunet 2016). Happily, there are good
methods of handling reticulation in both domains; this problem has been known to both
cultural and biological theorists for some time. Even before the problem of HGT was taken
up significantly in biology (see Quammen 2018), Deleuze and Guattari (1988) were claiming
that strictly tree-like genealogical methods in social science were unable to capture historical
patterns, claiming that “transversal communications between different lines scramble the
genealogical trees” (p.11). They based this conclusion on their reading of the work of French
biologists on an hypothetical transfer of an ancient viral gene from rodents to domestic
cats (Benveniste et al. 1975; Benveniste and Todaro 1974). Though, the recommended
solution for both Benveniste and colleagues (1974;1975) and for Deleuze and Guattari (1988)
are roughly the same: make use of reticulated phylogenies instead. Among others, Gray
et al. (2007) and my prior work in Brunet (2016) show in some detail how the methods
from phylogenetics can be used to study highly reticulated non-biological phenomena.6 The
right move, then, is not to reject evolutionary models of technology change on account of
reticulation but to demand that reticulation be accounted for within those models.
O’Malley (2014) has cautioned against basing our account of evolution narrowly on
examples of macroscopic organisms—charismatic megafauna—when the vast majority of
living things are microbiological. O’Malley’s caution is Wittgensteinian (PI.593): we
should not nourish our thinking with a one-sidedly macroscopic diet of examples. Certain,
often background, assumptions that hold true of macrobes break down in microbiology and
genomics, leading to misunderstanding of the majority evolutionary process. Importantly for
us, the interplay of horizontal and vertical inheritance plays only a minor role in the evolution
of macrobes, while it plays a major role in the evolution of microbes.
There are macroscopic cases of reticulation. Slime moulds manage to form fruiting bodies
in highly complex and adaptive ways, despite the fact that the colonial aggregations required
come from millions of parents with at times significant genetic diversity (Hehmeyer 2019;
Sathe et al. 2010). Slime mould fruits do not have clear ancestor-descendent relationships
or, if they do, they are of the sort that have very “many parents”. There are occasional HGT
events in metazoans, particularly in plants (Richardson and Palmer 2007). And there are also
occasional tree-violating hybridization events between species, even in animals, as Gould
6See also network methods / conception in Doolittle and Bapteste (2007).
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(1988) acknowledged.7 But the clearest and largest abundance of counter-cases come from
microbiology and genomics.
Recent work by Koonin and collaborators (Wolf and Koonin 2013; Koonin 2015; 2016)
argues that, over the timescales of the evolution of major bacterial groups, gain and loss
of genes, rather than evolution of vertically inherited genes, predominates the evolutionary
process. In one sense, considering individual asexual microbes as wholes, these always
have a single parent, single grandparent (excluding forms of “bacterial sex” such as plasmid
sharing). But considered at the lower-level of genomic parts, the number and unrelatedness
of ancestors of a given microbe can be high enough to affect heritability over the timespan
of diversification of bacterial groups. Not only do organisms and machines have a partially
reticulated history, the processes of reticulation seem to have had a very significant effect.
This is enough to show the failure of the MOD based on the reticulated topology of the
history of technologies: the history of organisms is likewise reticulated.
In the remainder of this chapter I hope to set aside one remaining worry about evolution
as an MOD. If reticulation is such a problem for the general accounts of evolution we
have examined, and technology change is only ever so reticulated that these accounts are
inapplicable, then what sense of evolution, what account, would remain for machines? To
address this worry, I will examine the account of an earlier period of biological evolution
offered by Carl Woese (Woese 1998; Woese and Fox 1977; see Doolittle and Brown 1994;
Koonin 2014). Carl Woese offered a theory of the early evolution of life where “Lateral gene
transfer... would not only contribute significantly to but also would completely dominate the
primitive evolutionary dynamic” (1998). An appreciation of the interplay between horizontal
and vertical inheritance lead Woese to a very different account of this “primitive evolutionary
dynamic” which can inform our conception of the present evolutionary dynamic of technology
(and biology too) precisely because of how the Lewontin conditions fail in both cases. In the
remainder of this section I describe this account, relate it to the Lewontin conditions, and
argue that it is appropriate to the messy, entangled and reticulated genealogical relationships
characteristic of technological change.
6.4.1 Evolution in the Progenote Era
Consider the following (hypothetical) Figure.6.1. Given some distribution of present traits
and an assumed branching pattern, one can infer ancestral states on the basis of assumptions
about the likelihood of the changes that gave rise to the present state. Given the above, it is
7For the effect this has on the tree-of-cells for hybridizing species, see Doolittle and Brunet (2016).
132 Evolution and the Machine Organism-Distinction
Fig. 6.1 Comparison of three hypothetical branching patterns of three lineages (A, B, C) with
present traits (square, triangle, circle) and inferred ancestral relationships. Shapes at leaves
indicate traits, shapes at internal nodes indicate best inferences of past traits, shapes to the
left of branches indicate loss (-) or gain (+) of traits along branches.
entirely unclear which of the three should be favoured over the others, since nothing about
the branching itself is favourable. Until recently, with the discovery of the Asgardarchaeota
(see Williams et al. 2020), this was approximately the position we were in regarding the “tree”
of life. The deep branching structure of the Bacteria, Archaea and Eukaryotes was uncertain.
“Informational” 16S-RNA sequences indicated a tree where the Archaea and Eukaryotes were
sister, while some gene phylogenies placed Eukaryotes sister to Bacteria, and some further
placed Archaea sister to Bacteria. Without a reason to privilege one sort of evidence over
another, the “true” branching pattern is underdetermined. Moreover, without an assumption
about that pattern, inferences about the complement of traits that the Universal Ancestor
possessed likewise remained uncertain.
These incongruities lead Carl Woese to an hypothesis about the origin of the major
domains of life: the tree could be “rooted” not in a particular lineage, but in an amorphous
conglomeration, one where the cellular and genetic lineages were uncoupled and the concept
of genealogy, or organismal lineage, did not apply. On his view, the true branching pattern
was not underdetermined by evidence, since there was no true branching pattern, only this
amorphous conglomeration. He called these entities with decoupled cellular and genetic
lineages ‘progenotes’, i.e., something that lacked but would give rise to an organism with a
true genome.
So far ‘progenote’ has been characterized negatively: organismal lineages do not apply
and they are not “genotes”, but gave rise to them. In order to appreciate progenotes as
more than retrodictive holism run amok, it we should see how Woese arrived at the notion,
and provide a more concrete description. I first provide a short introduction to Woese’s
conception of the progenote, before turning to the consequences for our account of the
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evolutionary process. For Woese, the progenote concept was a consequence of rejecting a
“pivotal assumption” about early evolution, quoted in full below,
The Pivotal Assumption. Most theories of early evolution tacitly assume that
organismal lineages, organismal genealogies, have always existed and extend into
the stage of evolution of the universal ancestor. Eukaryotes, of course, contain
organellar genes, whose heritages are not those of the nuclear genes in general.
Laterally transferred genes are seen in prokaryotes as well. Strictly speaking
both eukaryotes and prokaryotes are of mixed heritage. Yet, we still speak of
eukaryotic and prokaryotic “lineages” (and for good reason) because in both
cases the vast majority of their genes presumably share a common history. If and
only if this assumption holds, however, can we speak of organismal lineages and
corresponding phylogenetic trees. But the assumption automatically makes the
universal ancestor an organism that itself had a lineage, a discrete genealogy. The
further back in evolutionary time we look, the more the notion of an “organismal
lineage”—indeed, the very definition of “organism” itself—comes into question.
It is time to release this notion of organismal lineages altogether and see where
that leaves us.—Woese (1998) p.6855
Woese’s identified pivotal assumption is that the vast majority of the genes in a cellular
lineage share a common history. The progenote hypothesis comes when Woese rejects this
assumption. The pivotal assumption is equivalent to assuming that inheritance is dominated
by vertical inheritance and rejecting it is equivalent to asserting that vertical inheritance
was not dominant, i.e., vertical inheritance was equal to horizontal inheritance or the latter
dominated instead. There are many features of present life that prevent the predominance of
horizontal inheritance. Thus the rejection of the pivotal assumption requires the rejection of
some of the features of present life that ensure vertical inheritance dominates over horizontal.
These are, (1) the tight association between the genotype and phenotype produced by an
efficient and accurate transcription and translation system and, (2) physical features of modern
cells, such as the existence of cell walls, sequestration of the germ line from environmental
DNA, viral and endosymbiont defence systems, etc. Woese acknowledges the importance of
(2) but focuses his attention on (1).
The modern translation apparatus is comparatively large, for a protein complex, in all
known species. Woese and Fox (1977) explain,
There can only be one reason for this [large size of the translation apparatus];
its size is essential to the accuracy with which the mechanism functions. There
exists a direct correlation between the “size” of an automaton — as measured
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roughly by the number of components — and the accuracy of its functions.
—Woese and Fox (1977) p.2
This is prima facie relevant to why there are no fully-fledged machine automata around today:
our machines are composed of too few parts to do all of the things necessary to make all their
components and put them together.8 However, this is not obviously relevant to the issue of
gene distributions and the prevalence of HGT—that requires two subsequent inferences.
Its [the progenote’s] subsystems were gener-
ally less complex and hierarchically organized
and the cell itself was less integrated than
are cells today. The states of the cell were
fewer, simpler and imprecisely defined and con-
trolled.
—Woese (1998)
The first inference explains the connec-
tion to HGT by a size–accuracy feedback
process, working backwards to infer an inac-
curate and small ancestral state of the trans-
lation apparatus. Gains in accuracy entailed
gains in the potential size of proteins trans-
lated, these platforming further gains in accu-
racy, and so on. Working backwards, earlier
translation apparatuses were likely smaller
and less efficient. But the translation apparatus is responsible for biosynthesis of all other
cellular protein components—DNA copying, proofreading—so that the universal ancestor
was likely limited in the complexity of other interactions. The next required inference is
that entities with low integration are also likely to have high transferability of parts. The
reason that (modern) amino-acyl tRNA synthetase genes are so frequently subject to HGT
is, it is believed today, that they are quite “modular” or “not integrated”—they interact with
only a few other cellular components. Induction on this leads to the conclusion that an entity
that was less well integrated generally would also be more subject to HGT (see Novick and
Doolittle 2020). Woese explains,
The degree of connectedness of the componentry of the cell has profound evolu-
tionary implications. If a cell was simple and highly modular in organization...all
of the componentry of a cell could potentially be horizontally displaceable over
time. The organismal genealogical record would be ephemeral; no stable record
could exist. —Woese (2002) p.8744
Progenotes evolve, though by a mode that differs from that of modern organisms in
significant ways. There is replication and reproduction of a sort, but these differ in their
degree of precision. The evolutionary dynamic differs from that or modern organisms to
such an extent that there is no genealogy. Or, if there is “genealogy” of a stripe, it is not the
8Though, of course, they do have some of those capacities (Ch.3) and most organisms cannot make all their
components from scratch either.
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genealogy of well-defined lineages presumed by our going accounts of ENS. Returning to
the graphical representation of the problem presented above. The following (Figure.6.2) very
roughly captures Woese’s solution—an historical rhizome during the progenote era, with
some lineage-like shoots to the present after the genotype-phenotype connection “crystalized”
(see Koonin 2014). Deleuze and Guattari would have found Woese an attractive source of
metaphors for their criticism of simplistic genealogy in social science.
Fig. 6.2 Comparison of three hypothetical branching patterns of three lineages (A, B, C) with
present traits (square, triangle, circle) and inferred progenote era.
If progenotes were so unlike modern exemplar organisms, what were they like? Woese
intends the notion of progenote to be something like primitive cells, though in such a
primitive form that it is not also an “organism”. Woese and Fox are somewhat obscure about
this. Woese and Fox (1977 p.3) say that “It is fair to say that the cell as we know it today
would not exist”, while Woese (1998) says “Evolution [in that era] can be seen as occurring
on the subcellular level, although it actually happens in the context of (primitive) cells.”
Unfortunately, we are are not told precisely how primitive progenote “primitive cells” were.
However, in his later view, Woese makes the positive claim that the non-organismal nature
of progenote primitive cells is reason to treat only communities of progenotes as a unit of
evolution. He writes,
The ancestor cannot have been a particular organism, a single organismal lineage.
It was communal, a loosely knit, diverse conglomeration of primitive cells that
evolved as a unit, and eventually developed to a stage where it broke into several
distinct communities, which in their turn became the three primary lines of
descent...The universal ancestor was not an entity, not a thing. It is a process
characteristic of a particular evolutionary stage.—Woese (1998)
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During the progenote era of evolutionary history, large collectives, not individuals or their
parts, are the appropriate “unit” for cumulative evolution. Presumably, the “communal” aspect
of progenotes refers to their lack of autonomy as individual primitive cells, while referring
to them as “loosely knit” or a “conglomeration” indicates that they are not specialized or
particularly organized qua community—an ant hill is communal, but it is not loosely knit,
and a herd of buffalo is loosely knit, but arguably not communal. For a perspective on the
community of progenotes, Woese seems to have in mind something more than a mere group,
but less than a society or super-organism.
There are different ways of looking at such a community of progenotes. On the
one hand, it could have been the loose-knit evolutionary (genetic) community
just discussed. On the other, it could have been more like a modern bacterial
consortium, with cells cross-feeding one another not only genetically but also
metabolically.—Woese (1998) p.6856
Taking the other option, we can understand the communal nature of conglomerations
of progenotes by analogy to contemporary community ecologies. In particular, the Black
Queen Hypothesis (BQH) (Morris et al. 2005, or the GQH: Ch.3) helps us understand
how interdependencies can exist at the level of collectives, binding them together into an
evolving “unit”. Consider two traits A and B, such that B is of some benefit (e.g. to the size
of potentially translated proteins), only when supported by the effect of A (e.g. increase
accuracy of translation). Usually, for there to be cumulative evolution of A+B in lineages
dominated by vertical inheritance, those lineages must not lose A at a greater rate than they
gain B (i.e. B emerges by mutation), otherwise they will not benefit from the synergy of
A+B. But this assumption is violated by progenotes (and unstable ecological communities).
Nonetheless, it is still possible for there to be cumulative evolution of communal con-
glomerations with A+B, provided there is metabolic or genetic cross-feeding. Suppose the
effects of A and B are non-local, like the “leaky functions” postulated in the BQH (Morris
et al. 2005), as would obtain if A and B affect cross-feeding. Then, progenotes within a
conglomations can benefit from the effects of A without physically having A within their
primitive cell. Even if that progenote lineages loses A before gaining B, it can still benefit
from the cumulative (non-local, leaky) effects of A, provided some other local progenote
still contains A. Moreover, even if the effects of A and B are local (non-leaky), only having
their cumulative effect when present in the same progenote, if there is “genetic cross-feeding”
then a conglomerate with A and B is still more likely to give rise to A+B individuals and
thus to enjoy the benefit of A+B. Even in present organisms HGT has been proposed to do
this as an “adaptive strategy” for maintaining a beneficial trait within microbial communities.
Even if you cannot hold onto your genes, if your community exchanges the benefits of
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their pangenome or exchanges the genes themselves at sufficient frequency—if horizontal
inheritance predominates—then cumulative evolution can occur.
This highly disordered, loosely knit genealogy arguably means that our general accounts
of evolution do not apply well. We can see clearly why. The Lewontin conditions are
best suited to cases of non-reticulated evolution or descent with modification, and apply
less according as more reticulation obtains. They apply quite well when we assume that
HGT is low. The Lewontin conditions do not apply well when HGT is too high since HGT
is a constraint on heritability—if we obtain genes from our non-parents, this affects our
resemblance to our parents. In the extreme, if HGT is high enough to overcome heritability,
L3 will not be satisfied. Rephrasing Godfrey-Smith, if there are too many genetic ancestors
contributing genes from outside a lineage then there is insufficient heritability within that
lineage, correlation between parent and offspring lineages is washed away. We can take this
as an argument against the evolutionary potential of entities subject to high HGT, or we can
take it as an argument that the Lewontin conditions are just not the right account of evolution
when HGT is high.
Fig. 6.3 Analogy between progenote framework and replicator-interactor framework. Over
time, the effects of HGT on progenotes will decouple replicators from interactors, making
the analogy only applicable over short timespans.
The replicator framework might be in a better position, but not by much. Progenotes do
contain the ancestors of genes, replicators of an inaccurate sort, and conglomerations thereof
do interact with the environment in such a way as to affect the differential reproduction of
progenotes. The “unit of replication” would, on that analogy, be the ancestors of genes, and
the “unit of interaction” or “basic unit of analysis” in such a framework will turn out to be the
conglomerations or “cross-feeding consortia” of progenotes that Woese says “evolve as a unit”
(Fig.6.3). That is approximately right at a given instant during the progenote era, although it
begins to break down over the lengths of time of significant evolutionary change. Firstly, this
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is because the protogenes are poor replicators, and secondly because progenote communities
are poor interactors. Protogenes were inaccurately replicated and their ability to “code
for” proteins was more stochastic. These entities were unlike what we would comfortably
call genes today, and the same goes for pro-genomes as wholes. It is just not appropriate
to take a gene’s or genome’s eye view in a non-genote. Moreover, the effect of HGT on
decoupled replicators from interactors was supposed to be so significant that it dominated the
evolutionary dynamic. Indeed, one of Dawkins’ motivations for focusing of the gene as the
evolving unit is, similarly, that organisms themselves are too ephemeral—especially sexual
organisms—and progenote conglomerates are even more ephemeral.
The universal ancestor does have an
evolutionary history, but that history
is physical, not genealogical.
—Woese (1998)
Nonetheless, the inapplicability of these accounts
of evolution to progenotes supports an account of
technological evolution, since they fail to apply to this
biological case for the same reasons they fail to apply
to technology change: unclear or absent genealogies.
At least as far as Woese’s account is concerned, we
do not need genealogy to have evolutionary history. Evidently the solution to the problem of
patchy distribution of present traits leads to another: What should our account of evolution
be, in non-genealogical entities so different from familiar organismal lineages? The Lewontin
conditions wont help, since they require genealogies, making evolution in a progenote era
forbidden by definition. I now turn to a reformulation of the Lewontin conditions in the spirit
of Woese. I hope for this reformulation of Woese to help us understand progenotes in more
familiar terms, but also for it to be directly relevant to our conception of technological evolu-
tion in the current era. In the following I provide an account of evolution that is appropriate
to progenote conglomerations and show how it applies to some cases of technology change.
6.4.2 Lewontinizing Woese
Although progenotes are not paradigm organisms, they evolve as non-autonomous members
of conglomerations. The notions of ‘individual’, ‘population’, ‘phenotype’ and ‘parent and
offspring’, at least as we know them today and as they appear in Lewontin, are arguably
inapplicable without significant qualification—qualifications that likely would, all things
done, disqualify progenotes from satisfaction of those conditions. Nonetheless, they can be
substituted for Woesian terms: ‘progenote’, ‘conglomeration’, ‘physical characteristics’, etc.
However much the progenote era is unlike Lewontin’s recipe for ENS, we gain some traction
on the idea of progenote evolution by reframing it in similar terms, by separating out roles
analogous to phenotypic variation, differential fitness and heritability. My attempt at such a
Lewontin-style reading of Woese is as follows,
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W1. Different progenotes in a conglomeration have different morphologies, physiologies,
and behaviors (pro-phenotypic variation).
W2. Progenote characteristics affect the reoccurrence of their parts, via an effect on con-
glomerations, in an environment dependent way (mediated differential fitness).
[a.] Different characteristics of progenotes have different effects on different
conglomerations (differential fitness-a).
[b.] Different characteristics of progenote conglomerations have different effects
on the reoccurrence of progenote parts in different environments (differential fitness-b).
W3. There is a correlation between progenotes and those they physically influence in the
contribution of each to future conglomerations (fitness is physically heritable).
A Woese-sympathetic Lewontin might have said: taken together these criteria are sufficient for
evolution by natural selection in progenotes; any era during which these criteria are satisfied
will undergo evolution among its progenotes.9 Likewise, although individual progenotes are
not auto- or self-reproductive, there can be selection at the level of conglomerations thereof
provided they differentially contribute to conglomerations on the basis of their pro-phenotype.
The need to separate Lewontin’s second condition into W2.a-b is that progenotes themselves
do not survive or reproduce when they directly interact with their environment; that they
are loosely tangled together into “consortia” or “communal conglomerations”. And W3 is
Woese’s notion of a history being “physical” but not genealogical framed in terms similar to
those for heritability. Woese might have said, I imagine, that progenote conglomerations do
have heritability, but it is “physical heritability”.
6.4.3 Technological Progenotes
W1. Prophenotype in Machines
Let us call the technological analogue of the progenote the ‘proautomaton’ and our era the
‘proautomaton era’.10 Not all machines are (parts of) proautomatons. They must first of all
9Lewontin indeed says similar things to W1 when discussing the theory of Oparin (1957) on coacervates,
which are membrane-like platforms for chemical reactions also hypothesized to be important in early evolution.
Lewontin says, “Even though individual molecules in solution may not have been autocatalytic, there may have
been selection among variants of a given molecular species when incorporated within a coacervate, so that the
coacervate itself would evolve.”
10For a machine to qualify as a proautomaton, my intuition is that they should have some of the properties
of organisms or their parts. Proautomata should perhaps be “poietic” in the sense of the distinction between
autopoietic and allopoietic offered by Maturana and Varela (1980); “organize” in the sense of the opposition
between self-organizing and other-organized offered by Mossio and Moreno (2015); be teleological, due
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not be too simple. At the same time, the technological equivalent of a progenote should
not be as advanced as fully-fledged self-replicating machine-automata. Those, when or
were they to exist, would be by hypothesis sufficiently like modern organisms to license the
straightforward application of the Lewontin conditions. Automata are too much like “genotes”
and simple machines are too simple, too much like parts (e.g. proteins) or extended replicators
to count. We should probably include examples of all complex machines: computers,
clockworks, televisions, 3d-printers, and perhaps tractors and jack-hammers. In every case,
different sorts of complex machine have different properties—with potential for different
effects on conglomerations thereof—and that is all that is required to potentially satisfy W1.
W2. Mediated Fitness Effects
Most machines at present are significantly allonomous; their effects on conglomerate entities
will be mediated by ourselves and other machines. These mediated effects will be complex,
but are no less evolutionarily significant simply for being mediated. Some complex machines
satisfy W2.a when they have effects on conglomerations thereof, come whatever complexity
of process. The more significant problem is nontrivial individuation of conglomerations for
W2.b. This is not a special problem with proautomata or even progenotes—understanding
the individuation of interdependent microbial communities is independently difficult (Inkpen
et al. 2017). Though it does require posing the question in the right way: What are the higher
level entities which are effected by complex machines and in turn affect their re-production?
Social sciences are replete with higher level objects of analysis—actor-networks, groups,
programmes, corporations, societies, industries, institutions, etc.—many of which are, for
better or worse, already the topics of cultural evolutionary theories. When the task is to
identify conglomerations that reciprocally affect the re-production of machines then some of
these higher-level entities might be good candidates. However, there is reason to worry that
starting from these familiar entities and working backwards to infer the supportive effects
on machines is liable to achieve little more than “show that a well-understood phenomenon
can be reframed in an evolutionary idiom” (Lewens 2015, p.37). This would leave W2.a-b
satisfied but uninteresting. Even admitting that machines can, at a certain level of abstraction,
be thought of as “proautomata” and that the traditional candidates for higher-level entities as
“conglomerations” thereof, there is reason to worry that this reading will be disfavoured over
to reciprocal causation with their conglomerations, in the Kantian sense offered by Nicholson (2013); sit
somewhere on the autonomy-allonomy spectrum; and perhaps they should have sufficiently robust or active
internal mechanisms or processes in the senses offered by Godfrey-Smith (2016), Skillings (2015), or Nicholson
and Dupré (2018). Each of these features of organisms or their parts gets at something important about canonical
examples of evolving things and, as each fails to be an MOD (Ch.1-5), both machines and organisms sit in this
milieu.
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the traditional modes of explanation available for each. If by individuating “conglomeratons
of proautomata” we just end up picking out “industries”, or similar, then arguably we have
not individuated anything (special) at all. Fruitful application of an evolutionary account to
technology change should provide something in addition to what we can already furnish with
non-evolutionary reasoning about higher-level social entities.
That said, I don’t see any reason that framing problems of technological change in terms
of Woesian conditions should be attached to seeing conglomerations of proautomata as
identical to any of these higher objects of analysis. And if it turns out that the higher-level
entities that most clearly are affected by, and in turn affect, complex machines cross-cut
traditional higher-level objects of analysis in social science, so much the better for the
special explanatory status of the Woese conditions. If it turns out that it is only ever the
traditional objects of social science analyses that turn out to satisfy the conditions for being a
conglomerate of proautomata, then W2.a-b seem to be latching on to something independently
interesting—insofar as those objects of analysis are interesting. Moreover, I do not see any
reason that framing an instance of technology change in Woeseian terms should latch onto
all the same features of those higher-level entities as are traditionally analysed. Institutions,
industries, etc, are presumably interesting for a number of reasons besides their (W2.b)
effects on the production of complex machines. However, an analysis of those higher-level
entities qua proautomaton conglomerate should abstract away some of these details to supply
a clearer picture of the evolutionary features of their dynamic—an evolutionary approach
should cut out some of the gory details.
The aim of providing this account is not to show that it has the same theoretical explana-
tory power as those theories already used to explain technology change, but to “release”
pre-existing notions of changing individuals—as Woese does with the notion of organismal
lineage—and see where that leaves us. This demands considering conglomerations that
become apparent when we relax our fixation on lineages, and thinking of complex machines
as proautomata. Thinking of machines as proautomata, the aim is to consider the conglom-
eration that affects the re-production of a given machine. Recalling the problem we began
with—that the histories of technologies, especially complex ones, are too reticulated to be
accounted for with conventional phylogenies or genealogical trees—it is implausible that
genealogies of any one of the typical objects of analysis alone can serve that role. The
genealogical record obtained by looking too narrowly at a single sort of object of analysis
will be too ephemeral.
This puts us in a position of trading tractability of analysis for plausibility of explanation—
it is harder to pick out those conglomerations that do explain re-production (W2.b)—but this
problem is not specific to proautomata conglomerations and obtains likewise for progenotes
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and microbial communities. Perhaps it is better still to concentrate on those effects that
seem to run counter to our expectations on more traditional analyses, cases where a “conflict”
between the analyses reveals something important about the inter-level effects, e.g. when the
effects that some machine has on conglomerations are not among those that are traditionally
invoked to explain the existence or reoccurrence of the machine. For analogy, it is often
remarked that MLS is only interesting when species selection pressures oppose those at the
individual or genome level (see Jablonski 2008). Selection at different levels often aligns
and when it does the lower (typically organismal) level is the favourite target of explanation.
But when there is a conflict between levels of selection MLS becomes a more attractive
explanatory framework. Likewise, cases of conflict between our traditional explanations of a
machine and the effects it has qua proautomaton thereby speak in favour of considering it,
and the entities it effects, within the Woese framework.
Personal computers (PCs) are a good example. PCs are highly designed objects. Nonethe-
less, they have many autonomous capacities and these can have effects on the persistence
of conglomerations thereof. There are cases where these complex capacities align between
lower and higher-levels of analysis, such as the positive effect of antiviral software on
computer network stability. But there are also unexpected cases of conflict. To name one,
PCs tend to engender dependence in users. Whatever effects some machine has that make
conglomerations dependent on them—that make them “addictive”, in the sense of “addiction
molecules” (Van Melderin and De Bast 2009; Brunet and Doolittle 2018), or “selfish” broadly
speaking—will tend to be re-produced so long as the conglomerate persists, regardless of
whether this dependency was a reasoned product of design.
We might think specifically of designed cases like spell-check software affecting unas-
sisted spelling activity or learning, or of more general forms of dependence wrought by
converting one’s livelihood to require PCs.11 In cases like these it makes sense to apply a
framework like W2 to understand the causal relationship between the effect of computation-
dependence on the persistence of techno-industrial conglomerates (W2.a), and the consequent
reciprocal effect on computer production (W2.b). To explain why there are so many re-
currences of PCs, we will have to refer in part to the reciprocal effects of dependency,
though that needn’t ever have been one of the motivations of their users or designers, nor
figure in economic accounts of their development, or be part of our account of the computer
manufacturing industry conceived as an institution, etc.
Dairying also affords an interesting example, since it is a classic case of cultural evolution
that has shifted drastically by the introduction of technology. Whatever role there may have
11Corporations, institutions or economists might have intended certain forms of dependence, which, as a
precondition for demand, fits nicely into a traditional economic framework. But many such effects likely were
not and could not have been intended.
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Fig. 6.4 Automatic milking machine. US Patent #: US5379721A
been for the effect of milk production to be brought about by the cultural evolution of tech-
niques for milking by hand (Lewens 2015), these have evidently been largely supplanted by
the technologies involved in production of automatic milking machines (Fig.6.4). Likewise,
whatever artificial selection there was between milking by hand and the genes involved in
udder development is now involved in a new coevolutionary dynamic, further involving the
use of artificial intelligence in the technologies for detecting udder placement and timing of
milking (US Patent # US7895972B2).
Straightforward explanations in terms of positive effects of intentions are more or less
obvious, though of course not guaranteed to be true. Perhaps automatization of farming
had and was intended to have a direct and positive effect on the persistence and recurrence
of farms using automata, since automation is known to free up resources to be put to use
elsewhere in the industry. But these are not the only sorts of effects on re-production of
milking technology. For example, if the agro-industrial complex happens now to be dependent
on these technologies, a return to hand milking would mean significant reductions in growth
and the arguments of the above paragraph apply. Automatic milking machines might be
addictive machines within any agro-industrial conglomerate, and might recur despite our
best intentions to eliminate them from farming practices, since large farms without them
inevitably fail.
Positive effects and reciprocal dependencies also interact. As Woese noted about the
efficiency of automata generally: accuracy trades off against complexity. The complexity
of autonomous machines also correlates with the number and variability of techniques of
technological resources required to produce them. Perhaps automation technologies generally
tend to be good examples of proautomata, since they tend to serve both a positive role, for
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which they presumably were designed, and later generate dependency on the capacities
freed-up by automation. But automation technologies are not easily produced, and generally
depend on the prior existence of other such technologies—e.g. modern milking machines
require microprocessors for their AIs. Thus we should expect that highly efficient automata
of the sort that might have positive system-level effects would also be locked into a causal
feedback loop with larger conglomerations of such automata.
No present proautomaton is self-reproducing. This is a problem for satisfying Lewontin’s
second condition. Though, it is precisely because proautomata recur only when they both
affect and are affected by “communal, loosely knit, conglomerations” of proautomata, and
thus only “evolve as a unit”, that they are good targets for evolutionary explanation satisfying
W2 instead.
W3. Conglomerate Heritability
Heritability is important for cumulative evolution. The “problem” that the progenote theory
solves is that ancient HGT overcomes heritability. It does this by situating progenotes within
larger conglomerations, effectively pushing the problem of the explanation of similarity-
across-time, and adaptive feedback, up to a higher-level of organization. We must also recall
that progenote conglomerations need not reproduce—they may of course split off into isolated
parts, but that is not part of the explanation for evolution among progenotes. Indeed, once the
conglomerate ancestor was able to separate into distinct groups, once lineages “crystalized”
(Woese 1998, the “shoots” in Fig.6.2), the progenote era was effectively over. The appropriate
notion of heritability applies during the progenote era at the level of conglomerates.
Early life and progenotes may have had too many parents to have parents at all—their
status as genealogical entities is threatened by their reticulated origins—but a form of
“heritability” sufficient for cumulative evolution obtains at higher-levels of organization
nonetheless. I suggest the same is true of proautomatons. Complex machines do form
short-lived inaccurate lineages—insofar as the term still holds meaning at such a threshold;
they are sometimes allonomous or scaffolded reproducers in Godfrey-Smith’s sense, or
replicators in the sense of the ERF, or extended parts of organisms, in a sense to be explicated
in the final chapter (Ch.7). But they are modular, so that even though the structure of one
machine may have a direct causal influence on the structure of subsequent machines, that
relationship is too weak and ephemeral to explain significant cumulative change along those
short-lived lineages. There is little guarantee that any feature introduced into a machine
(intentionally or otherwise) will be re-produced in its “descendent” machines, those that it
causally influences. On the other hand, if a machine were not modular but highly integrated
instead, this would place a strong constraint on copying of that machine. It would probably
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be difficult to produce make-shift parts for a highly-integrated fully-fledged self-reproducing
automaton, and so lineages of such machines would likely have a higher heritability.
Because proautomatons are highly modular, however, tracking their ephemeral lineages
goes only a little ways towards explaining their features. Too many of the causes and
effects of proautomatons reside outside of their genealogical relationships (Fig.6.5). At
this level, feedback effects within a lineage will be slight and short-lived, so that lineage-
level cumulative evolution is improbable, and intention or design end up on balance better
explanations for any given feature. Nonetheless, these divergent effects of proautomatons do
Fig. 6.5 Incident causes and divergent effects (solid lines) of proautomaton lineage (dashed
line).
not exist in a vacuum; they ramify across the conglomerate, reticulate, “physical histories”
of other machines (Figure 6.6 below). At the level of conglomerations, there is plenty of
opportunity for complex forms of feedback—technological changes platforming further
changes in other machines—leading to cumulative change at the level of conglomerates. So
heritability in our proautomaton era should be assessed at this level.
Fig. 6.6 Rendering of reticulated history of causes and effects (black lines) of progenotes /
proautomata (dashed lines) within a conglomerate (wavy border).
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Evidently a batch of milkers in 2002 does not contribute much to a batch in 2003—though
they do contribute, perhaps vitally, to a complex system that ensures correlation among re-
produced machines. Advances in computational power platform development of automation
technologies that feedback to affect the production of computer hardware. Machines reap the
benefits of developments elsewhere in the technological conglomerate, allowing the evolution
of complex machine traits that would not have been possible within individual, inaccurate
lineages of machines, or by intention alone. Contemporary technology change may not
have a genealogical history sufficient for cumulative evolution along lineages of machines.
However, as Woese realized about early life, this doesn’t matter to evolution: physical history
is enough.
6.5 Conclusion
I take the arguments of this chapter to show that no MOD based on evolvability will work.
Organisms evolve sometimes as individuals, their parts evolve, and sometimes biological
evolution takes place at the higher-level of larger collectives. So too for machines. Sometimes
machines evolve as individuals. Though rarely, it does occur. Sometimes machines evolve
as parts of other things, as artefacts as much tied to our evolution as nests are tied to the
evolution of birds. That is, sometimes we ourselves are the “wholes” that machines evolve as
parts of. The following chapter argues for this more fully. A relative significance debate is
appropriate, and there may be no pressing need for engineers or anthropologists to change
their good research programmes. However, evolutionary processes do sometimes occur in





In this final chapter I develop a view of the relationship between machines and organisms
that is mereological: machines are extended parts of organisms. The notion of extension has
received many prior treatments. Some version of this idea appears in Canguilhem (1952),
Clynes and Kline (1960), Dawkins (1982), Haraway (1990), Sterelny et al. (1996), Clark
and Chalmers (1998), Hacking (1998) and Kline (2009). What is common to these views is
that they attempt to incorporate artefacts into some existing biological theory via part-whole
relationships, as a functional biological object, such as an organ or phenotype. I adhere most
closely to the terminology of Dawkins (1982), and propose that we consider machines as
extended parts of organisms and of groups of organisms.
7.1 Introduction
. . . [I]n artifacts we extend our own intentionality; our tools are extensions of our
purposes... —Searle (1980) p.419
This final chapter is the most constructive. Instead of only countering MODs, I also
argue for a particular relationship between some machines and some organisms. I argue
that machines can be classified as biological entities, specifically, as the extended parts of
organisms. Part-whole relationships are deeply connected with hierarchical classification in
biology. Since machines are extended parts of biological things, they have a place in that
classification.
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Biological entities tend to be contained within larger biological entities.1 The nature
and ordering of that containment is a fundamental aspect of the classification of biological
things. At the organism-level, we classify parts of organisms on the basis of their part-
whole relationships. Typically, into a hierarchy of organelles, cells, tissues, organs and
organ-systems. At levels above the organism, species-level and higher, we have come to see
taxonomic classifications as metaphysically grounded in part-whole relationships between
clades and metapopulation lineages (Hull 1986; Ghiselin 2005; De Queiroz 2007). I take
this to be an example of real philosophical progress in biology: intuitive or similarity-
based classifications of biological things can be replaced by classifications on the basis of
part-whole relationships.2
The idea that machines can be included within our biological classification follows
naturally from a solution to a problem that has already existed for some time: the problem-
atic position of animal-artefacts (§ 7.2.1). A number of different thinkers (Weiner 1948;
Canguilhem 1952; Clynes and Kline 1960; Dawkins 1982) have hit on this problem, in
one way or another and for different reasons. Remarkably, they have come to very similar
resolutions. Common to these resolutions is that animal artefacts should be seen as extensions
of organisms. Whether parts of organisms or groups, animal-artefacts enjoy a place within
the part-whole classification of biological entities.
This is more readily accepted in the case of non-human animal artefacts. Spider webs
are extended parts of spiders; termite mounds are extended parts of termite colonies; birds’
nests are extended parts of birds. But there is persistent suspicion that human artefacts
cannot be lumped together with non-human ones. Dawkins (2004) is particularly critical
of over-extending his analysis of animal artefacts to humans. I argue, to the contrary, that
once we take account of the diversity of human and non-human animal artefacts, there is
no sharp line separating the former and the latter. Put another way, a unified analysis of
non-human animal artefacts spills over to include some human artefacts as well. If our
biological mereology is expanded sufficiently for the classification of non-human animal
artefacts, it thereby classifies some machines as well.
In § 7.2 I argue that animal artefacts and social organisms present a problem for biological
classification, since they do not obviously fit into the part-whole hierarchy applicable to
other biological entities, and that a solution to this problem is provided by the notion of
extension. In § 7.3 examine the reasons given by Dawkins (2004) and Sterelny (2004) that the
1Aside from such maximally inclusive things as Life itself or the sum totality of the “tree” of life (Mariscal
and Doolittle 2018).
2Many other questions in biology also have a mereological component. For example, whether or not some
entity (e.g. a symbiont) evolves with another (e.g. a host) is often phrased as whether they are both parts of
the same evolving lineage; key biological concepts (e.g. homology) are also plausibly interpreted as parthood
relationships (Ghiselin 2005).
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notion of extended phenotypes does not apply to all animal artefacts, and argue against these.
In § 7.4 I present a general account of extended parts and show how it applies to include
machines in biological classification. Finally, in § 7.5 I argue that this machine–organism
relationship does not amount to an MOD, since some organisms are also extended parts of
other organisms.
7.2 The Position of Non-Human Animal-Artefacts in Hier-
archical Classification
7.2.1 The Problem
There is a clash between (a) the desire for a unified classification of biological entities
and (b) problematic cases of biological entities that do not fit within the classification of
traditional cases. These problematic cases include non-human animal artefacts, human
artefacts, machines, and some organisms as well, especially when those organisms are social
(bees), or artificial in some way (dairy cows, GMO mice). In her book Animal Constructions
and Technological Knowledge, Shew (2017) develops a view of “technologies that considers
some of the actions and products of non-human animals as technological in character.” This
chapter intends nearly the converse. I develop a view of animal artefacts that considers
machines as biological in character. I consider this a development in its own right, the kind
of view we should be aiming for after the preceding eulogy for the MOD. It is also a solution
to a problem that pre-exists in biology. Around the organism-level of classification, there is
a great diversity of problematic cases where it is difficult to decide whether we are dealing
with an organism, an item or artefact in its environment, or rather an organ, or a group of
organisms.
To isolate this problem for the present discussion, two theoretical considerations must
be backgrounded. I will discuss there first before elaborating on the problematic position
of animal artefacts. (1) I adopt a view of classification that is mereological (based on
part-whole relationships). I take it as a genuine discovery of biology that higher-order taxa
(above species) are constituted by part-whole relationships among lineages, and thus that
phylogenetic classification is classification on the basis of part-whole relationships (Hull
1986; Ghiselin 2005; De Queroz 2007). Moreover, this mereological view of classification is
in many ways continuous with classification of lower-level taxa (at species level and below).
Groups are parts of species, and organisms themselves can be described in terms of part-whole
relationships: organisms are composed of organ systems, which are composed of organs,
tissues, cells, organelles, multimers, etc. (2) There are problems and incongruities with
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the mereological classification system, most notably (i) the misalignment of mereological
(AKA “organizational”) levels with putative levels of selection, and (ii) the known processes
of reticulation amongst biological parts that prevent the mereological classification system
from being strictly hierarchical at all levels. The phylogenetic history of life contains many
events that violate a strictly tree-like pattern of dissent, such as symbiosis, endosymbiosis
and horizontal gene-transfer (Deleuze and Guittari 1988; Doolittle 2000; Doolittle and
Baptest 2007; Doolittle and Brunet 2016). Indeed, unity across classification, levels of
selection and folk intuitions about the desirability of hierarchical taxonomy may be precisely
the sort of thing we should not expect from biology on metaphysical grounds. Life is too
disorderly to expect such hierarchies (Dupre 1995). Nonetheless, I take it that both i-ii can
be independently dealt with in satisfactory ways (Godfrey-Smith 2013, p.117; Brunet and
Doolittle 2018; Doolittle and Brunet 2016; Doolittle and Bapteste 2007) and, moreover, that
neither poses a particular problem for the present use of mereological classification—I see
no problems with non-hierarchical mereological classifications that do not align with levels
of selection.
Fig. 7.1 Problematic place of artifacts and
colonies within a portion of the biological hi-
erarchy.
More threatening are cases where it
seems that a biological entity is ambigu-
ously classified or, worse, not classified at
all. Two sorts of biological phenomena that
lead to these problems are: animal artefacts
and (eu)social relationships between animals
(artefact animals). Consider a few examples.
If a spider’s web is an organ of the spider, it
is the only such organ that is not composed
of tissues; it is composed of macromolecules,
but if it is an organelle of the spider it is the
only such organelle not composing a cell.
Worse, if a beaver’s dam is a part of the
beaver (lineage, life-cycle), it is not even
principally composed of biomolecules orig-
inating in beaver bodies. Artefacts seem to stratify the biological hierarchy, spreading it
out laterally in ways that forbid more conceptually-comforting nesting relationships among
parts. For examples of the second sort we can consider social organisms, such as holobionts,
chimeras, and crustaceans or insects with a caste system including non-reproductive mem-
bers. Such social relationships cast doubt on a clear distinction between organ, organism and
group, so that we might plausibly see individual worker ants or social shrimp, for instance, as
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organisms in a group or as organs of an organism. In each of these diverse cases, the proper
place of some entity within the hierarchy of biological organization is not clear (Figure 7.1).
Concentrating our focus around the organism-level, we can see that the problem is one of
finding the right place for biological entities within the part-whole classification. Colonies,
consisting of a number of organisms, seem to be groups. But qua parts of lineages, they seem
to be organisms (super-organisms perhaps), which would make individuals within the colony
more akin to the parts we usually call organs. When non-human animal artefacts consist of
parts of organisms like proteins they seem to be organelles, but sitting outside cells seems to
forbid this. Likewise, artefacts like tools and nests seem to be produced by organic activity
and play such an integral role in animal life-cycles that they should be organs, despite not
being composed of tissues in the right way. In short, our meso-organism-level mereology is a
mess.
Further attention to specific examples will continue throughout the remainder. What is
essential and problematic about these cases is now clear: part-whole classification at and
around the organism-level seems unable to account for putatively biological entities—spider
webs and worker ants. Some reformism of part-whole classification is needed to account for
these phenomena. Unfortunately, there is no consensus as to how these problematic cases
should be resolved. The following sections (§ 2.2-3) present some options and argue for a
reform, not to our classification procedure itself, but to the nature of part-whole relationships
admissible within it.
7.2.2 The Solution(s)
Dawkins’ extended phenotype analysis raises the option of treating animal
artefacts as part of the organism, not part of its world. Not all artefacts fit into
Dawkins’ extended phenotype model.—Sterelny (2004) p.11
Perhaps the most famous account of artefacts in the philosophy of biology is provided
by Dawkins’ Extended Phenotype. On Dawkins’ account (more details below) of non-
human animal artefacts, some artefacts can be interpreted as phenotypes of the organisms
that produce them. Thus we are licensed to conduct studies into the genetic evolution of
artefacts (Dawkins 1982). Dawkins does not intend his view to impact our account of
biological classification. Instead, his thesis that artefacts may be treated as phenotypic parts
of organisms is justified on the basis of geneic selectionism. If we take gene selectionism (of
Dawkins’ selfish-gene variety) seriously we should see, his account proposes, that bodily
or conventional phenotypes are not the only evolutionary relevant consequences of genes.
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Artefacts too are consequences of genes, albeit sometimes at a much “longer reach” from the
body.
There are alternatives, critics and contenders to Dawkins’ Extended Phenotype Theory
(EPT), each of which offering some perspective on artefacts and how they are best incorpo-
rated into biological theory. The two most noteworthy adversaries are the Developmental
Systems Theory (DST) of Griffiths and Gray (2001; 2005) and the Niche Construction
Theory (NCT) of, among many, Odling-Smee (1988; et al. 1996), Laland (2003), Jablonka
(2007). Explicating the contentious relationship between these notions is beyond the scope
of this chapter (but see Sterelny 2001). What each of these theories share is some proffered
way of extending our analysis of organisms beyond the boundaries of their body and into the
environment—the “world” in the epigraph from Sterelny (2004) above—to artefacts.
Wilkins and Bourrat (2001) say of the difference between Dawkins’ EPT and the Extended
Replicator Framework of Sterelny et al. (1996), the “views are so general that any case that
can be described in one can be redescribed in the other. Differences lie in ease of description.”
The EPT, DST, and NCT are arguably also sufficiently general to permit redescriptions of
the case at hand, and any one might be a viable route to a general theory of animal artefacts.
However, in the remainder of this chapter I primarily discuss the EPT of Dawkins, because it
furnishes us, without any redescription, with a notion of extension. The notion of extension
is a general one: it has been offered a few times without the Dawkinsian undergirding, and
largely before Dawkins’ Extended Phenotype. Other theorists have used similar concepts
of extension for similar uses: the analysis of human artefacts, tools, and in cybernetics
(Weiner 1948; Canguilhem 1952; Clynes and Kline 1960; Haraway 1991; Hacking 1998).
The EPT is just a better starting-point than the NCT or DST for incorporating these other
non-Dawkinsian views.
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Claims about treating parts as “extensions” have arisen from strong analogies between
machines and organs. Hacking (1998) points to Canguilhem’s (1952) La Connaissance
de la Vie, where he advocates the view that machines are a kind of organ, an “organic
projection”. Hacking applies the term extension’ to Canguilhem’s phrase ‘organic projection’.
Early cybernetic discussions of automata by Wiener (1948) likewise draw parallels between
organs and machines, though not explicitly as “extensions”. Wiener at times sounds like
Canguilhem, “...we deal with automata effectively coupled to the external world... The organs
by which impressions are received are the equivalents of the human and animal sense organs”
(Wiener 1948). Haraway (1991) points to a different strand beginning in Clynes and Kline’s
(1960) article Cyborgs and Space, a speculative discussion of the use of machines to create
cyborgs, “exogenously extended” organisms [ibid p.1]. Along the strand stemming from
both Dawkins and Clynes and Kline, Clark and Chalmers (1998) and Clark (2001) offer their
own view of ‘cyborgs’ via the notion of extended cognition. It is not essential to cyborgs, on
Clark’s account, that any parts be internal to the organism, since some parts of the organism
(specifically, cognitive resources) are already extended beyond that boundary. Objects like
computers and notebooks can become the bearers of cognitive properties (e.g., beliefs) and
thus parts of biological systems (Clark and Chalmers 1998), in virtue of how they extend
cognition. See the chronology in the historical sketch below (Figure.7.9).
Fig. 7.2 Short history of concepts of technology, machines or animal artefacts as “extensions”
or “projections” of organisms. Arrows indicate influence on subsequent articles.
The following quotes are representative.
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. . . [M]achines can be considered organs of the human species. A tool or a
machine is an organ, and organs are tools or machines. —Canguilhem (1952)
For the exogenously extended organizational complex, function as an integrated
homeostatic system unconsciously, we propose the term “Cyborg”. —Clynes
and Kline (1960) p.1
. . . Once we have accepted that there are genes for building behavior, the rules of
existing terminology imply that the artefact itself should be treated as part of the
phenotypic expression. —Dawkins (1982) p.302
Despite the different purposes of these authors, they are all interested in understanding
animal artefacts from within their respective biological fields and all remarkably come
to deploy similar concepts to that end. There does not seem to be any initial historical
connection between them. Dawkins does not seem to have read or referenced Clynes and
Kline, nor do they seem to have any engagement with Canguilhem. The word ‘extension’
and the nearly synonymous ‘projection’ have been used repeatedly and independently to refer
to things that are in some sense parts of organisms but somehow more than the familiar stock
of organs.3 I interpret these authors as saying that biological mereology needs to supplement
the stock of conventional parts with additional extended parts, and conclude from this that
the proper mereology of biology is an extended hierarchy (Figure 7.3).
Fig. 7.3 Portion of the simple hierarchy of “conventional” parts (left) extended horizontally
to include artefacts and colonial relationships as “extended parts” (right).
Why adopt this view of artefacts as extensions? There are as many reasons as theorists
using the term, however, there are two main shared reasons. For some, the notion of extension
3A survey of the appearance of this idea in popular culture would be expansive.
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is appealed to because it has the consequence that some previous distinctions are broken
down. In Dawkins, Clark and Chalmers, the artefact/environment or artefact/phenotype
distinction begins to be eroded. In Wiener, Canguilhem, Hacking and Haraway, the denial of
the machine/organ distinction is taken to license an even broader “blurring” of the boundaries
between the technological and biological, or natural and artificial. Hacking (1998) writes,
“Canguilhem may have blurred more boundaries, in 1947, with specific argument and example,
than Haraway did forty years later, by decree.” To my mind, it is better not to adopt a notion
of extension as a means to counter the MOD, or similar distinctions, but to adopt it because
the MOD has already been eroded for other reasons.
Another shared reason for adopting a notion of extension is that it helps make sense of
existing theory in bioscience, perhaps by carrying some theory to its “logical conclusion”
(Laland 2004 p.314). In the case of those views stemming from Clynes and N. S. Kline
(1960), R. Kline (2009) argues that it is the “key concepts of cybernetics” which lead naturally
to the view that cyborgs are cybernetically extended. On Kline’s (2009) view, we can only
make sense of cyborgs as distinct from organisms, i.e. such that not every organism is trivially
a “cyborg”, when we understand them as cybernetically extended.
At first thought, ‘cybernetic organism’ seems like a misnomer because all or-
ganisms are cybernetic in that they interact with the world through information
and feedback control, [which are] the key concepts in cybernetics[.] The mouse
and implanted pump is thus a cybernetically extended organism – an organism
extended with cybernetic technology – what [Clynes and Kline] call a cyborg.
—R. Kline (2009) p.332
For Dawkins’ part, he says that it is the “rules of existing terminology” (Dawkins 1982)
that demand we see some non-human animal artefacts as parts of the phenotype. If we are
going to make sense of non-human animal artefacts in genetics at all, then they will have
to be construed as (complex, indirect, behavioural) consequences of genes, and on existing
terminology the consequences of genes are phenotypes. So artefacts are part of phenotypic
expression. To distinguish artefacts from the other, conventional or bodily phenotypes,
Dawkins uses the term ‘extended’. However, Dawkins is resistant to further extension of his
notion of the extended phentype (see Laland 2004; Dawkins 2004), and particularly to the
inclusion of human artefacts as extended phenotypes. The following section argues that we
can and should generalize the EPT to apply to human artefacts, to at least some machines.
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7.3 Pushing the Limits of the Extended Phenotype Theory
Dawkins (2004) says that the EPT does not apply to human buildings. Sterelny (2004) also
argues that the EPT does not apply to some simple tools, some non-human animal tools
included. What sets these limits on the EPT? There seem to be two sorts of reasons given
that some artefact should not qualify as an extended phenotype. In this section I explain and
argue against these reasoned limits on the EPT, before offing a more general framework of
extended parts in the following section.
The first relates to genetic adaptationism. Apparently, if an artefact is not produced by
genes in such a way that the effects of the artefact, potentially at least, affect the frequency of
those genes—if it is not a “candidate adaptation” of some genes—then it cannot count as an
extended phenotype. The second limit on applying the EPT to machines relates to the level
of specificity, plasticity, generality or flexibility involved in the production of the artefact.
Apparently, if an artefact is produced by a process that is too general, flexible or plastic, then
it cannot count as an extended phenotype. The two are entangled, since it is some specific set
of genes that are required to be candidate adaptations.
Consider Dawkins’ (2004) response to Laland (2004),
The relevant point about the extended phenotype is that it is a disciplined ex-
tension. There are lots of other tempting ‘extensions’, which sound similar but
take us off in misleading directions. I have always fought shy of misapplying
the phrase to a profligate range of apparently plausible extensions.
. . . [W]hen I am asked. . . whether buildings count as extended phenotypes, I
answer no, on the grounds that the success or failure of buildings does not affect
the frequency of architects’ genes in the gene pool. Extended phenotypes are
worthy of the name only if they are candidate adaptations for the benefit of
alleles responsible for variations in them...—Dawkins (2004) p.377, emphasis
added.
We should reject part of Dawkins’ claim straight away, before dealing with the more chal-
lenging claim about candidate adaptations. Dawkins’ first point, the grounds above, is a
claim about reciprocal fitness effects and is false. Plainly, buildings do sometimes affect the
frequency of their architects’ genes in the gene pool. In 2015, a pair of UK news agencies
reported that the architect of the Pyongyang Airport was reportedly executed by Kim Jong-un,
because the leader did not like the design.4 This is not an isolated example. The success
or failure of shelters has a profound effect on human life; poor shelters cause death by the
4(Accessed Nov 2019): https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3143059/Was-architect-Pyongyang-
Airport-executed-Kim-Jong-didn-t-like-design.html
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elements, disease or predation. Moreover, if the grounds were only that artefacts needed to
have potential fitness effects (on the genes) of artefact producers, then perhaps all human
artefacts are thereby included. Fitness effects are cheap. Cellphones kill drivers; a compass
can save your life; clocks keep you from missing your date. Reciprocal fitness effects on
builders’ (genes) will not exclude human artefacts.
Fig. 7.4 One of my family hens in nest-box.
Photo provided by Kathryn Price.
Dawkins’ conditional only if claim is the
more serious objection. If something is an
extended phenotype, then it must be a can-
didate adaptation for the benefit of alleles
responsible for variations in itself. The adap-
tationist component requires some qualifi-
cation. There are plenty of phenotypes that
are not “adaptations for the benefit of” any-
thing. Moreover, there is nothing preventing
an organism from building artefacts that are
deleterious. Chickens will sometimes make
nests and attempt to raise a brood outdoors,
although in fact they are much safer from
predators if they use the artificial nest boxes
provided in their coop. But the condition
should not be about being an adaptation but simply about being a candidate for adaptation; it
is about whether some artefacts are really traits or phenotypes after all. Perhaps buildings
do not and have not had a significant enough effect on builder genes so that variations
correlating with good (or bad) building behaviour have ever contributed to the frequency of
those genes in the population sufficiently to overcome drift. In that case, buildings would
not be adaptations, but they would still be candidates for adaptations if the gene’s effect or
correlation had been sufficient to positively affect gene frequencies.
The limit boils down to the genetic causation of the artefact, to whether an artefact
is a consequence of alleles responsible for variations in it. Dawkins’ phrase “candidate
adaptation” is a bit obscure, Sterelny speaks more plainly: woodpecker tools are not an
aspect of the bird’s phenotype. Surely artefacts have reciprocal effects on their architect’s
genes, the issue is really whether they have any effect on genes specifically for the artefact.
If this is really what was required for human-artefacts to be subject to an extended phenotype
analysis—that, e.g., there be clock-genes and microwave-genes—then the theory’s domain
of applicability stops short of a general analysis of artefacts. There are no clock-genes, we
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may safely assume, if what is meant by clock-genes are genes that specifically code for the
construction of clocks. Clocks are not polypeptides.
However, Dawkins’ condition is stated in terms more general than a simple requirement
for “genes-for” an artefact. He says there must be “alleles responsible for variations” in the
artefact. This only says that there must be covariation between genes and artefacts—some
weight to the “genes for” relation—not how specific that covariation must be. This invites two
further questions: (q.1) what the sort of covariation is required and (q.2) how specific does
covariation need to be, i.e., what grain of analysis of covariation is acceptable. A behavioural-
genetic account of animal artefacts would be significantly constrained in the analysis of real
cases if it required gene-artefact covariation to be overly direct, or overly specific. Perhaps
most animal artefacts are not biochemical products of genes (and behaviour), like spider
webs, nor perhaps do they covary with small specific sets of genes.
For instance, among artefacts that are acquired “ready-made” from the environment—the
spikes of butcher birds, stone hammers of primates, bark spades of Visayan pigs—there
can be little to no covariation between the structure of the extension and the genes of the
organism. Consider hermit-crabs in particular. Hermit crab shells are animal artefacts if
Fig. 7.5 Hermit crabs lining up to exchange shells following a period of growth, smallest to
largest. Obtained from (Nov 2019): http://www.bbc.co.uk/earth/story/20141103-hermit-crab
anything is, though they are not biochemically, synthetically, products of hermit crab genes.
Instead they are the result of chains of crab behaviour—perhaps, more akin to mobile cave-
dwelling than architecture. Nonetheless, hermit crab shells can benefit alleles responsible
for variations in hermit crab shells (the specific shell worn by a specific crab) since they can
benefit crabs that have behaviours that allow for variable choice of shells—or trading variable
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shells, as in the image above. While there is little to no crab-gene/shell-structure covariation,
the shell remains a reliable animal artefact due to the strong covariation of crab-genes and
crab-behaviour for shell acquisition.
Moreover, the inclusion of artefacts that are products of behaviour alone is just what
Dawkins promises. Dawkins’ argumentative strategy while introducing the notion extended
phenotypes is to show how it can be justified in very little and “not difficult” steps. This
begins by noting that “conventional” or “bodily” phenotypic traits are often caused in “long,
ramified and indirect causal chains” [ibid, p.198], and asking us to take a small step further
for cases of animal artefacts. These too are caused by long, ramified, causal chains, it is just
that those chains also involve behaviours, such as building.
The upshot is that it should not be covariation between human genes and human artefact
structure but covariation between human genes and the behaviour that result in humans
having artefacts. Humans end up with artefacts in perhaps as many ways as animals do—we
acquire them ready-made, we find them, we shape them to greater or lesser degrees, we
construct them from raw materials, etc. But this diversity of means opens up more rather
than less opportunity for covariation between genes and behaviours. Of course, there has
never been a genome-wide association study of correlations between gene variants and
human artefact related behaviours. Though, it is difficult to imagine that there would be
none—especially pertaining to shelter and simple tool-use. If some covariation is all that
is required, and “long, ramified and indirect causal chains” are allowed, the EPT should
arguably apply to a much broader class of artefacts. Once attention is shifted, in Dawkinsian
fashion, away from the structure or material composition of the extension and towards the
behaviours that result in it, it becomes far less clear that humans do not display precisely the
right sort of covariation between our genes and artefact-resulting behaviours.
What should we say if the only genes that covary with human artefact behaviour are those
that also have some non-specific effect on learning, intelligence, sociality, dexterity, etc?
Sterelny (2004) provides a related limit on the EPT: that it is curtailed by plasticity.5
Treating artefacts as part of the agent’s phenotype is not an option for artefacts
whose construction is an expression of phenotypic plasticity: tool use in the
woodpecker finch (the hypothesis runs) is not itself an adaptation, and is not
an aspect of the bird’s phenotype. The relevant phenotype trait is the learning
ability through which the tool use is acquired.—Sterelny (2004) p.13
Sterelny (2004) also offers an explanation for why plasticity excludes some artefacts but not
others.
5Laland (2004) offers a similar qualification based on the “flexibility” of learning.
160 A Machine-Organism Relationship: Part-Whole Classification
The tool of the woodpecker finch... is not likely to be a capacity that evolved
incrementally through the assembly of dedicated developmental resources. In
contrast, nests are aspects of a bird’s extended phenotype. They are as devel-
opmentally stable, as heritable, and as predictable in their ecological effects as
other traits. And they are adaptive complexes, and like other adaptive complexes,
this nest almost certainly evolved incrementally. —Sterelny (2004) p.12
Since human artefacts are plastic to an upsetting degree, this would prevent the EPT from
applying to them. However, plenty of conventional phenotypes did not evolve “incrementally
through the assembly of dedicated developmental resources”, so that shouldn’t be part of
our criteria for extended phenotypes in particular.6 Plenty of phenotypes are irremediably
tied up in complex epistatic causal chains that tie their expression, development, to a broad
group of other genes. Dawkins’ own style of argument should again be used to include these
cases within the EPT. Many “conventional” or “bodily” phenotypic traits are often caused in
“long, ramified and indirect causal chains” and some of these causal chains involve plasticity.
Conventional, or bodily plasticity is no argument against being a phenotype.
By maintaining consistency with Dawkins’ argumentative strategy we can push the limits
of the EPT quite significantly towards including more artefacts. Then it is unclear why any
human artefact should not be an extended phenotype as much as a bird’s nest is. Moreover,
we can keep the general notion of extension developed within the EPT while removing some
of the commitments that limit its applicability to artefacts. To that end, the following section
provides an account of extended parts, as a generalization of extended phenotypes.
7.4 Extended Parthood and Biological Classification
7.4.1 A General Account of Extended Parts
In § 7.2.2 I raised a number of accounts that deploy a similar notion of extension. They are a
disunified bunch. Between Dawkins and Canguilhem there isn’t a word in common, until
Hacking provides his interpretation “projection = extension”. I take Dawkins’ EPT to be the
best point of departure. However, as argued in § 7.3, Dawkins’ own view of the limits of the
EPT (Dawkins 2004) is inconsistent with the analytic strategy used to justify it (Dawkins
1982). Put another way, we have a theory of extended biological parthood in “many accents”.
6As with Dawkins above, the physiological issue of how a given artefact is caused (by genes and during
development) is run together with the status of the artefact as an adaptation. And as above, we should dismiss
that part of the limit on the EPT that depends on the evolutionary status of the trait.
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So which account of ‘extension’ should we adopt? In this section I offer a more generic,
“accent free” characterization of the view to be used going forward.7
I begin with a definition of extended parthood and follow with examination of cases to
show that it covers the previous uses of ‘extension’.
Part p is an extended part of O iff:
(1) Causality: O or O’s conspecifics contribute causally to the occurrence of
p. E.g., O might produce, acquire, construct, synthesize, build, etc. as its
contribution to p.
(2) Reliability: O or O’s conspecifics reliably contribute to the re-occurrence of
p. E.g, O might reliably re-produce p, reliably re-acquire p, etc.
(3) Reciprocal Causality: p must contribute to O. Minimally, p must have
some reciprocal causal role in the life of O, and may further be classified
accordingly as that effect was / is / is not under selection and had / has / does
not have a positive, negative or neutral consequence on fitness.
(4) Detachment: p must be a physically extended part of O. Part p must at least
temporarily be detached from the conventional body of internal organs.
These criteria are intended to capture the general features of the EPT, without imposing
the specific constraints (§ 7.3) that have come along with it. On (1) we would not want p
to be a part of O, let alone an extended part, if O made no causal contribution to p. An
organism, for instance, make some causal contribution to each of its conventional parts, and it
should do the same for its extended parts. However, (1) does not build the features of genetic
causation present in the EPT into this account of extension. Arguably one of the reasons
that genetic causation of animal artefacts is preferred is that it entails some heritability or
“developmental stability” (Sterelny 2004), and that is captured by (2), the requirement for
reliable re-occurrence of the part. However, how reliability is ensured is left open by (2). On
(3), as argued in Ch.2-3, there is something right about the idea that reciprocal causality is
present in organic wholes, it is just wrong that these whole coincide with (the conventional
bodies of) organisms—perhaps all of our conventional parts have reciprocal causal relations
within us, but so too do our extended parts. Note that (3) does not build adaptation into our
account of extension, so it makes sense to ask of some extended part whether it is also an
adaptation. Finally, extension is meant to capture a parthood relationship that obtains even
for (4) detached parts.
I now show that this account covers existing usage of ‘extension’.
Consider a spider’s web: it is (1) produced by the spider, (2) reliably re-produced by
that spider and its descendents, (3) a contributor to the spider’s fitness and (4) not one of the
7I owe the phrase “accent free” to the lectures of Peter Johnstone, Department of Mathematics, Cambridge.
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spider’s internal organs. Or consider a beaver’s dam: it is also (1) produced and gathered
by that beaver and/or its kin, (2) reliably re-produced by groups of beavers, (3) presumably
not a luxury, and (4) not an internal body-part of any beaver. Likewise, when we think
of Canguilhem’s notion that human machines are “organs of our species” it is clear that
a tool at least, such as a hammer (1) is produced by some human or group thereof, (2) is
reliably re-produced by humans, and (3) contributes to human functions, such as domicile
construction, and (4) is detached from the main portion of our organs. Taking an example
from Clark and Chalmers (1998), consider an external cognitive resource such as a notebook:
(1) it is produced by humans, (2) re-production of notebooks can be relied upon in many
contexts, and (3) the ability to record information has effects on humans that can be positive,
negative, or neutral, and again (4). Finally, the perennial example: a clock is (1) produced by
individual humans or groups thereof, (2) re-produced (and repaired or sustained) reliably and
(3) contributes to human functioning, such as by external “regulation” of circadian rhythms.
Fig. 7.6 “Rose”, a rat implanted with an os-
motic pump. Claimed by Clynes and Kline
(1960) to be the “one of the first Cyborgs”.
Turning to R. Kline, and Clynes and
Kline’s cyborgs, do cyborgs have extended
parts? Considering some astronaut with an
implant, e.g. an ordinary pacemaker, it (1)
is surely produced by the astronaut or con-
specifics, (2) can be re-produced as reliably
as the conditions for its manufacture and im-
plantation, and (3) hopefully contributes to,
rather than detracts from, the functioning of
the astronaut. On (4), though a pacemaker
is internal at the time of its effects on the
beating of the heart, it is exogenous, at least
temporarily detached. Though, not all the
exogenous parts of a cyborg are extended parts. For instance, note that a consequence of
this definition (which I am willing to accept) is that Rose, the rat with attached osmotic
pump, does not have that osmotic pump as an extended part. That is because Rose and
her conspecifics do not causally contribute to the occurrence of the osmotic pump. For the
same reason, the nest-box of my chicken in Fig.7.4 is not an extended part of that chicken.
Of course, were Rose not around she could not be implanted, but nothing Rose or her
conspecifics do makes the occurrence of her implants any more likely. The relevant causal
difference makers are entirely human. This is acceptable for a number of reasons, not least of
which is that it makes it clear that Rose was being mistreated. Moreover, it does not prevent
Rose’s implant or the nest-box from being an extended part of some human.
7.4 Extended Parthood and Biological Classification 163
Works of art are also an example: they are certainly produced and reliably re-produced
by us, although their reciprocal causal role is dubious. It is an open question what effects
human art truly has on our lives as organisms, and whether human artistic abilities depend on
a history of selection for such abilities, despite the enthusiasm of some (see Dutton 2009).
Nonetheless, artistic behaviours are not evolutionary epiphenomena; they at least sometimes
affect human lives reciprocally as paid crafts. There are also cases of uncontroversial (sexual)
selection for the production of animal-artefacts that seem to occupy a middle-ground between
watercolors and beaver dams, such as the nest of the bower bird (pictured below).8
Fig. 7.7 Bower-bird, rearranging some of the items it has collected to adorn its nest, top-right
From the foregoing examples it looks like quite a few biological, and some technological,
things are extended parts. Is the definition too permissive? Are there things that count as
artefacts that we might not want to consider our extended parts? Each criterion indicates
at least some phenomena that should not be extended parts. E.g., (1) without a causal
contribution to O, p should not be an extended part. All else being equal, a waterfall that
provides drinking water is not an extended part (despite satisfying 3-4); a natural barrier
such as a mountain-range or other happenstance bulwark is not an extended part; astronomic
phenomena are not extended parts. A sextant is an artefact but stars aren’t. That said, of
course, an organism can have behaviours which make them seek out or otherwise secure
the use of things that they otherwise have no causal contribution to. A bear seeks a cave;
cliff-nesting birds squabble for rocky outcroppings that they could not sculpt. These latter
cases satisfy (1) after all.
8Obtained from National Geographic, 2019. https://pmdvod.nationalgeographic.com/NG_Video/
982/183/55695_1_1280x720_1024x576_177550915953.jpg
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Likewise, (2) reliability varies. The happenstance arrangement of sticks fallen from
a nest may satisfy (1,3-4)—they may be caused by nestbuilding and happen to confuse
predators—without being explained by anything reliably occurring in bird behaviour. One-
off human artefacts that happen to affect our lives, happy or unhappy accidents, can be safely
excluded from the basic package of human extended parts. A haphazard scattering of trash
might attract prey food-stuffs, but scattered trash should not be counted among our parts.
Although, reliability can emerge from initially unreliable or unlikely accidents. We can learn
from unreliable mistakes and highly-advantageous artefactual accidents can scaffold their
subsequent locking in. One narrative for the origin of human-canine symbiosis involves an
initial step where dog ancestors were adventitious scavengers of our (unreliable stream of)
wastes and our subsequent “exaptation” of their predatory alerts. Today, the hunting dog is
a symbol of functional reliability and fidelity, and arguably has become more a part of our
groups over time.
Reciprocal causation (3) is perhaps the most contentious. Depending on one’s choice
of function concept, different human and even animal artefacts will thereby be excluded. I
intend a wider reading, and think the essentials of CR functionality should count towards
extended parthood. In the case of bodily parts, many are merely CR functional without
thereby being non-parts. Perhaps the appendix now has no SE or etiological function, but
this doesn’t matter to its status as a part. Some stretches of human DNA seem to have no
adaptive biochemical activities and no observable effects of their deletion—no fitness effects.
Nonetheless they are copied, they may mutate to some effect, and at very least they consume
some of the available energy resources for their upkeep in the cell—they are CR functional
and they are indubitably parts of us. What is more concerning is the idea of parts that have
no reciprocal effect whatever. E.g., many animals reliably produce certain markings in their
surroundings—tracks or traces—yet these are ordinarily not even CR functional. Every
organism has some reliable causal chains extending outside of them, but not all of these
circle round and affect their origin. Objects that arise as mere effects of organisms are not
their extended parts.
Overall I have argued that extended parthood includes all extended phenotypes and some
additional human and non-human animal artefacts, but is not parthood run amok, since it
does exclude some intuitive non-parts.
7.4.2 Extended Part-Whole Classification
Parts of organisms are subject to the part-whole based classification spanning levels of bio-
logical organization. Though not Dawkins’ intention, his EPT clearly does have implications
for classification. Consider first the standard, non-extended view of organisms and artefacts,
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Fig. 7.9 The non-extended view of animal artefacts at the level of lineages. Lineages are of
birds, their artefacts remain outside the lineage, since outside the body of the bird.
where there is a sharp divide between all animal artefacts and the organisms that produce
them (Fig.7.8). Plainly, since on this view artefacts are not parts of organisms, they do
not thereby have any place within the same part-whole classification. This makes them
unclassifiable on the mereological account of classification. Notice further that this exclusion
of extended parts at the organism level propagates upward through the classification at higher
levels—artefacts are thereby not parts of lineages either (Fig.7.9).
Fig. 7.8 The non-extended relationship be-
tween organisms and their artefacts. Artefacts
are not parts of the organism, but parts of the
environment.
The EPT changes how we think of the
part-whole relationship between some arte-
facts and organisms. I think it best to treat
the EPT as advocating a somewhat more in-
clusive whole, containing both artefacts and
the “conventional” (or “bodily”) phenotype
(Fig.7.10). On this view, (some) artefacts are
parts of biological-wholes and thereby sub-
ject to the part-whole classification scheme
spanning levels of the biological hierarchy.
Notice also that this inclusion of extended
parts at the organism level propagates up to
higher levels, as in Fig 7.11.
What I hope the account of extended parts adds to the EPT is just that more artefacts
are extended parts than are extended phenotypes. Graphically, this view is captured by
Figure 7.12. As with the EPT, this parthood relationship propagates upwards through the
classificatory hierarchy. Since artefacts are parts of more inclusive biological wholes they
are thereby subject to part-whole classification (Fig.7.13).
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Fig. 7.10 The EPT view of (some) animal artefacts.
Fig. 7.11 The EPT view at the level of extended-lineages.
Fig. 7.12 A generic view of artefacts as extended parts. NB: human bodies and human
artefacts are chosen for example and, since more general, the view should apply equally well
to usual non-human artefacts.
When we see machines as extended parts of us, as human-parts, they earn a place in our
classification of ourselves. As with the rejection of phenetic classification generally, it is no
matter that machines are not sufficiently similar to our other parts to merit an hierarchical
classification on the basis of overlapping sets of similarities. Similarity can be a bad indicator
of history; a nest is not much like a mating dance and is much like certain happenstance
amalgamations of leaf-litter, but the former are phylogenetically related in a deep sense that
the latter are not. Machines do not usually much resemble organs, but are much more like
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Fig. 7.13 The extended-parthood relationship at the level of lineages. Depicting (1) causal-
ity, (2) reliability, (3) reciprocal causality and (4) detachment is presented via the non-
overlapping circles.
them than the are like mineral deposits, on phylogenetic grounds. Godfrey-Smith (2014
p.117) asks us to imagine zooming in on different parts of the “tree” of life, and finding
different lower-level relationships in different branches. If we were to zoom in on history of
life, including all the extended parts, machines would appear within the animal kingdom.9
7.5 Extendedness is not an MOD
Recalling the arguments of Ch.2, some organisms are themselves artefacts of other organisms,
such as cows and other forms of animal-animal domestication (see Brooker and Feeney
2019). This suggests immediately that there could be overlap between the extended parts
and organisms. I have argued that a theory of extended parthood, readily generalized from
the EPT, broadens our biological mereology and thereby provides a classification of human
and non-human animal-artefacts. If one is going to understand animal-artefacts within
biology, then introducing the notion of an ‘extended part’ suffices. To conclude, I argue
that this is not all it suffices for. This section argues that extended parthood applies to
some organisms themselves—particularly in social animals. If one is going to understand
artefact-animals, ‘extended parthood’ suffices there too. This shows that extended parthood
not only resolves another incongruity in our classifications, but that it does not amount to an
9It might be complained that extended lineages are not very lineage-like, or at least that their “trees” are not
very tree-like. This was essentially the problem dealt with in Ch.6. To my mind, that is more an issue with the
relative importance of tree-likeness in evolutionary history, and indeed, the “tree” of non-extended lineages
is already not very tree-like, given the preponderance of HGT. Moreover, if we see the replicator framework
as a generalization of the notion of genes and their vehicles, and the ERF as a further generalization thereof
to include non-genetic replicators, then noting the non-treelikeness of artefact histories, extended-lineages, is
just to note that there is a process, akin to HGT, at the level of generality of ERF. That is, there is “Horizontal
Replicator Transfer”, but some of those replicators are not genes.
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MOD: some machines are extended parts of organisms and some organisms are extended
parts of organisms as well.
The other sort of biological phenomena that does not readily or intuitively fit within
our part-whole classifications are eusocial relationships. As well as the animal-artefacts
produced by social animals—bees, termites, social shrimp, ants, as well as beavers, primates,
etc.—some of the animals themselves occupy a questionable position in our classifications. In
particular, sterile worker animals and slave animals seem simultaneously to be organisms in
their display of organization (they are free-floating amalgamations of cells that are organized
into organs and organ-systems) while also being functional parts of larger organizations. For
those sterile workers, their parthood relationships with lineages are doubly unusual: they
are only ever at the tips of lineages, evolutionary “dead-ends”—like somatic cells—while
they are nonetheless essential components for the perpetuation of “lineages” of the larger
organizations. Referring to Fig.7.1, this places social animals in a position similar to that
of artefacts—as “artefact-animals” instead of animal-artefacts—where their place in the
part-whole classification of biology is uncertain.
Problems associated with understanding sociality at the level of lineages are old. The
conceptual jump to considering selection of colony-level individuals was so great that it
left Darwin in doubt (Herbers 2009). For Darwin, neuter insects were a “special difficulty,
which at first appeared... insuperable, and actually fatal to my whole theory” (Darwin 2003
[1872]).10 Perhaps unintuitively, I think we gain some traction by asking about the artefacts
of social organisms: What is the appropriate mereology in cases of artefacts arising from
social interactions?
The key animals cases involved are complex artefacts, like buildings, ant-hills, termite
mounds and beaver dams. All seem to require some kind of collective or group-level
contribution to extension, making it difficult to identify the whole that such structures are
parts of. This is undeniably a key problem with considering human artefacts as extensions:
the causal processes leading to human artefacts are much more complex, roundabout and
amorphous than simpler causes of animal artefacts with a clear bearer—such as the web of a
solitary spider. Dawkins, who is not shy of machine analogies, offered one on the topic of
those extended phenotypes which appear to be extensions of more than one individual. After
discussing the case of beaver habitats, which are often maintained by a family of beavers, he
turns his attention to a case that is “worse”: termite mounds. Whether this case is “worse”
10 Whether the higher levels of organization apparently present in social animals necessitates a novel sort
of organism concept, superorganizmality, has received substantial attention (Queller and Strassmann 1998;
2009). Another solution to the problem of neuter insects is provided in the theory of inclusive fitness (see
debate between Abbot et al. 2011 and Nowak et al. 2010) where focus on lineages is shifted from considering
the effects of an organism on its own direct descendents to those on its close relatives—resolving some of the
strangeness of how non-reproductiveness of sterile insects could be adaptive.
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depends, we will see, on how we conceive of the mereology of termite colonies. Dawkins
says,
Worse [than the case of beavers], consider the mound built by a colony of
termites... It is built by perhaps a million termites, separated by time and into
cohorts, like medieval masons who could work a lifetime on one cathedral and
never meet their colleagues who would complete it. A partisan of the individual
of the unit of selection might pardonably ask exactly whose extended phenotype
the termite mound is supposed to be.—Dawkins (1982) p.200
Analogies with the structure of cathedrals have a special place in the hearts of philosophers
of biology.11 The problem for Dawkins is whether an organism, the worker termite, can have
an extended phenotype that is the result of collective, group-level activities. His answer to
this hypothetical objection is a tu quoque: that “exactly the same problem” apparently arises
when multiple genes contribute to an organism’s phenotype. That might be approximately
right; there is collective causal contribution in both cases. The “partisan of the individual as
the unit of section” will still object, however—Dawkins’ retort does not pin the mound on a
particular individual termite, and even a “superorganism” is a non-canonical individual at
best.
Nonetheless, there is a direct answer to this hypothetical objection that even the partisan
should be amenable to: the mound is the extended phenotype of the queen, and so are the
worker bodies. Recall Dawkins’ argumentative strategy: extended phenotypes are justified as
a little step from ordinary phenotypes, since both involve “long, ramified and indirect causal
chains”. Dawkins seems to drop this approach precisely when continuing with it would be
doubly beneficial. By abandoning this strategy, Dawkins is forced into embroiling himself in
issues about (whole) colony-organism analogies and into questions about the proximal vs.
distal effects of genes (p.199). In any case, however distal, workers p do satisfy condition (1)
of the account of extended parts for their queen O—they are caused by her. They are also (2)
reliably re-caused by her, as reliably as her “reproductive” system allows. They are also (3)
functional for their queen, indeed even “sacrificing” their own evolutionary interests for hers.
And (4) they are detached from her body after “birth”.
We might imagine a more strategically stubborn Dawkins arguing that, just as bodily
phenotypes are caused by long and ramified causal chains and some artefacts are caused
by causal chains involving behaviour, others are cause by long causal chains involving
reproductive behavior. One way evolution can lead to an organism constructing its house
is by organisms that can build their own houses, under the power of their own bodies,
11Also see Odling-Smee and Turner (2011).
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i.e. by creating organisms with straightforward extended phenotypes. Another is to create
organisms that can get other bodies to produce the houses for them. One way to do that is by
producing those bodies via a “reproductive” system, now coopted into worker manufacture.12
There is also a very plausible origin for this sort of strategy since organisms typically
come pre-equipped with the capacity to produce other bodies via the reproductive system.
Provided the reproductive system can be bifunctional—making worker bodies and ordinary
reproduction—it can be put to work extending the phenotype.
Fig. 7.14 Worker bees and hive as extended
parts.
On this reading, the queen has many or-
gans for mound construction that lie outside
her conventional body and that have most of
the trimmings of bodies themselves—legs,
a nervous system, etc. In stubbornly extend-
ing Dawkins we begin to sound like Can-
guilhem. In the terminology of Canguil-
hem, individual worker termites are organs.
I think these viewpoints say approximately
the same thing: these interpretations of the
caste systems provide further support to the
idea that organisms can be extensions of or-
ganisms.
I conclude with the idea that the similarities between beavers and cathedral masons
justifies thinking of complex artefacts and extensions of human groups.
On the basis of the analogy with cathedrals, one might incorrectly imagine that Dawkins
was friendly to the idea that complex human artefacts are extended phenotypes. He is
not. Though this is for good reason: cathedrals are not the products of a central genetic
control by a sole reproductive member who is thereby the beneficiary of reciprocal effects
of the cathedral.13 If cathedrals are analogous to an animal artefact, termite mounds are
not it. Dawkins takes the termite case to be “worse” than the beaver case because there
are more termites in a mound than beavers in a family. This quantitatively complicates the
process of explaining the emergence of mounds as an extended phenotype. With termites,
the “quantitative, mutually interacting, mutually modifying, effects on a shared phenotype,
the mound” [ibid, p.201] are greater in number. But on the reading given above, that termites
12Moreover this latter strategy comes with certain advantages not possible when building one’s own house,
such as a distribution of simultaneous labor—some bodies may eat while others build. Of course, this sort
of strategy is only advantageous to the queen, or stably so, under certain conditions required to suppress the
individual interests of these other bodies, such as sterility and non-aggression, what Godfrey-Smith (2009) calls
“de-darwinization” of parts.
13Excluding, perhaps, the case of hereditary monarchies.
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are extended parts of their queen, the beaver case is qualitatively “worse”. In the termite
case, despite being greater in number, the ramified causal chains bringing about phenotype
are actually of a simpler sort: they are tree-like and rooted in the queen. In the causal
process producing mounds, we may begin with the genes of the queen (if we like), then their
influence on the production of the queen’s conventional phenotype, then to the production of
her extended phenotype, first via a large number of ramifications producing the external parts
that are her workers, then to the direct effects of workers on the building or maintenance of
mounds.
Fig. 7.15 Beaver stamp produced in 1851. From CBC (Nov 2019): https://www.cbc.ca/news/
canada/beaver-canada-symbols-1.3658037
Beavers do not have queens, nor a worker cast that is easily amenable to consideration as
extended parts of any other species member. It is beavers that are much more like masons
constructing a cathedral—even provided we do not think too much philosophical ice is cut by
an analogy to literal monarchies and worker castes. Beavers are the worse case because they
build their complex artefacts in a family structure without clear genetic or control-hierarchy.
When considering the ramifications of causal chains leading to the production of beaver dams
and nests, there is no root in any particular beaver, no sole genetic beneficiary. For beavers,
the “quantitative, mutually interacting, mutually modifying, effects on a shared phenotype”
are organized into a complex partially-reticulated network, and just the same can be said of
masons building a cathedral and of nearly every other complex human artefact.
If human artefacts are difficult to incorporate into biological theory on account of the
complexity of the causal structure by which they arise, then so too for beaver dams. We need
to allow for extended parts even if the causal chain leading to that part does not originate
entirely with one organism, but arises from a collection. Perhaps we should allow that
a beaver lodge be an extended phenotype of a beaver even when that beaver has not yet
contributed much to the lodge, because its living relatives, parents or more distant ancestors
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contributed. This is one way to make extended parts apply to structures produced by family or
guild-like organisms. Another is to allow for extended-parthood at all levels of organization.
If we want to say “exactly whose extended phenotype the [shelter] is supposed to be”,
perhaps the beaver-family, more than the termite-colony, deserves that title. That is, we might
consider guild- or family-level extended traits. Canguilhem seems to have something at this
level in mind when he says that machines are “organs of the human species” (1947). Beaver
lodges are organs of the beaver family, and a young pup yet unable to produce or maintain
the lodge is granted higher-level extended parts simply for its family membership.
Fig. 7.16 A beaver lodge. Photo taken by me,
in Glengary, Southern Ontario, 2018.
Happily, all this can be justified “inter-
nally”, on the basis of the intent to save the
analysis of common animal artefacts like
beaver lodges. Extension is a good way
to establish a relationship between organ-
isms and artefacts. Nonetheless, it is not
an MOD. Some machines, like clocks and
cathedrals, are extensions, and so are some
organisms, like cows and termites. This is an
un-Dawkinsian conclusion, but the concep-
tual move to achieve it is essentially Dawkin-
sian: artefacts are extended parts since they
are products of specific sorts of behaviour,
come whatever complexity of the causal
structure needed to produce them.
7.6 Conclusion
Seeing technology as an extension of organisms entails that technology is not exogenous
after all—in particular, that cyborgs are not, ultimately, “exogenously extended”. Technology
is a biological product and thus an endogenous element of life. A proper classification of
technology should be included within biological classification of artefacts. The foregoing is
offered in favour of an account of biological mereology that allows for “extended parts”. The
considerations of § 7.2 pose a challenge within biological theory to account for structures
(artefacts) and relationships (enslavement, sociality) that do not fit nicely into a simple
hierarchy. The solution to this problem within biological mereology suggested here is to
allow extended parthood into our analysis. This lets us keep the conventional biological
hierarchy much as it was by separating out the class of extended parts. Moreover, a theory
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of extended parthood sufficient to include animal artefacts also ends up including machines
as biological parts. The tactic has been to show that, with minimal elaboration on and
generalization of existing theories of ‘extension’, a theory of extended parthood could be
crafted that relates machines to organisms in a biologically familiar way. This “machine-
organism relationship” is the closest we can get to an MOD. However, if we were looking
for an MOD, this is not it. Social organisms likewise fit the mould of extended parts, so both




8.1 Recapitulation of Results Against the MOD
Is all this a vindication of Cartesian mechanical philosophy? Consider again what Descartes
says in his infamous, and often grossly misinterpreted (Riskin 2016), simile about organisms
and clocks.
I desire, I say, that you should consider that these functions follow in this machine
[an organism] simply from the disposition of the organs and wholly naturally as
the movements of a clock or other automaton follow from the disposition of its
counterweights and wheels.—Descartes, Treaties on Man, p.169, my emphasis
This thesis does not vindicate this view; I do not defend any reduction of the movements
of animal bodies to the dispositions of their organs and make no use of the similar reduc-
tion of the movements of automatons to the disposition of their parts. Perhaps Descartes
reductionism to dispositions is correct, or at least correct insofar as he takes it to exclude any
need for “vegetative or sensitive souls” in the explanation for the movements of the bodies of
organisms.
Moreover, taking the simile alone—made by the comparison “wholly naturally as”—I
think the view is obviously correct, perhaps even a truism given a broad reading of Nature.
Something about Descartes’ phrasing make it seem as though a strong claim is being made,
something like an identity or direct analogy between “organs” and “counterweights and
wheels”, when that is not really at issue. The simile is symmetric, however its reversal does
not seem to arouse the same suspicion. If Descartes had claimed that the movements of a
clock or other automaton follow from the disposition of its counterweights and wheels wholly
naturally as the functions in this [organism] follow from the disposition of the organs, I think
we wouldn’t blink. Other passages support this reading: “all things that are artificial are...
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natural. Thus, for example, when a watch keeps time by means of the wheels of which it
is made, that is no less natural for it than it is for a tree to produce its fruit." (Descartes,
Principles of Philosophy, Part iv, § 203, trans. Hacking 1998). Surely, we believe that
the functions of organisms follow naturally from the dispositions of their organs if they
follow from the dispositions of their organs at all, and we have no suspicion that anything
less or more natural happens in the movements of clocks.1 We do, however, have myriad
other beliefs about what differs between machines and organisms, some of which have been
addressed in this thesis.
Teleology
In chapter 2, on teleology, I addressed the view that organisms and machines differed
in the sort of teleology applicable to them. I began with the view of Nicholson (2013)
that organisms possess intrinsic teleology while machines possess only extrinsic teleology.
Nicholson’s (2013) view of teleology is founded on a variety of neo-Kantianism, where
attributions of teleology are made on the basis of the relationship between the organization
of an entity and its relationship to ends. If the ends of an entity are something other than
itself, then that relationship is extrinsic; if the ends of an entity are only itself, than that
relationship is intrinsic. I then showed that there are many cases where this distinction
failed to apply—where organisms failed to have intrinsic teleology or machines failed to
have extrinsic teleology—and where the typology actually reversed the expected order of
teleological judgements—where an organism had extrinsic teleology and machines had
intrinsic teleology. I did this by showing that there are plausible cases where an organism
had ends directed towards things other than itself and where machines had ends directed
towards themselves.
Autonomy
Another way of seeing the counterexamples presented in chapters 2-3 is as a criticism that
neo-Kantianism was not adopted with sufficient uniformity. Pushed to examine cases of
machines with the right sort of intrinsic organizations, we can ascribe them intrinsic teleology
as well. Chapter 3 in particular addresses what sort of organization is required of organisms,
and shows again that there are counterexamples of both varieties. Maturana and Varela
(1980) and Moreno and Mossio (2015) both, in similar fashion, argue for placing the highest
1Excluding, of course, if we have some uncharitably reductionist reading of “following naturally from the
dispositions of the parts”, where either naturalness or dispositions exclude reasonable forms of emergence. I set
that aside here since it is addressed earlier.
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importance on the concept of autonomous organisation for organisms, and a corresponding
lack of autonomy or allonomy of machines. Chapter 3 then shows that, provided a sufficiently
broad consideration of organization in both, that there are non-autonomous and allonomous
organisms and that there are non-allonomous and autonomous machines. I show this by
analysing autonomy into a number of self-directed capacities, and providing examples of
machines and organisms possessing or lacking these to different extents. We can see this as
a further application of neo-Kantianism to autonomous machines, and its inapplicability to
some allonomous organism).
Processualism
Chapter 4, addressing the topic of processualism and distinctions provided therein, is the
first to move from teleology to ontology. Drawing largely on the work of Dupré (2013-
2018) and Dupré and Nicholson (2018), I identified four key features of interest for process
philosophers in their analysis of organisms: (1) how process is constitutive of organisms, (2)
how stabilization of organisms is hierarchical, (3) the kind of material flux that organisms
undergo, and (4) the role of “top-down” stabilization. In each case direct claims about
distinctions with organisms were provided (by Dupré and/or Nicholson), and I showed in
each case how either, (a) the distinction fails to account for counterexamples of either type
or, (b) the difference with machines was actually unhelpful to the ultimate processualist goal
of analysing organisms as processes.
Above I said that the neo-Kantian philosophers of biology were not Kantian enough; here
I claim that the neo-Heraclitean process ontologists were not Hericlitean enough—when
it comes to machines. On the one hand, acceptance of panta rhei (everything flows) leads
inevitably to the conclusion that machines are a kind of process as well, so any specifically
processual critique of the relationship between machines and organisms must fail—they may
turn out to differ in some way, but not in being processes. On the other hand, Heraclitus’
philosophy was partly processual and partly about the unity of opposites. The often misquoted
river passage—“on those who enter the same rivers, ever different waters flow”—has to be
seen in conjunction with others that unify opposites, such as “the way up and the way down
is one and the same” (Burnet 1908). Even setting aside counterexamples of contemporary
machines with key processual features (Ch.4.3), a neo-Heracliteanism accounting for both
of these philosophies might have said: for machines to operate at a constant, ever different
gears must turn. Insofar as organisms and machines are seeming opposites, Heraclitus would
likely have sought their unification.
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Mechanism
Chapter 5 continues with metaphysical issues, addressing distinctions with machines that
appear within debates about the role of (new) mechanism in analysis of organisms2. One
distinction, advocated similarly by Skillings (2015) and Godfrey-Smith (2016), points to the
“regularity” of mechanisms (and machines) as distinguishing them from the “stochasticity”
of organisms. I argued against this on two fronts: firstly it is a terminological error to
interpret ‘regularity’ as ‘non-stochasticity’— both in the mechanisms of new mechanism
and machines—since ‘regularity’ is a Humean property of connectedness or gaplessness
in explanations (Machamer et al. 2000 p.3, see § 5.1) and not equivalent to predictability.
There are indeed many mechanisms in molecular biology that are stochastic in the sense
Skillings and Godfrey-Smith find in organisms, and moreover there are plenty of machines
that involve parts with stochastic effects.
The second mechanistic distinction—offered as a criticism of new mechanism by Godfrey-
Smith (2016) and taken as an argument for new mechanism by Austin (2016)—is the role of
holism. On Austin’s (2016) view, machines are not appropriate models for the analysis of
organisms because their effects do not arise holistically from their parts (as do the functions
of organisms), while new-mechanisms are appropriate because they do allow for such holistic
phenomena. Here I return to counterexamples of both types: first showing that there are
features of organisms that do not seem to require an holistic analysis, and second showing
that there are holistic machines.
These criticisms and advocations do get at something: we should not neglect stochasticity
and holism from our analysis from the beginning, insofar as these features are important for
explaining what organisms do. I would add to this that we should not neglect these features
of machines, or mechanisms, either. Though I do not think they have been neglected in either
case. What we end up with then in not a distinction between machines and organisms, but
only a mild Cartesian-revisionism: Descartes spoke too soon when we said the following
(immediately after referring to the explanation of movement by counterweights and wheels
above),
...To explain these functions, then, it is not necessary to conceive of any vegeta-
tive or sensitive soul, or any other principle of movement or life. —Descartes,
Treaties on Man, p.169, my emphasis
He should have allowed that machines might have dispositions that are more stochastic or
holistic—more like lottery number generators or evolved microchips than counterweights
2§ 5.1 contains an overview of the philosophy of new-mechanism and § 5.3 examines the older mechanical
philosophy of Descartes
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and wheels—and for the functions of organisms to be explainable by other, comparatively
more statistical, principles of movement.
Evolution
Chapter 6 addressed the role of evolution in defining an MOD. The success of evolutionary
theory has encouraged its application to a number of alternative cases. Its application to
cultural change, technological change and specifically change in artefacts has been well
studied. One common line of argument (Fracchia and Lewontin 2005) is that the theoretical
assumptions required for evolution by natural selection are not appropriate to artefacts
(machines) and another, more moderate, is that the assumptions do apply to artefacts but do
not provide significant theoretical gains (Lewens 2004). In this chapter I begin by arguing
that, even if the theoretical gains of an evolutionary account of technology are few, or only at
high-levels of abstraction, that an evolutionary account explains the change of artefacts in
part is enough to make it an essential component of our account of technology change.
I then rehearse a now standard line, that some artefacts indeed satisfy the Lewontin
conditions for Evolution by Natural Selection (ENS)—phenotypic variation, differential
fitness, and heritability—but that the cases where they interestingly satisfy them are few
(largely restricted to digital cases and laboratory engineering experiments). I then argue that
there are two other accounts of ENS that apply more interestingly to machines, and to more
of them. These are, firstly, a generalization of the extended replicator framework of Sterelny
et al. (1996), and a generalization of the conception of progenote evolution due to Woese
(Woese 1998; Woese and Fox 1997). In sum, the chapter argues that there are three senses or
modes of biological evolution applicable to machines.
Classification / Parthood
Chapter 7 addressed hierarchical biological classification. I take the best theory of biological
classification to be coextensive with a theory of biological parthood, so the chapter focuses
on considerations of parthood in organisms and machines. Specifically, I argue that machines
qua human artefacts are not in a fundamentally different position from animal artefacts, both
being plausibly captured by a modification of Dawkins (1882) theory of extended phenotypes.
Moreover, it is not just that machines are much like the artefacts of organisms, I also argue
that some social organisms themselves are plausibly considered as extended phenotypes. In
service of this unification of diverse cases, I present a theory of extended parthood that is
more general than those appearing in Dawkins (1982) or Sterelny et al. (1996).
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Reconsidering the neo-Kantian underpinnings of chapters 2-3, the teleology and or-
ganization that Kant thought characteristic of organisms, as opposed to machines, was
“grounded...on the internal possibility of the object” (Kant, Judgement XII, my emphasis).
One way to look at the arguments of chapter 7 is another kind of challenge to this idea,
showing that function and organization depend integrally on the extended possibilities of
objects.3 Once we account for organs like webs and nests, the grounding on internal vs.
external possibilities of objects—that was supposed to neatly distinguish machines from
organisms—becomes even more thoroughly blurred.
8.2 How to Think About Machines and Organisms as Kinds
Might we salvage something like an MOD by combining MODs discussed previously? And
how would this be done? Biologists and their philosophers are no strangers to multi-factorial
distinctions where no single property serves to demarcate a fundamental (natural) kind
distinction. One way of going about this, common in science and growing in popularity
among naturalist philosophers, is to produce a space of orthogonal distinctions, then plotting
examples and their apparent counterexamples into the space. If some way of opposing axes
in such a space succeeds in grouping cases into clusters, then we have succeeded in defining
a multi-factorial distinction or “cluster kind”. Moreover, when paired with a notion of some
“homeostatic" process responsible for maintaining clustering, one obtains a homeostatic
property cluster kind (Boyd 2010; Dieguez 2013).
An example of a clustering approach was used in Ch.2 (§ 2.6, Fig.2.1) to oppose two
dimensions of analysis of teleological properties (rational-natural, and intrinsic-extrinsic).
Another now famous example is Godfrey-Smith’s (2009, chapter 3, Figure 3.1) “cube” relat-
ing three variable axes of interest for defining Darwinian populations (fidelity of inheritance,
dependence of fitness on intrinsic differences, and smoothness of the fitness landscape). And
another example is the graph by Queller and Strassmann (2009, Figures 1-3) plotting axes
relevant to social organization (cooperation, conflict), where “organisms" cluster together in
a region of high cooperation and low conflict, while societies cluster in the adjacent quadrant
of high cooperation and high conflict.
For the spectrums of Intrinsic-Extrinsic teleology, Allonomy-Autonomy, and Natural-
Rational history discussed in Ch.2-3, the following cube could be given. Ideally, if these axes
defined an MOD, there would be a distinctly defined cluster of organisms (left-bottom-front)
3Put suggestively, if Darwin was Kant’s “Newton of a blade of glass”, then Dawkins was the Kant of
spider-webs.
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Fig. 8.1 Conceptual cube relating axes of Autonomy (x-axis), History (y-axis) and Teleology
(z-axis).
and a cluster of machines (right-top-left). However the arguments of Ch.2-3 show that,
though there may be clusters, they are not distinct.
An immediate problem arises when more than three axes seem relevant to clustering cases
of interest: a cube only has three axes. If, for example, we wanted to see how Darwinian
populations cluster when accounting for social organization, if we wanted to fit Godfrey-
Smith’s (2009) cube together with Queller and Strassmann’s (2009) graph, we would have
five axes. Granted we can plot a maximum of three at once, we would need ten cubes. What
began as a conceptual aid has quickly turned into a conceptual difficulty of its own. If we
want to think of something like a class or cluster based MOD, given the number of prima
facie relevant dimensions to this analysis, we will need to think outside of the Godfrey-Smith
cube and deploy a visual analogy for the conceptual landscape that is capable of expressing
more multi-variate notions.4 However we choose to represent the relationships between
machines and organisms, the conceptual point remains: it will depend in part on what axes
we find relevant and how we oppose these to one another. This thesis has shown that no
matter one’s choice from among the major competing analyses of machines and organisms,
the clustering obtained will not be sharp and in each case there will be outliers—machines
clustering better with organisms along one axis or another.
4I will not here defend any particular representation, since there are many available—examples include
parallel coordinates where points in an n-dimensional space are depicted as lines with n-possible turning points
(e.g., a radar plot), and techniques of dimensional reduction where similar dimensions are collapsed (e.g.,
principle-component analyses).
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Might the MOD be found at this (higher) level of analysis of kinds of distinctions between
clusters themselves? Are organisms and machines, not different kinds, different clusters,
but different kinds of kinds? One way we might run this high-level MOD is to say that
organisms (perhaps Life generally) is a homeostatic property cluster kind, while machines are
not. That is, that the kindhood of organisms is maintained in homeostasis by some property
or characteristic process applicable to them, while machines are not so maintained. In Ch.3-4,
I argued that, with respect to properties of self-maintenance and bottom-up processes of
physiological homeostasis, there was immense diversity among both organisms and machines.
If it is bottom-up self-maintenance that is at issue, then there is indeed a difference between
the homeostatic kindhood of machines and organisms, but it is a difference of degree—one
sometimes violated—not a difference in kind of kinds.
Another potential homeostatic property is top-down, evolutionary stabilization. Or-
ganisms can be subject to various forces of “stabilizing selection”, and moreover sexual
organisms maintain species boundaries and within-species “stasis”, over the short term at
least, by recombination and species specific mating. Perhaps these properties serve to main-
tain organisms as a homeostatic kind. Nonetheless, in Ch.6-7, I argued that the processes
that maintain technologies at higher levels are in may ways genuine processes of selection,
and this can be seen as a top-down form of stabilization of technologies. Insofar as machines
cluster together well, part of this clustering is explained top-down by forms of technological
stabilizing selection.
In the latter chapters I aimed for unification between our analyses of machines and
organisms, and I conclude with one further speculation on that topic. Perhaps cyborgs in
the widest possible sense—encompassing nesting birds and humans with tools, as hybrids,
consisting of organisms and the artefacts that arise from them—are actually high-probability
outcomes of these high-level processes of, initially biological, evolution. Perhaps the cases
that trouble us most arise more or less “naturally” as a consequence of the evolution of
extended homeostatic properties or processes in organisms. The evolution of capacities
to extend one’s homestatic processes outside the conventional body into artefacts, and the
eventual stabilization of integrated lineages of these extended parts (qua replicators or
phenotypes) does seem to have arisen many times in a great diversity of organisms. If so,




The sceptic of the value of analytic counterexamples might rightly point out that, for many
purposes in science and technology, the sort of refutation of the MOD offered in this thesis
will come to little practical effect. They might point out that we can, nonetheless, often make
judgements about which biological theories apply to contentious cases, and we are most often,
in most familiar cases of organisms and machines, unperplexed by their overall similarities
or differences. Indeed, throughout this thesis I have required and largely presupposed that we
can sometimes identify cases of machines and organisms. To provide the counterexamples, it
was necessary to claim that something is prima facie a machine (or organism) and possessed
some property that some MOD said it ought not to possess. Moreover, at some points in
this thesis it was necessary to make claims, in full seriousness, that would, in commonsense
discussion of machines and organisms, probably sound like sarcasm (“clocks are not much
like ribosomes”, p.106). To the claim that an unsophisticated distinction can often suffice, I
can only wholeheartedly agree. This thesis does not defend any broad scope indiscernibility
of machines and organisms, it is not postmodern boundary blurring run amok. I have only
argued that the MODs used by philosophers of biology did not do the analytic work sought
of them, and they often did not do much more work than would be done simply by noting
these more commonsense similarities and differences between machines and organisms.
I have not argued against all of the MODs that there could be, nor all that there are, but
I have argued against all of the MODs that appear in contemporary philosophy of biology.
I have shown how each MOD fails to account for our knowledge of present biological and
technological diversity. In each case, I present counterexamples to the distinctions between
machines and organisms that are offered, and sometimes show how these examples affect the
conclusions that were supposed to be drawn from the MOD. In each case I also argue that the
diversity spanning between machines and organisms should more properly be considered as
a spectrum, full of intermediate cases and occasionally reversals of the expected relationship
between machines and organisms. Each MOD offered by contemporary philosophers gets at
something interesting and comes with far-ranging conclusions about organisms and machines;
none establishes a fundamental distinction.
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